A STRATEGY FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Forward ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
Strategy Board……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
Cooperating Colleges, Universities & Think Tanks…………………………………………………….. 7
American Security Council National Strategy Committee…………………………………………… 15
Chapter 1 The Choice We Face………………………………………………………………………….. 18
Chapter 2 Soviet Strategy for Dominance………………………………………………………………. 21
Chapter 3 Soviet Organization for Conflict……………………………………………………………. 24
Chapter 4 Peace Through Violence……………………………………………………………………… 27
Chapter 5 Soviet Deception………………………………………………………………………………… 31
Chapter 6 Soviet Peace Offensive………………………………………………………………………… 36
Chapter 7 Soviet Economic War Strategy……………………………………………………………… 41
Chapter 8 Soviet Military Power…………………………………………………………………………. 44
Chapter 9 A Strategy for Peace with Freedom ……………………………………………………… 50
Chapter 10 Structure for Strategy………………………………………………………………………… 57
Chapter 11 A Crusade for Freedom…………………………………………………………………….. 61
Chapter 12 Diplomatic Initiatives………………………………………………………………………….. 72
Chapter 13 Knowing the Score……………………………………………………………………………. 77
Chapter 14 The Economic Arm of Freedom…………………………………………………………… 83
Chapter 15 Deterrence and Defense…………………………………………………………………….. 89
Chapter 16 The Common Defense………………………………………………………………………. 101
Appendix A Peace Through Strength Resolution…………………………………………………….. 107
Soviet expansionism has been driven by the goal of world domination and guided by a grand strategy to achieve that goal.
Soviet successes have been possible only because the United States has had neither a goal nor a strategy in this conflict. U.S. policy has been essentially that of reacting to Soviet initiatives in defense of the status quo.
Senator Paul Laxalt, Senate Co-chairman, Coalition for Peace Through Strength
From his speech introducing the Peace Through Strength Resolution to
U.S. Senate, March 8, 1983
Senator Laxalt’s statement identifies the strategy gap which this book is intended to help close.
In this study we present a bipartisan synthesis of the best thinking on a strategy to deal with Soviet expansionism.
Succeeding studies in this series will deal with individual elements of the strategy in greater depth.
This study has been prepared by the Strategy Board of the American Security Council Foundation for and with the cooperation of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alliance of 158 national organizations and pro-defense leaders including 240 Members of Congress.
When the Coalition was organized in 1978, it selected eight principles of strategy that should be adopted as national policy by the United States.
These principles were incorporated in a Peace Through Strength Resolution, co-sponsored by 257 Members of Congress, passed by 13 state legislatures, and endorsed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, Jr.
The Republican Convention Platform said:
We reaffirm the principle that the national security policy of the United States should be based upon a strategy of peace through strength, a goal of the 1980 Republican Platform.
President Reagan was an early member of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength and has agreed to sign the Peace Through Strength Resolution when it passes both Houses of Congress.
President Reagan has not waited for passage of the Resolution to start implementing an affirmative strategy. For example, he has already launched the Crusade for Freedom and the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The Peace Through Strength Resolution was introduced in the Senate as Concurrent Resolution 15 on March 8, 1983, with 54 co-sponsors. Eight senators– four Republicans and four Democrats–spoke to define principles of a national strategy and to urge their adoption as national policy.
The Resolution was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Tower, asked the American Security Council Foundation, as the educational coordinator for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, to seek the broadest possible participation in the further definition and development of this proposed strategy for the United States.
Hearing of this project, President Ronald Reagan wrote:
I am particularly pleased that you also plan to involve Members of Congress, key administration officials and a wide range of private institutions in the further development of a national strategy of peace through strength. This will be essential as a guide on how to expand democracy throughout the world.
Senator Tower invited a wide range of organizations and institutions of higher education to cooperate in this project.
A total of 514 universities, colleges and think tanks officially accepted Senator Tower’s invitation to cooperate. They range from the University of California – Riverside to the U.S. Global Strategy Council; from the University of Maryland to the Heritage Foundation; from the University of Georgia to the Hoover Institution; from the University of Virginia Center for Law and Security to the Concordia Theological Seminary.
This remarkable response in itself is a strong indicator that America wants to close the strategy gap.
A total of 96 organizations accepted Senator Tower’s invitation to cooperate in this and follow-on studies.
These organizations range from the American Civil Defense Association to Lions Clubs International; from the International Association of Chiefs of Police to the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
All cooperating institutions and groups were invited to make suggestions concerning the content of a national strategy. These suggestions were used in preparing a working draft of the study. Over 1200 copies of the working draft were distributed for review and criticism.
In addition, several government officials participated in the process; some were able to attend meetings of the Strategy Board.
While it is not practical to give credit to everyone who assisted in an important way, we have listed all institutions and organizations, the member organizations of the Coalition and the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, who cooperated in the preparation of this study.
We are deeply grateful for their generous participation in providing many suggestions that greatly enriched the study.
It must be emphasized that the institutions, organizations and individuals who cooperated in this study do not necessarily agree with all specific recommendations.
The content of this study is the sole responsibility of the Strategy Board of the ASC Foundation. All members of the Strategy Board are in full agreement on the basic thrust of this study, although there are differences on some details.
We publish this study with a strong sense of urgency because the world is going to have peace through strength. What is being decided now is whose strength and whose peace.
The leaders of the Soviet Union want a peace in which they dominate all other
nations. Americans and most of the people of the world want peace with freedom.
That is why all Americans must put aside any differences on other issues and work together.
Strategy Board Co-Chairmen
American Security Council Foundation
Dr. Ray Cline Ambassador William Kintner
John M. Fisher Dr. William Van Cleave
Rear Admiral Robert H. Spiro, Jr., USNR (Ret.)
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL FOUNDATION
Daniel Arnold, President Hon. Edwin Feulner, Jr.
Tashkent Associates President
Dr. Richard Bissell
Executive Editor John M. Fisher
Washington Quarterly President
Center for Strategic and American Security Council
International Studies of American Security Council Foundation
General Edwin Black, Editor in Chief
USA, Ret. Comparative Strategy
Director, Pacific & Asian Affairs
Council, Honolulu Dr. Stephen Gibert
Director, National Security Studies Program
Dr. Robert E. Budwine Georgetown University
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Dr. Leon Goure
Director of Soviet Studies
Clay Claiborne Science Applications, Inc.
Black Silent Majority Walter Hahn
Committee Vice President
U.S. Strategic Institute
Dr. Ray Cline
Senior Associate Dr. Robert Jastrow
Center for Strategic and Department of Earth Sciences
International studies of Dartmouth College
Phil Karber, Vice President
Dr. Sam Cohen National Security Programs
Senior Associate BDM Corporation
R & D Associates
Hon. William Kintner
Dr. Joseph Douglass Professor of Political Science
Vice President and Director University of Pennsylvania
National Security Division
Major General Richard Larkin Ms. Harriet Scott
President Senior Research Associate
Association of Former Advanced International Studies Institute
General Lyman Lemnitzer, USA, Ret. Colonel William Scott, USAF, Ret.
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Consultant & Writer on Soviet
Neil C. Livingstone
Senior Vice President Major General John Singlaub, USA (Ret.)
Gray and Company Former Chief of Staff
UN Command-U.S. Forces in Korea
Dr. Edward Luttwak
Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies Rear Admiral Robert H. Spiro, Jr.,
Center for Strategic and International USNR (Ret.)
