Category Archives: Jimmy Carter

Now The Shah’s Children Are a Part of Iran’s Tragedy by Gregory Hilton

President Jimmy Carter and the First Lady are shown with the Shah of Iran and his family at the Niavaran Palace in Tehran on New Year's Eve, 12/31/1977.

The two young children in this photo have both committed suicide. Princess Laila died in 2001 and the death of her brother, Prince Ali Reza, was revealed today.
In his televised toast that night, Carter said “Under the Shah’s brilliant leadership, Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more.” This was their last meeting. Continue reading

Trivia Questions About the First Ladies by Gregory Hilton

1) Which brilliant First Lady used her own money to send 46 disadvantaged young people to college? The press never knew of her generosity and neither did her husband. He only discovered what she had done after her death. Continue reading

April 25, 1980 – 30th Anniversary of Desert One, Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran Fails by Gregory Hilton

It was 30 years ago today that eight U.S. servicemen died at the Desert One site south of Tehran, Iran. Their bodies had to be left behind, and at the time it was described as the worst humiliation the U.S. had ever suffered. Continue reading

A Liberal Democratic Senator Every Conservative Republican Should Admire by Gregory Hilton

Yesterday’s big news was about a possible upset in the Massachusetts special election to fill Ted Kennedy’s vacancy. A political earthquake similar to this happened before. Democrats won the 1957 special election to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI). The GOP candidate appeared to have many advantages going into the election. He was undefeated former Gov. Walter J. Kohler (1950-1956) who had a high approval rating. The Democrats nominated William Proxmire who had only served one term in the state legislature (1950-1952), and had lost statewide campaigns in 1952, 1954 and 1956.
Kohler significantly outspent Proxmire, but the deepening economic recession was a big advantage for the Democrat. Proxmire was skilled at obtaining free publicity and was even able to use previous defeats to his advantage. The Democratic candidate said: “My opponent doesn’t know what it is to lose. I do. And I’ll welcome the support of voters who do too. I’ll take the losers. I’ll take the debtors. I’ll take those who’ve lost in love, or baseball, or in business. I’ll take the Milwaukee Braves.”
Proxmire graduated from Yale University in 1938, and enlisted as an Army private in the days after Pearl Harbor. He was discharged in1946 as a first lieutenant. He earned his MBA from Harvard two years later and stayed on campus to complete a degree in public administration.
The Proxmire seat remains in Democratic hands today, but unfortunately few members of his party are similar to the late Wisconsin Senator.
He served from 1957 to 1988, and was the original Porkbuster. He was known for his devotion to curbing governmental waste and mismanagement, and beginning in 1975 he issued a monthly Golden Fleece Award. The award was bestowed on the most “wasteful, ridiculous or ironic use of the taxpayers’ money.” He also issued merit awards for successful actions of government agencies which resulted in increased efficiency. A few examples of Golden Fleece Awards are:
* The National Science Foundation for spending $84,000 to learn why people fall in love. Proxmire said such a study was better left to “poets and mystics, to Irving Berlin, to thousands of high school and college bull sessions.”
* The National Institute for Mental Health which spent $97,000 to study what happened in houses of prostitution. The researchers said they made repeated visits in the interests of accuracy.
* The Federal Aviation Administration for spending $57,800 on a study of the physical measurements of 432 airline stewardesses, paying special attention to the “length of the buttocks” and how their knees were arranged when they were seated.
* The Justice Department for spending $27,000 to determine why prisoners wanted to get out of jail.
* The Department of Defense for spending $3,000 to determine if people in the military should carry umbrellas in the rain. He also brought attention to the $7,000 coffeepot, the $400 hammer and the $792 doormat.
* The Department of Agriculture for spending $100,000 to study whether fish that had consumed tequila were more belligerent than fish that had stuck with gin.
Another Proxmire campaign was to cut back on the use of government limousines. In testimony before the House Committee on Government Operations he said “The limousine is the ultimate ego trip, the supreme sign of success. It shouts: “Hey, this guy is really and truly Mr. Big.”
President Jimmy Carter took his advice and used a Town Car instead of a limousine. Carter also accepted Proxmire’s recommendation and surprised everyone by walking down Pennsylvania Avenue after his Inauguration.
Proxmire opposed new federal spending even when it was for his state. He deleted money for a lake improvement project in LaFarge by saying it was wasteful. The lake then became a mudhole, and a sign was erected calling it Lake Proxmire. Many of the financial problems which are being encountered by states and cities today were pointed out by Proxmire decades ago. This was especially true when he served as Chairman of the Banking Committee when it considered the $2.3 billion federal loan guarantee to New York City (which was then on the brink of bankruptcy).
Proxmire publicly criticized Mayor Beame and the city as profligate, and excoriated the City Council for seeking a 50 percent pay raise during a financial crisis. More importantly, he also said municipal workers made too much money and their pensions benefits should be revised because they were far better than the private sector. Few Democratic lawmakers would say that today.
Proxmire was a liberal and his foreign policy and national security views were misguided. His opposition to the C-5A transport, the Patriot missile, the F-16 and the F-18 fighter jets were not wise. Nevertheless, he deserves tremendous credit for efforts to improve governmental management.
Government waste, excessive spending and budget deficits were the prime targets of his books; “Report from the Wasteland” (1970), “Uncle Sam: The Last of the Bigtime Spenders,” (1972), and “The Fleecing of America” (1980). In each of his last two Senate campaigns, Proxmire refused to take any contributions and spent less than $200 out of his own pocket.
Proxmire retired from the Senate in 1988 after 32 years of service. He said, “I have spent my career trying to get Congressmen to spend the people’s money as if it were their own. But I have failed.” He served as Honorary Chair of the Advisory Board of Taxpayers for Common Sense. Suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, Proxmire died on December 15, 2005 after spending four years in a Maryland nursing home.
His name continues to be heard in Wisconsin politics. Former Rep. Mark W. Neumann (R-WI) is now running for Governor. Similar to Proxmire, Neumann frustrated many of his colleagues with his pledge not to vote for any bill which increased the deficit. Neumann believes tax-cutting is not enough, and as a lawmaker he advocated paying down the accumulated national debt and reducing the size of government. His campaign is featuring this 1995 letter the then Congressman received from Proxmire:
“Congratulations on your courage and conviction… I have rarely been so impressed by any Member of Congress as I was by your ‘flat-out act of conscience.’ Yours was truly a class act. Wisconsin should be very proud of you.”
PHOTO: Triumphant Democrats march to the State Capitol in Madison, Wisconsin on August 27, 1957 as three time loser William Proxmire easily wins the special election caused by the death of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI). Proxmire’s victory sent shock waves through the political world and a year later Democrats would win an unprecedented 13 seats in the U.S. Senate and catapult into the lead for the 1960 presidential election. Democrats would also win both 1959 Senate elections in the new state of Alaska, and the results were split in the new state of Hawaii. The results were an aggregate gain of 16 seats for the Democrats and a party balance of 65-35. Democrats gained three open seats in California, Indiana, and New Jersey, and defeated ten Republican incumbents: William C. Revercomb (WV), John D. Hoblitzell, Jr. (WV), John W. Bricker (OH), Edward Thye (MN), William A. Purtell (CT), Frederick G. Payne (ME), Charles E. Potter (MI), Arthur V. Watkins (UT), Frank A. Barrett (WY) and George W. Malone (NV).

Robert Novak’s Last Interview by Gregory Hilton

Bob Novak died today. He was against the Iraq war and I obviously did not share his opinions regarding the Middle East, but he was an expert on U.S. politics. His column “Evans and Novak” was well regarded for original reporting, but critics often called it “Errors and No Facts!” Continue reading

Back to the Cold War: Did the U.S. Push Castro and Ortega into the arms of the Soviet Union by Gregory Hilton

Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega in Managua in 1985.

Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega in Managua in 1985.

Back to the Cold War: Did the U.S. Push Castro and Ortega into the arms of the Soviet Union by Gregory Hilton–A myth continues to circulate in leftist circles that the United States pushed both Cuba and Nicaragua into the arms of the Soviet Union. Sandinista supporters claim this happened because of embargoes and the cut off of medical, humanitarian and food aid.
The problem with the myth is that it conflicts with public statements of Castro and the Sandinista leaders. The FSLN was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, who always described himself as a Communist. In discussing the origins of the FSLN, Fonseca said it was “a successor to the Bolshevik Revolution. . . the ideals of Lenin are the guiding star in the struggle in which the revolutionaries in Nicaragua are waging.”
Human rights was the focal point of President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, and he made no secret of his opposition to the Somoza government. He clearly wanted the Nicaraguan opposition to be successful, and Carter imposed a ban on arms sales to Nicaragua during his first week in office. This was later over turned by the U.S. Congress, but President Carter was able to accomplish it through an executive order. In the FY 1979 budget submitted by the Carter Administration, Nicaragua would be listed as the only nation denied the right to purchase military equipment.
The U.S. government also vetoed funding for Nicaragua from the World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank. Nicaragua was entitled to a $20 million line of credit at the IMF, but American opposition stopped it. The biggest blow was denying Somoza money from coffee and beef exports. The United States was able to work with the OAS to stop all cargo ships from entering Nicaraguan waters.
If the promises made by the FSLN during the civil war had been implemented it would have been a clear victory for Carter’s human rights campaign. Carter needed a success for his 1980 re-election where he was vulnerable on foreign policy issues after the seizure of hostages in Iran, the failure of SALT II and the setbacks to detente because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The U.S. embargo on Cuba is still in effect, but few nations have adhered to our action, and today America is the only country to maintain the embargo. Cuba can trade with everyone else. Fidel Castro has never said we pushed him away. He maintains that he was a communist going back to 1954. The USSR and Chairman Mao are gone, eastern Europe is no longer behind the Iron Curtain, Vietnam has adopted a free market, but Castro has not changed his ideology.
The situation in Nicaragua is equally clear and the FSLN was supported by the USSR well before they achieved power. The United States provided funding during the Somoza era to opposition labor unions and newspapers. America was also an active participant in the Nicaraguan power transfer process, including negotiations with the FSLN government in exile when they were based in neighboring Costa Rica.
America did stop arms shipments to Somoza, but the U.S. did not stop arms shipments to the FSLN from Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama or Venezuela. Venezuela was providing the funding, Soviet bloc equipment was sent through Cuba and transshipped on flights to Panama and later to the FSLN bases in Costa Rica.
The civil war began in September of 1978 but by the summer of 1979 the Somoza ammunition stockpile was almost depleted. The major reason Somoza’s National Guard stopped fighting was because they ran out of ammunition. An Israeli ship filled with 50 caliber ammunition and mortars was close to the coast of Nicaragua in June when the Carter Administration was able to cancel the order and the ship turned around. Somoza later wrote “This one ship could have easily turned the tide of the war.”
Nicaragua had not made a significant purchase of modern military equipment since 1957, and the arms used by the FSLN were far superior to Somoza’s National Guard. The Somoza government had a very small air force and navy, and their army lacked anti-tank and anti-personnnel grenades.
The four Somoza tanks were out dated and knocked out immediately by Chinese made RPG rockets. The same rockets caused havoc at National Guard installations. The sentries stationed at check points throughout Managua held automatic weapons but they were without ammunition. The FSLN also made effective use of French bazookas, Belgian mortars and hand grenades.
The Organization of American States passed a resolution on June 23, 1979 which demanded Somoza’s resignation. After that, any arms sale was impossible, and it would not have mattered because the government no longer had significant dollar reserves. No one would accept the Nicaraguan currency and payment had to be made in dollars.
With the advance approval of the FSLN, the US allowed General Somoza and members of his government to seek exile in Miami. On the afternoon of his arrival in Miami, Somoza was told by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher that he would have to leave the U.S. because his supporters in Managua were not cooperating. Somoza left after two days and was assassinated in Paraguay the next year.