Studies of Georgetown University National Executive Director
Reserve Officers Association
Dr. John Norton Moore, Director
Center for Law and National Security Kenneth Steadman, Director
University of Virginia School of Law National Security & Foreign Affairs
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Dr. Keith B. Payne
Executive Vice President Dr. Edward Teller
National Institute for Public Policy Senior Research Fellow
Dr. Richard Pipes
Professor of History Hon. Scott Thompson
Harvard University Director, Freedom Studies Center
Dr. Stefan Possony, Senior Fellow Dr. William Van Cleave
Hoover Institution Director, Defense & Strategic Study Stanford University Program
University of Southern California
Former Assistant Director Nils Wessell, Director
FBI, Intelligence Division Foreign Policy Research Institute
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt
USA, Ret. Former Chief of Naval Operations
Chief U.S. Strategist,
World War II
COLLEGES, UNIVERSITIES & THINK TANKS
Academy of Business Colleges Benedict College
Agricultural Technical Institute, Benedictine College
Ohio State University Bergen Community College
Aims Community College Berkeley Schools
Alabama Christian College Bhinn College
Albany Junior College Black Hills State College
Albany State College Bob Jones University
Albright College Boston University
Allen University Boston Conservatory
Amarillo College Bradley University
American Armenian College Brenau College
American Commercial College Brevard College
American Community College Brewer State Junior College
American Graduate School of Briar Cliff College
International Management Bridgeport Engineering Institute
American River College Brigham Young – Hawaii
American Technological Campus
University Bristol College
Andover College Brown College of Court
Anna Arundel Community Reporting
College Brunswick Technical College
Anson Technical College Bryant & Stratton Business
Arizona Career College Institute
Armstrong State College Buena Vista College
Artesia Christian College Burlington County College
Ashland Community College California American University
Augusta College California Coast University
Austin Community College California College of Podiatric
Bakersfield College Medicine
Bartlesville Wesleyan College California Graduate School of
Bartow County Community Theology
College California Maritime Academy
Bay Path Junior College California Missionary Baptist
Becker Junior College Institute
Bee County College Capital City Junior College
Bellarmine College Caribbean University College
Bellevue College Carl Albert Junior College
Carteret Technical College Columbia College
Catholic University of Puerto Columbia Junior College
Rico Columbia State Community
Cayey University College, College
University of Puerto Rico Columbus Technical Institute
Cedarville College Commercial College of
Center Business School, Shreveport
Incorporated Commonwealth Colleges
Center for Early Education Community College of
Center Graduate College Allegheny County
Central Arizona College Community College of Denver
Central City Business Institute Computer Learning Center
Central Florida Bible College Concordia College
Centralia College Concordia Lutheran College
Chase Business College Concordia Theological
Chatham College Seminary
Chattanooga State Technical Conservatory of Music of
Community College Puerto Rico
Chesapeake Business Institute Cooper Institute
Chesapeake College Copiah-Lincoln Junior College
Chesterfield-Marlboro Technical Cosumnes River College
College County College of Morris
Cheyney University of Cranford School of Business
Pennsylvania Crowder College
Christ College at Irvine Culinary Institute of America
Christian University College of Culver-Stockton College
America Cumberland County College
Circleville Bible College Dallas Baptist College
Clark University David Lipscomb College
Clarkson University Davis & Elkins College
Clatsop Community College Davis Junior College
Clemson University Dawson Community College
Cleveland State Community Daytona Beach Community
Clinton Community College Detroit College of Business
Coffeyville Community College Dickinson State College
Coker College Dorsey Business Schools,
College of Boca Raton Incorporated
College of Ganado Draughons Junior College
College of Santa Fe Dubois Campus of the
College of the Siskiyous Pennsylvania State University
Dudley Hall Career Institute Gallipolis Business College of
Dull Knife College Gallipolis, Ohio
Dyersburg State College Garrett Community College
Eastern New Mexico University Gateway Technical Institute
at Roswell Georgetown College
East Central College Georgetown University, Center
East Mississippi Junior College for Strategic and
Eastern New Mexico University International Studies
at Portales Golden Gate Seminary
East Tennessee State University Golden West College
Eastern Christian College Grace College/Seminary
Eastern Connecticut State Graduate School of Human Res.
Eastern Illinois University Grand Canyon College
East-West University – Chicago Grantham College of Engineers
Edison State College Green Mountain College
Electronic Data Processing Greenville Technical College
College of Puerto Rico, Inc. Guilford College
Elizabethtown Community Guilford Technical Community
Emmanuel College Hagerstown Business College
Emmanuel College School of Hannibal-LaGrange College
Christian Ministries Hardbarger Junior College
Erie Community College – South Hartford Secretarial School
Campus Hartford State Technical
Essex County College College
Faith Theological Seminary Hastings College
Fashion & Art Institute of Hawaii School of Business
Dallas at Omaha Hawkeye Institute of
Feather River College Technology
Flagler College Hebrew Theological College
Fleet Business School Heritage Foundation
Florence-Darlington Technical Hiram College
College Hoeber Corporation
Florida Southern College Hoover Institution
Floyd Junior College Housatonic Community College
Foothill-DeAnza Community Houston Community College
College District System
Forsyth Technical Institute Howard College
Francis Marion College Huertas Business College
Hussian School of Art., Inc. Lake Superior State College
Hutchinson Community College Lakeland Community College
Institute of American Relations Lamar Community College
Institute for Foreign Policy Lancaster Bible College
Analysis, Inc. Laredo Junior College
International Commercial Lawson State Community
Puerto Rico Junior College College
IRT Corporation Lebanon Valley College
ITT Business/Technical Lees-McRae College
Institutes Liberty Baptist College
Illinois Eastern Community Limestone College
Colleges Lincoln College
Indian Hills Community College Lincoln University of San
Indiana Business College Francisco
Indiana Institute of Technology Lincoln University of Jefferson
Institute for Creation Research City, MO
International Bible College Lock Haven University of
Iowa Western Community Penna.
College Lon Morris College
Irvine College of Business Longview Business College
Isothermal Community College Lorain County Community
Ithaca College College
J. Sargeant Reynolds Lord Fairfax Community
Community College College
Jacksonville College Lormax-Hansion Junior College
Jefferson State Junior College Los Rios Community College
Johnson County Community Lubbock Christian College
College Luzerne County Community
Judson Baptist College College
Judson College MBTI Business Training
Kemper Military School and Institute
College MacCormac Junior College
Kent State-Tuscarawas Campus MacMurray College
Kentucky Christian College Magdalen College
Keuka College Maine Maritime Academy
Keystone Junior College Malcolm X College
Latter Day Saints Business Mansfield Business College
College Mansfield University
LaPorte Business College Marian College
Lackawanna Junior College Marion College
Marycrest College Mount Olive College
Massachusetts Maritime Mount Sinai Medical Center
Academy Mountain View College
Maysville Community College New Hampshire Technical
McNeese University Institute
Meadows College of Business New Orleans Baptist
Medical Institute of Minneapolis Theological Seminary
Medical University of South New York Chiropractic College
Carolina New Mexico State University at
Melodyland Schools and Alamogordo
Colleges National College of Chiropractic
Merritt Davis Business College National Technical Schools
Mes. Torah Vodaath Seminary National University
Mesa College Nazarene Bible College
Metropolitan Business College Nebraska College of Business
Metropolitan Technical Nebraska Western College
Community College Neosho County Community
Miami Christian College College
Mid-Plains Community College New Hampshire Vocational
Area Technical College
Midland College New Mexico Junior College
Midlands Technical College New Mexico Military Institute
Midway College New Mexico State University at
Midwest College of Engineering Grants
Miles College New Mexico State University at
Miller Hawkins Business Carlsbad
College New River Community College
Minneapolis Business College Newport University
Mississippi Gulf Coast Junior Nichols College
College Norfolk State University
Missouri Baptist College North Carolina Wesleyan
Mitchell Community College College
Modern Business College North Central Technical College
Modesto Junior College North Dakota State School of
Mohave Community College Science
Montana College of Mineral North Harris County College
Science and Technology District
Montcalm Community College Northeast Alabama State Junior
Montgomery County College
Community College Northeast Iowa Technical
Moorhead State University Institute
Northeast Louisiana University Penn. College of Podiatric
Northeastern Oklahoma A&M Medicine
College Penn. State University
Northern Michigan University Delaware County Campus
Northern Montana College Percy Business College
Northern Virginia Community Phillips College
College Piedmont Bible College, Inc.
Northwest Alabama State Polk Community College
Junior College Polytechnic University of
Northwestern Business College- Puerto Rico
Tech Center Port Huron School of Business
Northwestern College & Radio Porterville College
Northwestern Michigan College Prestonburg Community
Northwestern State University College
of LA Pueblo College of Business
Norwich University Pueblo Community College
Odessa College Puget Sound College of the
Ohio State University – Marion Bible
Oklahoma Christian College RETS Technical Center, Inc.