The Carter Administration immediately recognized the new FSLN government and provided them with $10.5 million in aid which originally had been intended for Somoza before it was frozen. This was followed by emergency assistance of $8.8 million, $75 million in foreign aid and 100,000 tons of food in the first two years. Daniel Ortega was invited to the White House, and America had the power to block World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank assistance to the FSLN, but this did not happen.
These actions were taken despite the fact that the FSLN repeatedly lied to American negotiators. The only condition requested by the Carter Administration was a pledge from the FSLN to stop arms transfers to the FMLN in El Salvador. This did not happen and when the arms shipments increased many Democrats in the U.S. Congress urged a cut off in further aid to the Sandinista government.
President Carter took this step 12 days before he left office, and President Ronald Reagan froze all aid to Nicaragua two days after his Inauguration. Reagan’s action was reported in the news media as a continuation of Carter’s policy.
Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO), the current Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has said “True to its revolutionary beliefs, the Sandinista leadership was more interested in promoting revolution in Central America than in cultivating better relations with the United States. . . With close ties to Fidel Castro, the Sandinista leaders went about the task of setting up a regime modeled on that of their mentor. They invoked press censorship, established a powerful secret police, mounted systematic attacks on the church, and built up a large military force.
“In a little over a year in power the Sandinista popular army was the largest in Central America, having grown from 5,000 to at least 24,000 men. All this, it should be noted, came about prior to the Contra insurgency. In fact it was these policies that contributed to the rise of an armed resistance movement, soon to be known as the Contras. ”
In May 1983, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence confirmed this point. It noted that: “A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other Communist countries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assistance of the Sandinistas. . . . The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of which are located in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control, and for the logistics to conduct their financial, material, and propaganda activities.”
In August of 1981, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders went to Managua to meet with the Junta. He promised a very generous aid package and no support for any opposition groups in return for one promise — a complete halt in arms shipments to the FMLN which was actively making progress in its effort to overthrow El Salvador’s government.
The American offer was rejected. Sergio Ramirez of the Junta told Enders: “Today we have revolutionary Nicaragua and revolutionary Cuba. Tomorrow we will have revolutionary Salvador.” Four months later the first $20 million in funding was approved for the Contras. Their first assignment was to stop arms shipments into El Salvador, and this was not a covert program.
In announcing it Reagan said: “Our purpose is to prevent the flow of arms [from Nicaragua] to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica.”
The U.S. Congress passed the Boland Amendment in May of 1985 which barred funding to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The legislation was overturned in July of 1986 when Congress approved. $100 million in lethal and nonlethal assistance for the Nicaraguan resistance. Military success on the ground for the Contras was undermined by political scandal in Washington. In November 1986 the Iran-Contra affair broke. All efforts by the administration to build public support for its policy toward Nicaragua came to a halt. The momentum for continued military assistance to the resistance fighters was lost. This was confirmed in early February 1988 when by a vote of 219-211 the House of Representatives voted against further military assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance.
If the military pressure of the Nicaraguan resistance helped force the ruling Sandinista regime to agree to hold elections, equally significant was the economic embargo the United States placed upon Nicaragua in May 1985. Those sanctions on top of earlier Sandinista mismanagement of the economy took a heavy toll. By 1989, Nicaragua had been brought to economic disaster with widespread poverty, widespread shortages of consumer goods, an unemployment rate of more than 25 percent, and an inflation rate of 36,000 percent, a world record.
It was obvious the Sandinista revolution had never benefited the poor. In fact, the opposite is true–the revolution benefited the ruling elite at the expense of everyone else in the country. The experience of Nicaraguans replicated the experience of the peoples of Eastern Europe who suffered under 40 years of Communist misrule. The people of Nicaragua knew who had made them poor by wasting resources on unproductive state enterprises in addition to the mansions and luxury automobiles for the commandantes.

A Return to Nicaragua and the 1980s ‘Triumph of the People’: Is This Latin America’s Future? by Gregory Hilton

Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega had a Major Impact on U.S. Politics in the 1980s.

Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega had a Major Impact on U.S. Politics in the 1980s.