Oklahoma City University Randolph Technical College
Old College Richard Bland College
Open Bible College Robeson Technical College
Orange County Community Rochester Business Institute
College Rock Valley College
Orangeburg-Calhoun Technical Rockford Business College
College Rockhurst College
Oregon Graduate Center Rose State College
Oregon State System of Higher Rose-Hulman Institute of
Our Lady of Holy Cross College Rutledge College
Pace University SUNY College at Old Westbury
Pacific University in Oregon Saint Joseph’s College
Palmer College of Chiropractic Saint Martin’s College
Parkland College Saint Paul’s College
Parks College Salem College
Parks College of St. Louis Salem State College
University Salisbury Business College
Peace College Salisbury State College
Penn State University – Beaver San Diego Golf Academy
Campus San Jacinto College North
San Joaquin Delta Community State Center Community
College College District – Fresno, CA
Santa Rosa Junior College State Technical Institute –
Sauk Valley College Memphis
Sawyer College Stenotype Institute
Sawyer College of Business Stephen F. Austin State
Sayre Junior College University
Scottsdale Community College Stephens College
Seattle Community College Strayer College
District Tallahassee Community College
Sheldon Jackson College Tarleton State University
Simpson College Texas A&M University
Slippery Rock University Texas A&M University at
Somerset Community College Galveston
Southeastern Bible College Texas College
Southeastern College – Lakeland Texas Tech University
Southeastern Louisiana The Atlanta University
University The Boyo School
Southeastern Oklahoma State The Citadel
University The Rand Graduate Institute
Southern State Community The Sawyer School
College The School of the Ozarks
Southern Union State Junion The Smith Business School
College The Stratford Schools
Southern University A&M The University of Georgia
College The University of Virginia –
Southwest Baptist University Center for Law & Security
Southwestern Assemblies of Thomas County Community
God College College
Southwestern College of Thomas M. Cooley Law School
Christian Ministries Tiffin University
Spartanburg Methodist College Toccoa Falls College
Springfield College Touro College
Standing Rock Community Towson State University
College Trenton State College
St. Bernard Parish Community Triangle Tech.
College Trinity Christian College
St. John’s School of Business Trinity College
St. Mary’s University Trinity Evangelical Divinity
St. Philip’s College School
Troy State University – Dothan/ University of Texas – Permian
Fort Rucker Basin
Troy State University in Troy University of Wisconsin – Stout
Troy State University in University of Wisconsin –
Truckee Meadows Community University of Wyoming
College Upper Iowa University
Tucson College of Business U.S. Army Combined Arms
Umpqua Community College Center
Uniformed Services University U.S. Global Strategy Council
Of the Health Services Valdosta State College
Union County College Valley Forge Christian College
University of Alaska Statewide Valley Forge Military Academy
System & Junior College
University of Alaska – Fairbanks Villanova University
University of Alaska – Juneau Virginia Military Institute
University of Baltimore Wagner College
University of Central Florida Wake Technical College
University of Charlestown Washington Bible College
University of Colorado – Health Washington School for
Science Center Secretaries
University of Colorado – Waycross Junior College
Boulder Wayne College, University of
University of Dallas Akron
University of Maine at Machias Wentworth Military Academy
University of Maryland Wesley College at Florence
University of Maryland – Wesley College at Dover
Eastern Shore West Coast University – Main
University of Missouri – Rolla Campus
University of Nebraska West Coast University
University of Nebraska at West Liberty State College
Omaha Western Connecticut State
University of New England University
University of New Haven Western Nevada Community
University of Science & Arts of College
Oka. Western New Mexico University
University of South Caroline – Western Okla. State College
Salkehatchie Western State University
University of Steubenville Westminster College
University of Texas Medical William Woods College
Branch at Galveston Williamsburg Technical College
Worcester Vocational School Worthington Scranton Campus
Dept. Yakima Valley Community
World University College
Worthington Community York College
NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
The Honorable Elbridge Durbrow, Maj. General Milnor Roberts,
Former Ambassador AUS (Ret.)
Former Executive Director
Major General Robert E. L. Eaton, Reserve Officers Association
General Bernard A. Schriever,
Mr. Robert W. Galvin, USAF (Ret.)
Chairman of the Board Former Commanding General,
Motorola, Incorporated Air Force Systems Command
General Bruce K. Holloway, Dr. William R. Van Cleave,
USAF (Ret.) Director
Former Commander-in-Chief Strategic and Security Studies
Strategic Air Command Program
University of Southern
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, California
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs
Mr. James Angleton Mr. G. Duncan Bauman,
Former Chief of Former Publisher
Counterintelligence, CIA St. Louis Globe-Democrat
Dr. James D. Atkinson Brig. General Edwin F. Black,
Department of Government USA, (Ret.)
Georgetown University Director, Pacific & Asian Affairs
Mr. Gus A. Buder, Jr.,
Attorney Maj. General Vernon B.
Lewis, Jr., USAF, (Ret.)
Mr. Francis B. Burch, The Honorable John Davis Lodge
Attorney Former U.S. Ambassador
Weinberg and Green
The Honorable Clare Boothe
Dr. Stephen P. Gibert Luce
Director Former U.S. Ambassador
National Security Studies
Program Mr. A. B. McKee, Jr.,
Georgetown University President
Forest Lumber Company and
Lt. General Gordon M. Graham Imperial Valley Lumber Company
Vice President, Washington Office
McDonnell Douglas Corporation General Theodore Ross Milton,
General Paul D. Harkins, Board of Directors
USA, (Ret.) U.S. Strategic Institute
Former Commanding General
U.S. Military Assistance Dr. Robert Morris
Command, Vietnam Former President, University of
Dr. Montgomery H. Johnson
Mr. Charles J. V. Murphy
General Leon W. Johnson, Retired Senior Editor, Fortune
Mr. Asa E. Phillips, Jr.
Hon. William R. Kintner President Emeritus
Professor of Political Science American Coalition of Patriotic
University of Pennsylvania Societies
Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee, Dr. Stefan T. Possony
USN, (Ret.) Senior Fellow
Former Commandant of the Hoover Institution
National War College Stanford University
General Curtis E. Lemay, Mr. Ira G. Ross
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Major General John K. Singlaub,
Force USA (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff UN
Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper, Command-U.S. Forces in
USAF, (Ret.) Korea
Vice President, National
Leadership Foundation, Inc.
Major General Dale O. Smith, Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
USAF, (Ret.) Physicist
Former Senior Military Member
Of OCB General Albert C. Wedemeyer,
Mr. Harvey E. Stoehr Chief U.S. Strategist, World War II
Dr. A. B. Suttle General I. D. White,
Dr. Edward Teller
Senior Fellow Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Hoover Institution Physicist
General Lewis. W. Walt,
USMC Ret. Mr. Harvey Williams
Former Assistant Commandant International Management
United States Marine Corps Consultant
THE CHOICE WE FACE
Communism stops only when it encounters a wall, even if it is only a wall of resolve. The West cannot now avoid erecting such a wall in what is already its hour of extremity. Meanwhile, however, 20 possible allies have fallen to Communism since World War II. Meanwhile, Western technology has helped develop the terrifying military power of the Communist world. The wall will have to be erected with what strength remains. The present generation of Westerners will have to make a stand on the road upon which its predecessors have so thoughtlessly retreated for 60 years.1
The United States and the Soviet Union, with their respective allies, are locked in a long, costly and dangerous contest rooted in fundamentally different and irreconcilable views of the nature of human existence.
The outcome will be determined by the level of commitment on each side to its own value system.
The Declaration of Independence sets forth the basic ethos which has animated American behavior since our birth as a nation:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
American society has been shaped by the ideas that shine forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
The way of life we have and wish to preserve is one in which the state is subservient to the interests of the people. Our way of life is characterized by a democratic form of government, a free enterprise economic system, a legal system that guarantees human rights and freedom of expression including criticism of our own government.
Just as the United States is the most revolutionary society on earth, the Soviet Union is probably the most reactionary society ever designed. It is an abnormality in the family of present day nations.