A Return to Nicaragua and the 1980s ‘Triumph of the People’: Is This Latin America’s Future? by Gregory Hilton–The foreign policy debate of the 1980’s was often dominated by dramatic events in Nicaragua. This small Central American nation is now rarely in the global spot light, and the problems confronting it are no longer unique. Step by step Nicaragua now appears to be headed for a left wing dictatorship, and it continues to reject free market solutions.
The difference is that Nicaragua is no longer alone. In various forms capitalism is also under attack in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. They are all pursuing a mixture of socialism combined with a free market, and their recessions are deepening as export opportunities evaporate. The economic future of these Latin American nations, similar to the rest of the world, is very uncertain.
Nicaragua is an excellent example of what could happen to all of them, but July 19th of this year could well go unnoticed. The date marks the 30th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution. It was then that the flag of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was raised for the first time in Managua, where it would remain for next 11 years.
The Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution on June 23rd asking General Anastasio Somoza, Jr., to leave office. He complied with the resolution on July 17th, and along with high ranking officers in his National Guard, he fled to Miami. Over 50,000 people celebrated in the streets of Managua two days later as Nicaraguan Revolution Day was declared on July 19th. The “New York Times” compared the scene to January 1, 1959 in Havana when Fidel Castro came to power.
The Somoza era had finally come to an end, but no one was quite sure what was beginning. Three members of the Somoza family had ruled Nicaragua for almost 40 years prior to their 1979 downfall. The Somoza’s were firm allies of the United States, and their governments consistently voted with America in the United Nations.
Two days after the Pearl Harbor attack which resulted in America’s entry into World War II, Nicaragua declared war on Germany, Japan and Italy, and broke its diplomatic relations with Vichy France. Nicaragua was the first country to ratify the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba set off from Nicaragua in the presence of the clan’s last leader, General Somoza. As Franklin Roosevelt said of his father, “He’s an SOB, but he’s our SOB!”
The bright-eyed revolutionary days were in the summer and fall of 1979. Sandinista leaders were then viewed as young, romantic and idealistic. Allies from around the world soon joined them. Numerous participants from the Paris student uprisings and strikes of 1968 arrived in Managua, along with leaders of “progressive” political parties. They promised to perfect the socialist model which Stalin and Mao had betrayed.
In the late 1970s and early ‘80s the news media often portrayed Sandinista members as crusading heroes for the common good. The euphoria of that distant summer came after thousands were killed in a civil war, and the nation had endured four decades of corruption and abuses.
A popular book was “Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua,” and there was a widespread belief that all of Central America would soon be transformed. The U.S. debate over Nicaragua would continue for almost a decade and partisanship on both sides was intense.
Many of the Sandinista enthusiasts obviously had good intentions. They had tears of joy at the outset, and a number of them certainly meant well in traveling to Managua for development work. Their outlook was similar to those who cheered the downfall of the Shah of Iran earlier that year, or the Battista regime in the Cuba of 1958.
They wanted to make a difference, and never dreamed the alternative could be much worse. They may have been naïve but today a number of them are among the most effective critics of the Sandinista regime (see below). The supporters of the FSLN, Fidel Castro and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, all believed the claims of their heroes. They were blatantly misled, but that is not their fault.
On the other hand, numerous supporters of General Somoza, the Shah or Fulgencio Battista often overlooked valid accusations of corruption and human rights abuses. They were interested in those nations only when they entered the American political fray.
Many vehement backers of the Nicaraguan Contra’s in the 1980s completely abandoned that nation when their candidate, the anti-communist Violeta Chamorro, won the 1990 election. U.S. conservatives were primarily interested in a Sandinista defeat, and when it was secured at the ballot box, the plight of the Nicaraguans was soon forgotten.
In some respects the Nicaragua debate on Capitol Hill was not unusual. In many ideological battles there is a triumph of passion over reason, and I have often found both sides to be intolerant of dissent. Now that 30 years has elapsed, it is easier to view the Nicaraguan revolution in perspective.
Without General Somoza the Sandinista movement would never have achieved prominence. Anastasio Somoza, Jr., served as President from 1967 until 1972, and was re-elected to a second term in 1974. He was a West Point graduate and practically all of his education had been in the United States. His father, General Anastasio Somoza, Sr., was assassinated while serving as President in 1956.
His brother Luis also served as President from 1956 until 1963. Somoza, Jr., had to step down in 1972 because of a Constitutional requirement which only allowed one term. This did not stop him because he still was running things behind the scenes as head of the National Guard.
No one can deny the corruption following the 1972 earthquake which killed over 10,000 people in Managua and left 250,000 homeless. Over 90% of the homes in Managua were destroyed. Foreign aid flooded into Nicaragua but a significant amount never reached the intended recipients. It was diverted by Somoza and members of his National Guard.
General Somoza Enters the National Assembly for the Last Time in 1978.

General Somoza Enters the National Assembly for the Last Time in 1978.

Leaders of Somoza’s own Liberal Party did not want him to run for re-election in 1974 because they knew of past mistakes and the continuation of his family’s rule would not be popular. He defied them and was able to strong arm his way back into power.
Somoza and his cronies lived in luxurious mansions and many of his friends received lucrative contracts. In a devastating interview with the CBS program “60 Minutes,” Dan Rather pointed out that virtually every government contract in Nicaragua was with a vendor owned by Somoza. An accounting of Somoza’s property after the revolution included 168 factories, which represented 25% of the nation’s industrial plant capacity with a value in excess of $200 million.
The General’s second term was controversial from the start. He had to declare martial law in the first year and opposition newspapers were censored. The greatest sin of all was the 1978 assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily “La Prensa.” The newspaper was censored at times but it was still full of anti-Somoza articles on a daily basis. Critics of General Somoza were also free to travel at home and abroad, and the Catholic Jesuits and Maryknoll priests and nuns became a focal point for anti-Somoza activity.
According to the vehemently anti-Somoza Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the highest number of “human rights violations” during the Somaza era was 350 in 1997. No abuse can be excused, but the number of cases does seem small to what would occur in the 1980s. The 1978 U.S. State Department “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” said “The number of reported abuses and their severity have decreased markedly over the past year,” in Nicaragua. The report also noted that a number of people reported by WOLA as having “disappeared” were actually alive.
Despite the corruption there were also positive aspects to the Somoza era. The General made money, but so did the people. Nicaragua experienced consistent economic growth prior to the imposition of marital law in 1975. The growth rate was especially high during the 1960s and early 1970s, largely as a result of industrialization.
The nation became the most developed in Central America despite its political instability. This economic success story was the envy of its neighbors. Due to its stable and high growth economy, foreign investments grew, primarily from U.S. companies such as Citigroup, Sears, Westinghouse and Coca Cola.
Upon assuming power the Sandinista pledge to restore democracy was forgotten, and a five member Junta was created. Similar pledges regarding a free market, free speech and free association were also thrown out the window.
The most visible Junta member was 35 year old Daniel Ortega, the dashing young revolutionary who electrified leftists around the world. Ortega had been jailed by Somoza and was freed in 1974 after the FSLN held members of the Somoza family hostage at a Christmas Party. The original members also included Pedro Chamorro’s widow, Violeta, and businessman Alfonso Robelo. They both resigned after the first year.
Robelo feared for his safety and went into exile. Two years later he would meet with President Ronald Reagan and urge him to provide funding to remove the FSLN. Mrs. Chamorro said she was manipulated by the Junta, and claimed to be shocked by its “secret socialist agenda.” In fairness to the FSLN, it was not a well kept secret. She returned to the “La Prensa” newspaper which at times had been censored by Somoza. The FSLN went a step further, they simply closed it down in 1986. For a number of years freedom of the press vanished.
Sergio Ramirez was a Junta member who served as Vice President under Ortega from 1985 to 1990. When Ortega was defeated, Ramirez became head of the Sandinista bloc in the National Assembly. Ramirez later split with the Sandinista Party and expressed regret over some of his actions in the 1980s. He founded a new political party in 1995, the Sandinista Renovation Movement, but the FSLN will not it to appear on the ballot.
One of the most high profile Sandinista leaders was Eden Pastora. His father was assassinated by the Somoza regime, and he became the legendary “Comandante Zero” who masterminded the capture of the Nicaraguan Congress in 1975. He later led the Southern Front during the final offensive in 1979. Pastora left the FSLN when they moved into the same mansions which had previously been owned by Somoza and his cronies.
Another key member of the revolution was Father Ernesto Cardenal, who did much to spread the Sandinista mystique around the globe. He was one of the world’s most famous liberation theologians. From 1979 to 1987 he served as Nicaragua’s first Minister of Culture.
Cardenal left the FSLN in 1994, protesting the authoritarian direction of the party. He is now 83 years old but is being prosecuted by the current Sandinista government because he had the temerity to call President Daniel Ortega a “thief” who runs “a monarchy made up of a few families in alliance with the old Somoza interests.”
Fernando Aguero, M.D., was the opposition candidate to Somoza in 1967, and his body guard at the time was Eden Pastora. He received international attention with his documentation of Somoza’s corruption, and was later a leader in the broad opposition front who gave money to the FSLN. It did not help him. All of his property was confiscated after the revolution.
Upon assuming power in 1979, the Sandinista Party did an excellent job of bringing the economy to a grinding halt. The Sandinista platform called for “the equalization of wealth.” They began almost immediately by nationalizing 52% of the land, and this one action alone gave great impetus to the formation of the opposition Contra’s. There had been over 200,000 private property owners in Nicaragua and the vast majority lost their property.
Under Somoza farm land was free to any peasant who would clear it. The FSLN also nationalized sugar, agricultural cooperatives, and many businesses. All banks were nationalized and they refused to recognize or repay any debt from the Somoza era.
Foreign investors fled along with the upper middle class. The money which had been transferred out of the country by the middle class when the war began did not return.
By 1981, the state accounted for more than 30% of the industry of Nicaragua. The government also took control with so-called ‘wildcat nationalizations.’ This action provided the FSLN with control of 20% of the cotton industry, 50% of the tobacco industry, and 60% of the ‘staple cereal’ industry.
They had promised international nonalignment but quickly became a Soviet client state. Even before coming to power the Sandinista movement received substantial funding from the Soviet Union as well as military equipment which was passed through Cuba. The self described Marxist/Leninist FMLN which was trying to overthrow the elected government in neighboring El Salvador benefited greatly from the Sandinista victory.
The best legacy of the FSLN in this era was the campaign to raise literacy rates. The goal was admirable, but it was unfortunately marred because so much of the effort was devoted to propaganda and attempting to win over rural areas. They also deserve praise for finally agreeing to free elections in 1990. This controversial decision occurred for several reasons.
First, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Nicaragua without adequate outside funding. International pressure was mounting, and many countries were imposing heavy economic sanctions on Nicaragua. Second, the contra war, going on for more than a decade, was getting unbearable to Nicaraguans, who wanted nothing but peace, and a chance to succeed in global markets.
Ortega lost but deserves credit for accepting the result with out violence. The victor was Violeta Chamorro of the National Union of Opposition (UNO) who had previously been part of the Junta. Just before leaving office in 1990, Ortega and his colleagues carried out a land grab in which the FSLN looted the government and the private sector before handing over power. The FSLN expropriated private property worth tens of millions of dollars on the slimmest of pretexts, including more than 100,000 businesses, homes, and farms. They stole far more than Somoza had acquired.
Mrs. Chamorro’s government initially received over $500 million in aid from the United States, but the assistance did not last long. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who had championed the Contra’s during the 1980’s, was successful in cutting off aid to Mrs. Chamorro in 1992.
The nation had experienced 12 years of economic free-fall under the Sandinista regime and during the civil war. When the FSLN left in 1990, three successive Liberal Party administrations focused on free market reform as the path to recovery. During this 16-year period, characterized by steady GDP growth, the government made dramatic economic progress. It privatized more than 350 state enterprises, reduced inflation from 33,500 percent in 1988 to 9.45 percent in 2006, and cut the foreign debt by more than half. In 2006, the economy expanded by 3.7 percent as GDP reached $5.3 billion.
Ortega was defeated in two comeback attempts in 1996 and 2001. He patiently finagled his return by scheming with President Arnoldo Alemán, who had defeated him in 1996. Alemán was sentenced to a 20-year prison term in 2003 for embezzling over $100 million while in office from 1997 to 2002.
He and Ortega negotiated the infamous “El Pacto,” in which the two former enemies shared power by changing the constitution to give the Sandinista Party almost an equal number of seats on the Supreme Court, the Comptroller’s Office and in the Federal Electoral Council. Consequently, when Alemán was sentenced to prison, Ortega used his influence over the country’s courts to have the obese and ailing Alemán released from prison to serve his sentence at home.
Sandinistas at the walls of the Esteli National Guard headquarters in 1979. Copyright Susan Meiselas