The characteristics of the Soviet Union, a huge multinational empire, represent a fusion of the historical Russian political culture and the messianic ideology of Marxism-
Leninism. A student of history has written, “The rulers of Russia have never been successful in working out a tolerable compromise between freedom and authority, freedom in Russia having always tended to degenerate into anarchy and authority into despotism, and this failure is expressed in a general disrespect for law on the part of rulers who apply it capriciously and of subjects who readily evade it.”2
The contribution of Marxism-Leninism to the Soviet Union is reflected in the character and structure of the Bolshevik party from which the Soviet Union emerged. Lenin built a new kind of organization — in name a political party, but in actuality a military organization designed for protracted conflict.3
Communists believe that their mission is to save the world by fully dominating it. To dominate it, they must seize power. And, as Lenin stated, “power can no longer be taken peacefully,” but only by struggle.4 Thus, an overruling military purpose shapes every aspect of Communist organization. By now it is evident that the Soviet Union is a military state with a command economy dedicated primarily to the creation of military power.
The Soviet Union is the world’s foremost imperial power, as was its Czarist predecessor. It is estimated that between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, Russia conquered territory the size of the modern Netherlands every year for 150 years.
Between 1917 and 1921, the Soviet Union expanded its borders to include the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Outer Mongolia was colonized and subsequently became a Soviet satellite.
The three Baltic states were absorbed in 1940. In 1944, the USSR seized more territory from Poland, and then in violation of the Yalta agreement, imposed Marxist-Leninist regimes not only on Poland, but also on Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania and East Germany.
During and after World War II the Soviet Union acquired close to one hundred thousand square miles of land beginning with the annexation of Eastern Poland and Eastern Rumania.
The Soviets hold that between two systems as opposite as the United States and the Soviet Union, there can be no convergence. In Lenin’s words, “one or the other will ultimately triump.”5
Lenin’s uncompromising objective of total Communist victory continues to guide Soviet policy to this day. “Imperialism will not collapse by itself, automatically,” Brezhnev declared in May 1970. “Active and determined action by all revolutionary forces is needed to overthrow it.”6 Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, wrote as recently as May 1984:
Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of socialism’s class struggle against capitalism. This struggle is going on and will continue in the field of economics, politics and, of course, ideology, because the world outlook and the class goals of the two social systems are opposite and irreconcilable.7
The Time for Choosing
In his speech introducing the Peace Through Strength Resolution in the U.S. Senate on March 8, 1983, Senator Edward Zorinsky (D.-Neb.), summarized the need to act now as follows:
The principal goal of the United States has been the preservation of peace and freedom. No responsible American disputes this goal, but differences on how best to achieve it have badly divided our Nation and led to disastrous reverses in foreign policy. Because of these differences, it has proved impossible to adopt or adhere to a national strategy. Without a national strategy to give it direction and coherence, our foreign policy has been reactive, inconsistent, and far weaker than it need be.
On no issue has there been greater division than on the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union. Although Soviet strength and destabilizing behavior were recognized as potential dangers . . . American policy responding to them was based on accommodation and unilateral gestures of restraint. The Soviet Union, it was argued, had such a dismal history of war and invasion that a strong American policy would immediately trigger suspicion and hostility.
But if the United States avoided provoking this reaction, increased contact through trade, arms control negotiations, and growing cultural ties would convince the Soviet leadership of American good faith.
This argument formed the basis for the American policy of détente. During this period the United States drastically cut defense spending, froze its strategic nuclear forces, halved the size of its navy, and allowed its conventional land and air forces to undergo a significant decline. At the same time, it dramatically reduced its international presence, dismantled much of its intelligence services, and let most of its defense alliances deteriorate.
Soviet détente behavior was diametrically different. It not only enormously increased the quantity of its nuclear forces, but went for a qualitative change as well, achieving a large force with the explosive yield and accuracy to destroy the U.S. strategic force on the ground. It increased its overall defense spending by as much as 7 percent annually each year of this period, not only greatly increasing its ground forces but also creating for the first time in Soviet history a blue water navy. The Soviet Union greatly increased the size and scope of the KGB First Directorate, responsible for foreign operations, especially subversion and disinformation. It invaded, directly or through proxies, a half dozen Third World nations, proved a major impediment to a negotiated Middle East settlement, and promoted instability by training and arming terrorists worldwide.
In view of this, it is no surprise that the Soviet Union defines détente as “an intensification of the ideological struggle in the absence of nuclear war.”
The United States has at last recognized that détente cannot help to achieve the national goal of peace and freedom and has begun the first steps toward strengthening its defenses and foreign policy. However, because these steps have not
been explained to the American people in the context of a well-articulated national strategy, the political consensus for making them has been eroding. Such a strategy has been worked out — the national strategy for peace through strength.
The national strategy for peace through strength is based upon the realization . . . that the Soviet Union cannot be cajoled into good behavior by weakness or unilateral restraint. At the same time, it is neither possible nor desirable to coerce the Soviet Union by the direct use of military force. Instead, the national strategy of peace through strength, while providing for the military and strategic forces necessary to establish a margin of safety, will arrest and counteract the spread of Soviet influence by non-military means.
1.”Solzhenitsyn on Communism,” Time, February 18, 1980.
2.Edward Hallett Carr, The Soviet Impact on the Western World (New York:Macmillan, 1949), p. 5.
3.See William R. Kintner, The Front is Everywhere (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984)p. 7.
4.V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964),vol. 25, p. 186.
5.L.I.Brezhnev, Following Lenin’s Course (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 296.
6.V.I. Lenin, On Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971),p. 68.
7.”Lenin’s Peace Policy,” Moscow News Weekly No. 16, 1984, p. 5.
SOVIET STRATEGY FOR
As this century moves toward its close, the free world remains confronted by a threat to its very survival. The Soviet Union seeks to impose its will on mankind, has designed a strategy for doing so and, at great cost, has acquired the means by which it intends to execute that strategy.
The War-Zone, Peace-Zone Syndrome
The Soviets define “peace” as the end of the “class struggle,” that is, when their factions or forces in a conflict have won. Thus, “world peace” will only be realized when they have prevailed in the East-West struggle. The United States, in contrast, defines peace as the absence of organized armed conflict.
The result of these different concepts of peace has been to allow the Soviets to divide the world into the “peace zone” — where they are trying to establish dominance.1
The free world, through a process of wishful thinking, has by default accepted the Soviet definition of these terms. It has allowed the Soviets to draw the territorial limits of the protracted conflict. In fact, the “containment policy,” which furnished the official
theoretical framework for the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey and subsequent U.S. foreign and security policies, rested on the “war zone, peace zone” assumption.
The Soviets also have managed to maneuver the United Nations into accepting their ground rules. Most of the accusations in the United Nations from 1948 until 1984 involving “threats to peace,” “intervention,” “imperialism,” and denial of the “right of self-determination” have been leveled at actions by the free world. The question of Soviet imperialism, human rights violations, or its denial of the right to self-determination of peoples has seldom been raised. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and U.S. Ambassador to the meetings on the Helsinki Final Act, Max Kampelman, have fought to counter this trend.
While the Soviets are reluctant to risk an all-out war, they do not hesitate to threaten war in order to undermine the free world initiative. Given the “balance of terror,” the Soviets, acting through proxies, can present the free world with strategic faits accomplis and then invoke the specter of general war in order to prevent the free world from taking forceful action in the defense of its legitimate interests. At the same time, the Soviets’ unfettered expansion (underlined by their genocidal policies in Afghanistan) and the decline of free world power serve to convince the weaker nations that the Soviet Union is the dominant superpower and that Communism is the “wave of the future.”
Principles of Soviet Strategy
The first principle of Soviet strategy is that power determines the course of history.
Consequently, Soviet policymakers believe that their task is not simply to
recognize the balance of power, but to change it.
In assessing the balance of power, the Soviets look at both objective and subjective factors. Objective factors include such things as economic and military power, whereas subjective factors are perceptions and policies that result from them. According to the Soviet view of international relations, objective factors determine the subjective factors.