Sandinistas at the walls of the Esteli National Guard headquarters in 1979. Copyright Susan Meiselas

After 16 years in political exile Ortega regained the presidency in 2006. Many believe Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez supplied the Sandinista movement with as much as $50 million during the campaign.
Ortega said he was no longer a Marxist, and supported the CAFTA Treaty with the United States. He also pledged to respect private banking laws and land ownership, and dramatically changed his relationship with the Catholic Church. For the first time he opposed abortion and at the beginning of the campaign he married his wife of 30 years in a Catholic ceremony.
Ortega received 38% of the vote in a five candidate field in 2006 but this was sufficient because of “El Pacto.” The 1999 Ortega-Alemán deal changed the constitution and lowered the minimum level of popular support a candidate needed to win presidential elections from 40 percent of the vote to 35 percent. The two conservative candidates received a combined 54% of the vote, but their split ensured Ortega’s triumph.
In addition to having a strong alliance with Venezuela and Cuba, Ortega also pursued closer ties with Iran, even honoring Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with two of Nicaragua’s most prestigious awards, the Liberty Medal and the Rubén Darío Medal. He continues to openly court Russia, in part to show loyalty to a former political patron—Nicaragua is the only country besides Russia to recognize the rebellious provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as “sister republics.”
The abuses of the Somoza regime can never be excused but the situation today is ironically worse. In 2008, Ortega again reverted to the tactics of a bygone era by trying to impose his will on a political system that in 1990 rejected his autocratic tendencies. Two significant parties were arbitrarily denied the right to participate in the most recent election.
By eliminating his challengers, leaving only the FSLN and the Liberal Party to compete, Ortega has laid the foundation for his continued electoral victory and a greater chance to change the constitution to allow for reelection. This move further consolidates his power to deepen his control over other institutions, including the army, the police, and the judiciary.
Ortega has also been promoting “Citizens Power” as a solution to Nicaragua’s endemic poverty. These Citizens Power Councils are neighborhood committees. They are controlled by the Sandinista party, and they were established despite a vote against the plan by the National Assembly.
Some of the president’s opponents charge that the Citizens Power Councils are nothing more than patronage mills, channeling government largess to supporters of the party. Opposition leaders complain the councils smack of similar party-controlled organs in totalitarian governments like Cuba’s, where local committees of party loyalists not only influence who gets government benefits but also spy on political opponents.
Another major problem is energy. Global fuel prices have been reduced considerable but Nicaragua continues to have a significant problem. It is a problem the nation never experienced before. Before the 1979 revolution, more than 70 percent of Nicaragua’s energy was hydroelectric. Today, thanks to a lack of state planning by the last four governments from the right, left, and center of the political spectrum, the trend is going the other way fast.
Today Nicaragua is Central America’s poorest country—and the second poorest in Latin America, behind only Haiti. The past 30 years has seen massive emigration rates and equally massive dependence on remittances and foreign aid. The income inequality is far worse than it was under Somoza.
In addition, 27% of the people are malnourished, which quadruples the rate during the Somoza era. The widespread poverty prevents children from attending primary school, and these youngsters swell the ranks of child workers – who now number more than 230,000.
The average lower-income family of six has to work more than twice as many hours each month to maintain its 1979 standard of living. Between 1981 and 1992, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased by roughly half, dropping to a dismal $425.

Key Lessons of the Iran Hostage Crisis


On November 4, 1979, the United States faced one of the most serious crises in modern history. Almost 100 of its diplomats were taken hostage in Iran, a country that had become bitterly hostile and unpredictable. Caught totally off-guard, the U.S. was paralyzed, unable to negotiate or take action. Four years later, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. marines were killed in a terrorist bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. The marines were part of a multi-national force demonstrating U.S. presence while negotiations continued for a withdrawal of hostile forces from the country.

The memories of these two days, representing two of the largest U.S. foreign policy failures in recent times, appear to have faded in the minds of President Clinton’s foreign policy team. The intent here is to call them back into much clearer focus. A recent shift in the purpose of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, resulting in the loss of U.S. lives, and the looming prospect of another intervention in Bosnia, have created new memories, much like those in 1979 and 1983.

These events, manifestations of Clinton’s ‘enlargement’ doctrine and reliance upon U.N. multilateralism, have led to a renewed questioning of the post-Cold War shape of U.S. foreign policy, especially whether it represent U.S. national interests. My purpose, therefore, is to demonstrate that important lessons from the U.S. experiences in Iran and Lebanon should serve as cautions for the Clinton Administration as it continues to shape and implement a foreign policy doctrine.




Before introducing my model of analysis, I will first provide selective reviews of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1960, then the events surrounding the two Multi National Forces missions to Lebanon. These reviews are in no way comprehensive, detailed histories; my primary objective is not to offer a new theory on why they happened, who should be blamed, and how they could have been avoided, but to demonstrate that the situations in 1979 and 1983 have viable relevance to U.S. foreign policy in 1993 and beyond.