Yet, even if objective factors dominate subjective factors, that does not mean subjective factors are unimportant, since perceptions can influence actions that in turn will affect the objective balance of power. Thus, it is possible to alter the balance of power by influencing perceptions. “In this connection,” writes one Soviet scholar revealingly, “the role of information (and misinformation) is growing in world politics.”2
The dominance of objective over subjective factors in Soviet thinking about international politics means that internal economic factors are a major focus of their concern, since the ability to change the balance of power is largely dependent on the ability of their economy to support that effort. “The defense capability of the Soviet Union and, to no small extent, of the entire socialist community, and the possibility of countering the imperialist aggression and war depend on our economic achievements,” Leonid Brezhnev declared on June &, 1969. “Our possibilities of supporting the
revolutionary and liberation movement throughout the world likewise depend on these achievements.”3
The second principle of Soviet strategy is that world politics is, and must be, essentially bipolar, divided along East-West lines.4
At the present time the course and outcome of international events in any corner of the world are determined ultimately not so much by local and internal forces as by the correlation of world forces, primarily the balance of power between capitalism and socialism.5
Moreover, Soviet ideology perceives world politics as not merely bipolar, but also zero-sum: one side’s gain must be the other side’s loss. It assumes that the Soviet position in the balance of power, and its influence in the international arena, improves even if it does not materially change — so long as the U.S. position declines. Consequently, the Soviets are interested not only in building up their own power, but in weakening the United States and its alliances.
This leads to the third basic principle of Soviet policy: divide and conquer. Lenin taught that:
The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this
reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism in general.”6
Finally, the Soviets believe that the competition between their system and ours is permanent and irreconcilable: in the end, one must defeat the other. As one Soviet text forthrightly explains:
What is right is right: indeed, Communists are not willing to make fundamental concessions and are not about to repudiate their belief in the ultimate universal triumph of communism; they do indeed consider coexistence as something that will not last forever, but only until the day that capitalism ceases to exist . . . It is, therefore, just as absurd to demand that Communists issue a guarantee that capitalism will be preserved as it would be to seek assurances that the earth will stop its movement around the sun.7
Unlike the Soviets, the free world has not been organized for permanent conflict. To be sure, our decision making processes can never be as centralized as those in Moscow, precisely because the values we uphold are so vastly different.
The world knows of the 20 million Soviet citizens who died as a result of the attack by Nazi Germany, but we should not forget that in the 1930’s, as a result of Stalin’s collectivization and the purges, another 20 million people were killed.8
As we understand the nature of the conflict, we must take steps to prepare for it. The resources of the United States and its allies are superior to those of the Soviet bloc. What we have lacked so far is the understanding, will, and organization to use them.
1. This concept was first analyzed in Robert Strausz-Hupe’, William Kintner, James E. Dougherty, and Alvin Cottrell, Protracted Conflict (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959). This section updates and adapts this analysis.
2. D. Tomashevsky, Lenin’s Ideas and Modern International Relations, trans. Jim Riordan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 82.
3. Brezhnev, p. 192.
4. Sh. P. Sanakoyev and N. I. Kapchenko, Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, trans. V. M. Sukhodrev (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 85-86.
5. Tomashevsky, pp 68-69.
6. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 70-71.
7. The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism, trans. A. Bratov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) pp. 189-90.
8. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (Macmillan, 1968), p. 533.
SOVIET ORGANIZATION FOR
Since the primary Soviet goal is world conquest, the Soviets’ political system is organized to implement its strategy to achieve that goal.
Soviet decision making is distinguished from decision making in the free world by its centralization and secrecy. Whereas in the free world numerous interest groups compete for power and influence, in the Soviet Union such competition is severely circumscribed. Only one political party is allowed to exist: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Consequently, any political competition that exists occurs within the Party, not between parties.
Similarly, economic competition is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. The CPSU controls all means of production and therefore allocates the country’s economic resources as it sees fit. The Soviets call this the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” but it is in fact the dictatorship of the elite of the Communist Party, the so-called nomenklatura. This elite within an elite enjoys all the privileges of power. Indeed it owns the Soviet Union and runs it accordingly.
At the apex of the CPSU is the Politburo (short for political bureau) of the Central Committee. Although the size of the Politburo varies, it typically comprises approximately a dozen full and a half-dozen candidate members. These men are the policymakers within the Soviet Communist Party and the Government.
The Politburo of the Communist Party, not the Soviet government, truly rules the Soviet Union. No one achieves Politburo status without having developed a strong political base involving both personal and institutional ties. Since 1973, both the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister have been full members of the Politburo.
The Politburo does not vote on issues, but instead reaches decision by consensus. If after discussion no consensus is reached, decision is postponed for further study.
Occasionally, subcommittees are formed to examine specific issues in greater detail. As a rule, however, most differences have been resolved at lower levels before an issue is presented to the Politburo.
The Soviet decision making process is conducted in secret, with only bland press releases issued after Politburo meetings. Although Soviet leaders are eager to use free world political pluralism to affect decision making by their free world counterparts, they regard such influence in their own country as unacceptable. According to a prominent Soviet journalist, “A decision can be prepared more objectively and more scientifically if it is protected from the general public, which could influence it in one direction or another. It is more convenient for us like that.”1
To assist it in making decisions, the Kremlin has established several foreign policy think tanks attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences. Although they are not officially a part of the Communist Party apparatus, they have grown in number and importance in response to the leadership’s recognition of its need for specialized expertise. Probably the best known of these institutes, at least in the United States, is the Institute of the USA and Canada, headed by Georgy Arbatov, who frequently represents
the Kremlin’s views before the American media.
Another prominent think tank dealing with international affairs is the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). In addition, there are specialized institutes dealing with Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and “the international workers movement.”
Although these institutes have received much attention in recent years, in large part because their staffs meet regularly with foreigners, their role in the decision making process should not be exaggerated. While they do prepare analyses for the leadership, their access to sensitive information appears to be severely restricted, which indicates they are not central participants in the policymaking process (although Arbatov, as a member of the Central Committee, has some personal influence). Rather, they seem to be repositories of specialized expertise that the leadership can call on at will. In addition, as we have noted, their staffs serve as articulate spokesmen for Soviet policies before foreign audiences.
Of central importance to the Soviet decision making process is the Committee for State Security (KGB). This preeminent Soviet intelligence agency “publishes a daily summary of current events for the Politburo and regularly submits forecasts of future world developments.” Besides gathering intelligence (e.g., through listening posts such as the strategically situated Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C.), it undertakes covert operations overseas and is responsible for maintaining the control of the Communist Party at home. Under the leadership of the late Yuri Andropov, who subsequently became the General Secretary of the Communist Party, it created a new directorate “especially to harass, intimidate and ultimately eliminate nonconformists” within the Soviet Union.2
Among the activities undertaken by the KGB are those designed to influence foreign public opinion. In this regard, the Politburo can make use of foreign Communist parties in free world countries. The leaders of these parties routinely meet with Soviet Communist Party officials to report on their activities and receive advice on instructions. Although some cracks have developed in Soviet control of foreign Communist parties,
especially in Western Europe, the Soviets are still able to exert considerable influence. Through these parties, Soviet Friendship Societies, and a variety of international front organizations, the Politburo is able to influence the political climate in foreign countries, weakening opposition to its policies and creating opportunities for indigenous Communist politicians to take over.
Recognizing the increasing importance of public diplomacy in the modern world, the Soviet leadership created the International Information Department (IID) of the Central Committee in 1978. Headed by Leonid Zamyatin, himself a member of the Central Committee, this department “is charged with improving the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda abroad and providing improved treatment of foreign affairs by the Soviet domestic propaganda network . . . In carrying out its primary function of supervising Soviet propaganda activities abroad, the IID orchestrates a wide variety of propaganda outlets, all of which to some extent are involved in Soviet active measures.”3
These propaganda outlets include a number of press services and journals (e.g., New Times, which is published in ten languages), Radio Moscow (which broadcasts in over sixty languages), and Radio Peace and Progress (an especially inflammatory radio
station, which supposedly is unofficial but uses the facilities of Radio Moscow).
In toto, Soviet expenditures for propaganda and covert operations have been estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency to be more than $3.3 billion per year.4
The Soviet process makes possible an orderly consideration of priorities in relation to opportunities. The Politburo obtains from its support structures views on where it can move to implement long-existing goals. Whether Moscow has a “timetable” or “scheme” for “taking over the world” is immaterial. It has a goal of world hegemony, and as trouble breaks out in a region, whether or not Soviet-instigated, it can shift resources swiftly to take specific advantage of the turn of the wheel and thus to advance its more general goals.
Once the Politburo decides on a course of action, implementation is the responsibility of the relevant government and Party organs, with the International Department of the Central Committee managing and overseeing their activities.
The International Department traditionally has been thought to be responsible merely for coordinating the activities of non-ruling Communist parties and maintaining contact with a variety of left-wing movements, regardless of whether they are loyal to Moscow. Now its responsibilities have grown far beyond that. For example, its very influential First Deputy Chief, Vadim Zagladin, has been one of the most prominent and knowledgeable spokesmen about questions of European security and arms control.
An example of how the International Department works can be gleaned from its manipulation of the peace issue. In the mid-1970s, the Kremlin was concerned by the tendency in some West European Communist parties to define a position for themselves independent Moscow. In particular, the Soviets were upset by Eurocommunist, criticisms of Communism in the Soviet Union.
In an effort to restore solidarity to the world Communist movement under its leadership, the Kremlin reinvigorated its peace offensive. Writing in the main theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist Party, Zagladin reprimanded West European Communists for weakening the peace movement. “It was precisely the existence of
world socialism, its strengthening, and its policy of peace, together with the activity of the workers’ movement and, above all, of the communist parties,” he stressed, “that were the basic factors ensuring the progress of détente.”5
It is noteworthy that, following the publication of this article, the alignment of Communist parties in Western Europe did change. Eurocommunism declined, and support for Soviet policies increased. Perhaps most important of all, peace demonstrations critical of the United States and NATO grew in intensity, making it instructive to examine in greater detail how the Kremlin is using the peace issue.
1. Aleksandr Bovin in Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), February 27, 1983, in Foreign, Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report: Soviet Union (Hereafter FBIS:SOV), March 4, 1983, P. R 10.
2. John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (NY: Reader’s Digest Press, 1983), pp. 446,451.
3. U. S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, Hearings, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 35.
4. U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, p, 60.
5. V. Zagladin, “Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Contemporary Workers’ Movement,” Kommunist, No. 11, 1978, in Joint Publications Research Service (Hereafter JPRS) 71944, September 28, 1978, pp.87-88.
PEACE THROUGH VIOLENCE
Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been
solved in history except by violence.1
The Imperative of Violence
The Communist goal, repeated again and again by Soviet leaders from Lenin to the present, is to overthrow the free world political system. This goal will be achieved by the skillful combination “of both peaceful and non-peaceful paths and forms of revolutionary struggle.”2 Although the Soviets believe it is theoretically possible for a Communist revolution to succeed using peaceful means exclusively, they regard this as an unlikely possibility. For the Soviets, all violent means of struggle are acceptable. “Non-peaceful means of struggle include not only insurrection . . . civil war, guerrilla action, the coercive though not necessarily armed seizure of various state institutions, mass media, factories, and so forth.3
Terror has been an accepted tool of Communist revolution from the very beginning. As far back as 1848 Karl Marx wrote: “Only one means exists to shorten the bloody death pangs of the old society and the birth pangs of the new society, to simplify and concentrate them — revolutionary terrorism.”4 The intensification of terrorism against free world institutions in the modern era was set in motion by the Tri-Continental Conference, held in Havana in January 1966. Within a few months, “the first important network of guerrilla training camps was set up around Havana, and it was in these camps, starting in 1968 and 1969 that Europeans, including Western Europeans, came for their first guerrilla training.”5
Besides these bases in Cuba, terrorists are also trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For example, Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, which indoctrinates Third World students, is the alma mater of Carlos, the Venezuelan terrorist who led the seizure of an OPEC meeting in 1975.
Indeed, when the late Soviet President, Yuri Andropov, headed the KGB, it recruited and trained terrorists at its Moscow headquarters. Additional KGB camps are maintained in Bulgaria (Varna), Czechoslovakia (Karlovy Vary and Dupov), East Germany (Finsterwalde), and Hungary (Lake Vara).6
In addition to training terrorists, the Soviet Union provides weaponry and financial support to a variety of terrorist organizations. Frequently, equipment is transferred through the PLO, which maintains close ties to Moscow, to other terrorist organizations. By this method, Soviet bloc material has been delivered to several terrorist groups, such as those in Italy and in Ireland (Irish Republican Army).
It is also apparent that the Soviet Union has encouraged a variety of terrorist and subversive operations. One of the most clear-cut was the training of M-19 guerrillas in Cuba. When their training was completed, they landed in the Colombian countryside and attempted an armed uprising, which failed. The government of Colombia subsequently suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba, comparing its actions to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. According to a defector from the Cuban intelligence service, DGI has been placed under the direction of the KGB well before this event occurred. It is, therefore, apparent that this effort to overthrow the legitimate government of Colombia had Moscow’s approval.7
Perhaps the most extraordinary incident of Soviet inspired terrorism was the attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II. According to a report by Italian State Prosecutor Antonio Albano, the “conceptual, organizational and contractual bases for the assassination of Pope Wojtyla, to be carried out in the spring of 1981,” were agreed to in Bulgaria in the summer of 1980. The Bulgarian secret services evidently hoped that Pope John Paul II’s death would affect the situation in Poland, where the people, supported by the first Polish Pope, were challenging the authority of the Communist regime. Although the report does not prove direct involvement by the Soviets, it does implicate them. “In some secret place, where every secret is wrapped in another secret,” Mr. Albano writes, “some political figure of great power took note of this most grave situation and, mindful of the vital needs of the Eastern bloc, decided it was necessary to kill Pope Wojtyla.”8
Wars of National Liberation
Although the Soviets frequently talk of peace, they also stress that they are not pacifists. On the contrary, they believe that some was are just, including “wars of national liberation.” Shortly after the end of World War II, the USSR began to encourage such wars. Describing the Korean War, a clear case of aggression condemned by the United Nations, Nikita Khrushchev wrote:
…this was a war of national liberation. It was not a war of one people against another, but a class war. Workers, peasants, and intelligentsia under the leadership of the Labor Party of North Korea, which then stood and today still stands on Socialist principles, were united in battle against the capitalists. This in itself was a progressive development.9
As this example demonstrates, Soviet aggression, no matter how blatant, is automatically a war of national liberation. Moscow feels free to encourage such wars because it risks nothing thereby. Moscow’s support of these wars is part of its design to destroy the free world state system. By supporting them, the Soviet Union hopes to strike a decisive blow against the United States and its allies.
As an official of the International Department has explained, “the question of alliance with the national liberation movement …today…is a question of carrying on the offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them.”10
The Soviets see revolutionary violence as a good in itself. “The freedom of the people can be built only on the bones of the oppressors, the soil for the self-rule of the people can be fertilized only with the blood of the oppressors,” Stalin had written in 1905, a dozen years before the Bolshevik coup d’etat.11 In its encouragement of terrorism and national liberation wars and its repudiation of negotiations, the current Soviet leadership is following this Stalinist tradition.
The Role of the KGB
In undertaking violent subversion against the non-Communist world, the Kremlin makes special use of the KGB, which undertakes a variety of activities to undermine non-Communist governments, including direct efforts to overthrow them.