Against this background, I will then establish my framework of analysis, what I call the “triangular base” model, for linking the lessons of Iran and Lebanon to Somalia and future U.S. intervention possibilities. I will explain this base in detail at that point.

In anticipating critical evaluations of my model, I then provide a theoretical background that might offer insight into why the above foreign policy experiences are linked, despite the different circumstances surrounding each nation, and why U.S. policies have taken the shape they did.


Part One:

Iran and the U.S. 1960-1980


As mentioned above, my purpose is not to give a comprehensive review of U.S.-Iranian relations, but to highlight aspects of this relationship that had direct effects on U.S., and Iranian, policy actions.

From the end of World War II to the advent of the 1960’s, the status of relations between Iran and the U.S had been relatively unchallenged. With Iran, the U.S. had found a strategic ally in the vital Persian Gulf region, and committed its support to the regime of Iran’s Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Shananshah Aryamehr. Under the Shah, Iran was beginning to warm to its role of regional power, and enjoyed strong U.S. support against possible Soviet aggression.

Between 1946 and 1979, Iran under the Shah was transformed from a largely agriculture-based economy to a modern society, involving massive changes in the traditional social, economic, and political orders.

The Shah accomplished this mainly through a package of reforms he called the “White Revolution.” His launching of such an ambitious reform process coincided with the Kennedy administration’s growing dissatisfaction with Iran’s economic progress. Economic development, as opposed to military strength, became the stress of long-term U.S. policy toward Iran. Land reform to the U.S. was critical, a view shared by the Shah as well. The other major initiatives of the White Revolution included profit-sharing for workers, the nationalization of forests and pastures, the sale of state-owned factories, the enfranchisement of women, and the creation of a literacy corps.(1)

The positive initial effects of the White Revolution pleased U.S. officials, validating their analysis of Iran’s economic problems. Here I must note that it is well beyond my means to chart in detail the economic course Iran took as a result of the Shah’s reforms, but some general trends are instructive in demonstrating the effects of reform and explosive economic growth for the course of Iranian affairs.

During this period, especially from 1960 to 1978, the shah’s regime successfully achieved most of its economic, social, and military objectives. World Bank data shows that in this period Iran’s annual real growth rate, 9.6 percent, almost doubled the average of countries in its category, and was higher than any other group of countries in the world. Iran registered positive growth for fourteen straight years until 1977, held unemployment to relatively low levels, pushed industrialization using oil revenues and not at the expense of agriculture, and made great strides in public health, education, and illiteracy. These economic benefits, however, hid long-term political and cultural consequences that would lead eventually to revolutionary unrest in many classes.

White Revolution policies greatly expanded the autonomous capabilities of the Iranian state, and allowed the Shah to portray himself as progressive. Moreover, increased autonomy allowed the Shah to pursue his own priorities. His quest for military superiority in the Gulf, his desire to modernize Iran and create an industrialized welfare state within a decade- all dependent upon Iranian oil revenues- became too ambitious and too much of a burden upon traditional Iranian society. Before the program officially ended in 1971, the land reform program provided land to over 50% of Iran’s peasant population, but eliminated almost all of the large landowners, destroying the traditional upper class in Iranian society.

Another important effect was the rural migration to urban areas as a result of the land reform program and Iran’s rapid economic growth. Land reform failed to lessen rural poverty: 32% of the peasants still did not own land in 1971, and 75% owned less than the minimum for subsistence. The ignorance of rural needs, therefore, pushed peasants into urban areas, where they lacked any modern skills or experience. This held great significance, for in the midst of the confusion caused by a collision with twentieth-century mores, the peasants would turn to their mullahs for guidance.

This shift in political power contributed significantly to the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the religious revolution in 1979.

The early 1970’s would prove to be critical in U.S.-Iranian relations. Changing political and economic conditions in the U.S., largely a result of the Vietnam war, reduced U.S. abilities to maintain its commitments overseas. Foreign policy officials in the Nixon Administration, therefore, began to rely on regional powers taking greater responsibility for collective security. These powers would receive U.S. arms, but not U.S. forces, unless it was clearly in U.S. interests.

Deciding to rely on the Shah and Saudi Arabia, U.S. policymakers developed the “twin pillars” policy toward the Persian Gulf, in which the two nations would assume responsibilities for maintaining security. Most Iranians, however, understood that Iran was the only regional country to fill the vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, and “resented the United States for demanding this role from Iran and the Shah for playing it.”

With the twin pillars policy logically came an increase in arms sales to Iran. Since Iran was willing to contribute to its own defense, and U.S. commitment to its security maintained stability in the Middle East region, conventional wisdom became uncritical acceptance of Iranian requests for new weapons. The extent of these arms sales, and the appetite of the Shah for advance military hardware and capabilities, was not anticipated at first, however.

During the next eight years, Iran became the top buyer of military equipment of any developing nation, with almost 27% of its budget allocated to defense spending. Between 1973 and 1978, Iran bought over $20 billion worth of U.S. military hardware, representing over sixteen times the amount sent by the U.S. to Iran over the previous two decades.

Iran was able to purchase such large amounts of weaponry with the influx of oil money that resulted from the success of OPEC in 1973. But such unchecked spending began to strain not only Iran’s economy, but the patience of its people as well. Religious elements in Iranian society castigated the Shah’s regime for adopting a Western model of development that made Iran “dependent upon foreign raw materials, managerial know-how, technology, and trade.” In response, a disenchanted public took an increasingly negative view towards the modernization efforts of the Shah.

To many, they became associated with “disorganization, waste, corruption, incompetent administration, dependence on foreigners, inflation,…uncomfortably dizzying change,…[and a] poorly planned crash modernization [that] damaged Iranians economically and culturally.”