One of the most blatant of these attempts occurred in Mexico. In the late 1960s, a group of Mexican students at Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba University were encouraged by Soviet mentors to overthrow their government. The Soviets, not wishing to become too closely involved themselves because they maintained diplomatic relations with Mexico, arranged for the budding Mexican revolutionaries to receive assistance from North Korea. When they returned to Mexico, they undertook a series of robberies and made plans “to detonate bombs simultaneously at fifteen airports, hotels, restaurants, and public buildings throughout Mexico.” Other terrorist activities were also contemplated, including the sabotaging of bridges, railways, power lines, and factories. Fortunately, before the operations could begin, the terrorist network was discovered by Mexican
authorities. With evidence of the USSR’s involvement beyond dispute, the Mexican government in 1971 recalled its ambassador from Moscow and expelled five top officials from the Soviet embassy in Mexico.12
This KGB effort to overthrow the Mexican government is, despite its brazenness, not a unique episode. In the same year that Mexico uncovered the Soviet plot, the government of Sudan banished the Soviet ambassador and expelled hundreds of Soviet “technicians” after a pro-Soviet coup failed. At the same time, Ecuador ousted two KGB officials and a GRU (military intelligence) officer for their part in instigating a nationwide strike.13
In conclusion, it is clear that support of terrorism and subversion is undertaken at the direction of the Party leadership. Indeed, commenting on the operation in Mexico, John Barron, one of America’s foremost authorities on the KGB, has written that “there can be no question that an operation of this extent and sensitivity could not have been mounted without Politburo approval.”14 This is not surprising, for in undertaking these operations, the KGB and the Politburo are only fulfilling the instructions of Lenin.
I see with horror, real horror, that we have been talking of bombs for more than a half year and not one single one has been made….
Give every company short and simple bomb formulae…. They must begin their military training immediately in direct connection with practical fighting actions. Some will immediately kill a spy or blow up a police station; others will organize an attack on a bank, in order to confiscate funds for the uprising….15
1. Cited in Nathan Leites, a Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, II: The Free Press, 1953), p. 358.
2. Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary World, trans. James Riordan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 191.
3. K. Zarodov, Leninism and Contemporary Problems of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, trans. David Skvirsky, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 193.
4. Arnold Kunzli and Karl Marx, Eine Psychographie (Wien, Frankfurt, Zurich: Europe Verlag, 1966), pp. 703, 712, 715, in Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (NY: Crane Russak, 1984), p. 9
5. Claire Sterling in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support, Hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 49-50.
6. Cline and Alexander, pp. 56-57,59.
7. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, Hearings, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 6.
8. Claire Sterling, “Bulgaria Hired Agca to Kill Pope, Report of Italian Prosecutor Says,” New York Times, 10 June 1984, p. 20.
9. Khruschchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 369.
10. K. N. Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions Today, trans. Yuri Sdobnikov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), Part 1, p. 16.
11. Cited in Leites, p. 350.
12. John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (NY: Reader’s Digest Press, 1974), pp. 230-252.
13. Ibid., p.256.
14. Harry Rositzke, The KGB: The Eyes of Russia (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), pp. 227-228.
15. Letter of 16 September 1905, in Bertran D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (NY: Dial Press, 1948), p. 372.
With a diplomat words must diverge from acts–
what kind of diplomat would he otherwise be?
Words are one thing and acts something different.
Good words are masks for bad deeds. A sincere
diplomat would equal dry water, wooden iron.1
The English language has no single word to express adequately the entire complex of duplicitous methods the Soviet Union has developed to deceive, confuse and disorient the leaders of the free world. However, the Soviets do have such a term–in Russia, maskirovka. It sums up all the meanings of our words camouflage, concealment, deception, trickery, deliberate misinformation, and more. According to Soviet reference works, maskirovka includes a range of skullduggery, from military camouflage techniques to oral and printed disinformation. The importance of maskirovka as a weapon for complicating free world strategy is evident from the following official description of its military aspects:
Maskirova: . . . a complex of measures aimed at leading the opponent into error relative to the presence of and distribution of units (or fleet strength), various military installations, their condition, combat readiness and activities, and also the plans of the command. . . .According to the scale of application and the nature of the task decided upon, M. is subdivided into strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic maskirovka is formulated according to the decision of the supreme commanding staff and includes a complex of measures for maintaining in secrecy the preparations for strategic operations and campaigns, and also for disorienting the opponent relative to the true intentions and actions of the armed forces. . .2
In the political arena, the elements of deception which bear directly on the
effectiveness of America’s grand strategic moves include: 1) violations of treaties signed by the Soviets; 2) concealment of intentions in the development and deployment of weapons systems; 3) disinformation ploys designed to mask real political actions; 4) semantic warfare and 5) propaganda campaigns aimed at evoking desired reactions from free world peoples and governments. The last three of these deception devices will be discussed in Chapter 6.
The Soviets enter into treaties which they do not intend to keep in order to deceive the target country as to their intentions and thus inhibit their defensive actions. For example, as we discuss later, the Soviets have cheated on the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, but the United States still complies with the terms of these Treaties.
An illustrative violation of an early international obligation was Moscow’s disregard of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. This agreement was an attempt to outlaw war. It declared that “war should be renounced as an instrument of national policy, and that the settlement of disputes should never be sought except by peaceful means.” The logic was that if no side started a war, no war could occur. The reasoning, thus, was quite similar to current Soviet arguments for a no-first-use pledge: if neither side uses nuclear weapons first, a nuclear war cannot occur.
However noble the intentions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it clearly failed. The Soviet Union, in particular, violated its obligations by joining Nazi Germany in invading Poland in 1939. Later that same year, the Soviets invaded Finland, which led to the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations.
The Soviet Union was undeterred by the League’s condemnation, however. The following year it invaded Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, ultimately incorporating them, like Georgia, into the USSR. These acts of aggression, like the preceding ones, demonstrate the worth of Moscow’s signature on international agreements.
Just as the Soviet Union did not live up to its international obligations before the Second World War, it did not live up to them afterwards. Although it pledged under the Atlantic Charter not to seek territorial aggrandizement, it incorporated territory from Finland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia into its own boundaries. Similarly, in numerous East European countries, the Soviet government did not live up to its obligation to “respect the right of all peoples to choose their form of government.”
“This war is not as in the past,” Stalin told a visiting Yugoslav delegation during World War II. “Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”3
In seven summit meetings between a U.S. President and a Soviet leader up to 1970, 25 agreements were reached. The Soviets violated 24 out of the 25.4
Delusions of Détente
From the free world viewpoint, the policy of détente arose from the need to adjust to the Soviet Union’s growing military power. Mindful of the dangers inherent in an unrestricted rivalry, Henry Kissinger sought to establish a set of rules that would
moderate the competition and minimize the possibility of uncontrollable escalation.
Yet, as we have had occasion to see many times in recent years, the Soviet Union has cynically disregarded its agreements and promises. According to the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed on June 22, 1973, “the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations.”5 However, during the Middle East War that broke out during October 1973, the Soviet Union attempted to inflame the conflict for its own benefit.
For example, Brezhnev sent Algerian President Boumedienne a message stating that “Syria and Egypt must not remain alone in their struggle against a treacherous enemy” and urging “the broadest support for them.6 In addition, the Soviets encouraged the Arab oil-exporting countries to use their oil as a weapon against the free world. “Favorable conditions now exist,” broadcast Radio Moscow, “for Arab use of oil as an economic and political weapon of pressure against the capitalist states which are supporting Israeli aggression.”7
Perhaps the most spectacular breach of this agreement was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979. That cold-blooded first step toward annexation of a free and independent neighbor also violated at least nine provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.
New Revelations of Soviet Cheating
A secret new presidential report concludes that the Soviet Union has committed 17 “material breaches” involving nine treaties and four international commitments over the last 25 years. Seven of these breaches involved the critical SALT agreements.