Iranian resentment spread also to the growing American presence in their country. The booming arms sales business and intensified trade ties brought thousands of U.S. citizens into Iran, whom were offered numerous perks, such as triple salaries, tax-free shopping, and extended holidays. This created resentment and envy among those working with Americans, who “were representatives of an alien and threatening faith.

The relaxed way in which these strangers dressed, their love of liquor, their noisy parties, their car and motorcycle races and their ostentatious opulence could not but arouse…mistrust and anger over the years.”

In response to the Shah’s reform efforts, the disproportional spending on military equipment, and growing anti-Americanism, opposition groups slowly reemerged in Iranian society in the 1970’s. The women’s rights movement carried out in 1959, along with the land reform program, angered much of the Shi’i clergy (mullahs), whose ideology had great appeal to traditional Iranian middle classes.

Gradual and quiet activism carried out by the mullahs had built up a large base of support in the urban lower classes, which continued to grow rapidly and became more disillusioned with Iran’s economic, social, and cultural problems.

Iranian student groups overseas, largely in the U.S., became quite adept at mobilizing students against the shah’s regime and focusing attention on Iran’s growing human rights abuses.

These groups could not effectively operate inside Iran, however, mainly because of the Shah’s repressive apparatus. Another opposition group involved small guerrilla bands, whose attempts to launch violent uprisings repeated failed to generate popular support. Their violent tactics and complex ideology alienated them from most of the Iranian society, and furthermore made them prime targets for security forces.

The election of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency cast a new shadow over U.S.-Iranian relations in 1977. The special relationship between the nations could not prevent certain allegations of human rights abuses, and the initial emphasis of the Carter Administration on linking U.S. foreign policy with human rights appeared to seriously question U.S. assistance to Iran. In fact, the two priorities Carter campaigned on in 1976 involved limiting U.S. arms sales overseas, and giving a greater role to human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Differences with Iran were unavoidable if these goals were to be pursued.

Relations between the two nations remained unchanged, however. Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to anchor U.S. strategic policy in the Persian Gulf, and the Shah appeared determined to ease Carter Administration fears of human rights violations in Iran.

Beginning in 1977, the Shah instituted a series of reforms which prohibited the use of torture by security forces, released a number of political prisoners, loosened censorship rules, and made other minor policy changes. Whether or not this liberalization led to further demands for more reforms, and the eventual downfall of the Shah, is a possibility, since revolutionary forces were gathering significant strength in 1977 and 1978.

The Shah’s visit to Washington, D.C. in November of 1977 is an excellent example of the status of U.S-Iranian relations, and the surrounding environment, at this point. At the initial press conference, televised nationwide in Iran, 4,000 anti-shah students engaged 1,500 pro-shah demonstrators in a violent clash outside the White House, resulting in 124 injuries. Tear gas was needed, and a cloud of the gas drifted toward the conference, causing Carter and the Shah to blink and wipe their eyes. Privately, however, Carter praised and reassured the Shah, telling him how Iran was “‘a very stabilizing force in the world at large’ to which the U.S. was ‘bound with unbreakable ties.'” New arms sales were discussed, as well as controlling OPEC prices.

Only eight days after Carter returned from a visit to Iran in January of 1978, riots broke out in Iran that signalled the beginning of the end for the Shah. The riots continued to escalate in number, violence, and bloodshed throughout the summer, while the Shah desperately looked to the U.S. for advice and assistance, and continued to alternate between extending more liberalization and suppressing the violence.

Finally, with tacit U.S. support, the Shah appointed General Gholam Reza Azhari prime minister of a military government on November 6. (My summary of these and subsequent events leading up to November 1979 is taken primarily from a chronology of events found in Barry Rubin’s Paved with Good Intentions.)

Three weeks later, Carter reaffirmed U.S. support for the Shah, and declared that the U.S. would not interfere in Iranian domestic affairs.

Oil production continued to fall in Iran, causing huge shortages which ground the economy to a virtual standstill. As riots continued in most Iranian cities, Azhari resigned from the government on the last day in December of 1978. Four days later, the Iranian parliament appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar as prime minister, to whom the U.S. immediately offered cooperation. The Shah would leave Iran, and effectively end his thirty-seven year reign, on January 16.

The solidification of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s power was in evidence upon his return from exile on January 31, when hundreds of thousands of supporters greeted his arrival back into Iran. His announcement of Mehdi Bazargan as his choice for prime minister of a provisional Islamic government, led to the resignation of Bakhtiar in February. Bakhtiar’s departure effectively shut the U.S. out of the Iranian government, for the Embassy and foreign policy officials had failed to cultivate any genuine ties with Iranian officials who still remained in some position of influence.

U.S. attempts to generate diplomatic ties with the new religious power in Iran were for the most part unsuccessful. Throughout the spring of 1979, Khomeini and Iranian students continued to demand that the U.S. admit its guilt for past involvement in Iranian affairs, and return the Shah to Iran to be tried by the Islamic government. U.S. officials refused, and any further hopes of reconciliation were dealt a severe blow when the Carter Administration agreed to let the Shah come to New York for medical treatment in October.

On November 4, one day after the Iranian Foreign Ministry formally protested the U.S. decision to admit the Shah for treatment, Iranian students staged a sit-in at the U.S. Embassy, which ended violently with the taking of U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage. Khomeini shortly thereafter condoned the event, stating that “if they [the U.S.] do not give up the criminal…then we shall do whatever is necessary.” Khomeini had received his wish- a direct confrontation with the “Great Satan,” that would last over 440 days and cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen in the aborted rescue attempt in April of 1980.