The report, still classified, is entitled “A quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983.” It is the result of a study conducted by the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC), made up of outside experts. According to the Wall Street Journal, the GAC concluded that the Soviets have engaged in “an all-out deception and concealment campaign to mislead the U.S. about the true extent of the Soviet military buildup.” The Study also warned of covert Soviet development of genetic engineering to create new chemical-biological agents, “covert use of air defense systems to enhance ABM capability,” and the concealment of spare missiles for re-fire stored on land and on submarines.8
A government briefing official quoting passages from the GAC report said that some of the Soviet violations are “measures to test U.S. intelligence capabilities and U.S. political processes relative to arms control,” and “may have been a cover for more extensive violations taking place now or to take place in the future.”9
The extent and manner of the violations reveal the contempt the Soviet leadership has for the opinion of mankind, as well as for the arms control process. One of the violations, for example, concerns the use of booby traps and incendiary devices to maim and kill the civilian population of Afghanistan. Dr. Claude Malhuret, Executive Director of Medicine Without Frontiers, which provides medical assistance to the embattled Afghan people, has written of the Soviet “reign of terror.” His doctors have “seen the
damage caused by the explosion of booby-trapped toys, in most cases plastic pens or small red trucks, which are choice terror weapons. Their main targets are children whose hands and arms are blown off. It is impossible to imagine any objective that is more removed from conventional military strategy.”10
Other alarming violations concern chemical and biological weapons. Beginning in 1975, refugees fleeing Laos reported attacks by aircraft carrying rockets that released clouds of vapor. The vapors caused a variety of medical symptoms including blisters, nausea, shock, and vomiting blood. Victims frequently died. Over the next few years, the reports increased, not only from Southeast Asia, but also in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion. As one Afghan refugee told a U.N. investigating team:
In summer 1981–on the border with USSR–one group went into the cave. Russians brought tanks but they were not able to enter the cave so they started drilling. Twenty-five friends were inside the cave. The Russians made a hole and put a pipe into it and pumped something into the cave and then went away from the site. When we went to the cave the pipes were undug and found the bodies were as if cooked, flesh was very soft and came apart.11
Deception in Strategic Weapons Control
Among the most critical Soviet violations are those which contravene the provisions of SALT I prohibiting anti-ballistic missile defense systems. The combination of illegal phased-array battle-management radars, SAM-10 and SAM-12 surface-to-air missiles capable of intercepting incoming U.S. ICBM’s, and testing of these in coordination with ICBM launches in recent months have created grave concern over the future effectiveness of our deterrent forces. The Department of Defense observes: “The Soviets seem to have placed themselves in a position to field relatively quickly a nationwide ABM system should they decide to do so.”12
Robert Jastrow, former director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, has pointed out the significance of the new Soviet radars:
…the radar at Abalakovo has every characteristic of a radar intended for defense against enemy missiles. It is just the kind of radar that is outlawed by the ABM treaty.
Some Soviet violations of SALT have exploited loopholes in the language of the treaty, violating the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement. The radar at Abalakovo rips the very heart out of the treaty. Senator McClure calls it “the most flagrant Soviet SALT violation yet.”
The Abalakovo radar is disturbing for another reason. Radars of this kind are mammoth devices, requiring years to construct. The appearance of this radar indicates that the Soviets decided years ago to go in for a big system of missile defense, in violation of the ABM treaty. Apparently they decided to cheat on the treaty rather than withdrawing from it formally, in the hope that we would continue to honor it and thereby be placed at a disadvantage.13
One of the major violations of SALT agreements has been the Soviet use of encrypted telemetry from missile testing. Most recently, new deception techniques have been added, including jamming of satellite and other channels that monitor telemetry for compliance, and the use of drastic power reduction in transmissions from the missiles. A press report citing official sources states:
The latest apparent Soviet violation of nuclear arms provisions against interfering with the verification of compliance results in U.S. monitoring satellites, ships, and ground stations receiving virtually no usable telemetry data. . . .14
Viewed from a perspective apart from the details of treaty violations, there is another level of Soviet deception, or sowing of confusion. While arms control advocates debate with Administration officials the fuzzy question of whether the Soviets have or have not violated a particular section of a particular SALT agreement, the Soviets continue with their buildup, perhaps toward eventual ‘breakouts” that will catastrophically alter the balance of strategic power. We must not let ourselves be distracted from the realities by wishful thinking that the legalisms of arms control will really afford protection from Soviet power projection. Senator Malcolm Wallop (R.-Wyoming) has pointed up this pitfall of negotiating with the Soviets:
. . .the difficulty of reducing the reality of modern weapons to legal terms, the pressures on American negotiators to make those terms both negotiable and arguably verifiable, and the political impediments to deciding that any given Soviet activity warrants abandoning a fundamental foreign policy –all these have produced an intellectual tangle of our own making, within which we thrash about even as the Soviets widen their margin of military superiority. Since the question of Soviet violations of arms control treaties refers to a framework removed from reality, dwelling on the question is only to compound the unreality.14
1. Cited in Leites, p. 325.
2. Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopedia (Soviet Military Encyclopedi)(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978), Vol. 5, pp. 175-177.
3. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), p. 114.
4. U.S. News and World Report based on staff study for Senate Judiciary Committee, May 29, 1972.
5. U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 24, pt. 2, “Prevention of Nuclear War,” TIAS no. 7654.
6. El Moudharid (Algiers), October 10, 1973, in FBIS: Middle East & Africa, October 16, 1973, p. T 2.
7. October 18, 1973, cited bfy Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Détente (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1974), p. 82.
8. Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1984, p. 16.
9. Walter Andrews, Washington Times, July 17, 1984, p. 2.
10. Claude Malhuret, “Report from Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/84, pp. 429,430.
11. “Chemical-Biological Warfare in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1982.
12. Soviet Military Power 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 34.
13. Robert Jastrow. “Reagan vs the Scientists: Why the President is Right about Missile Defense,” Commentary, January 1984, p. 24.
14. Walter Andrews, Washington Times, July 12, 1984, p. 1.
15. Senator Malcolm Wallop, “Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: So What?” Strategic Review, Summer 1983, p. 19.
SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE
In pursuing their active peace policy, the USSR
and other socialist countries have no pacifist illusions.
Their policy rests, on the one hand, on the widespread
international antiwar movement and the public forces
opposed to aggression and war, and, on the other, on
the military cooperation of the socialist countries and
their material strength.1
Marshal Ivan Bagramyan
Member, Central Committee
Communist Party, Soviet Union
One of the principal Soviet strategies for conquest is to disarm the free world militarily and intellectually by a massive peace offensive.
Support to and manipulation of “peace forces” in the free world have been central to Moscow’s plan to change the world balance of power increasingly in its favor, since these political groups inhibit the ability of free world governments to respond to the Soviet Union’s military buildup.
Thus, one Soviet specialist on nuclear arms wrote on the eve of the first SALT negotiations that the USSR should not negotiate in a spirit of give-and-take, but instead should base its position on the erosion of the American position resulting from domestic political pressures.
Disarmament. . . can be achieved only as a result of the most active pressure on their governments by the revolutionary forces in the imperialist countries in conjunction with a flexible and principled policy by the socialist camp. Any other notion of the paths for achieving disarmament is an illusion.2
In 1983, the same author wrote in Military History Journal, the monthly organ of the Ministry of Defense, that the Soviet Armed Forces and free world peace movements are effectively united in one giant “front” against free world governments.3
In order to foster ties between these two fronts, the Soviet Union has tried to expand its influence over free world peace movements. Because Western Communist parties are known to have loyalties to Moscow, and therefore lack credibility in the eyes of many antiwar activists, the Kremlin has established a number of international front organizations, the foremost of which is the World Peace Council.
“The opening of a profound dialogue with the antiwar movements in the free world is a prime task of the peace movement in socialist countries, “B. Sarkadi Nagy, the General Secretary of the All-Hungarian Peace Council, has explained. “This can be facilitated substantially by such a respected international organization as the World Peace Council (WPC).”4
WPC activities in the United States used to be coordinated by the U.S. Communist Party (CPUSA), but in 1979 two of the CPUSA’s members established the U.S. Peace Council as a WPC affiliate. Subsequently, WPC related activities in the United States increased materially.5
Nevertheless, the close public association between the WPC and the international Communist movement has tended to undermine the credibility of the WPC and its affiliates. Indeed, even Nagy, while disputing the idea that the WPC is a “puppet organization” of Moscow’s, nevertheless cannot avoid acknowledging that “the socialist countries fully share the aims of the WPC.”6
The Kremlin also influences public opinion through disinformation by the KGB. For example, the number of forged documents designed to promote Soviet foreign policy interests has more than doubled since 1975-76, according to a U.S. interagency intelligence study.7
Perhaps the most notorious of these forgeries was a fake U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, which, among other things, asserted that the U.S. envisaged “the use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard the interests of the United States in friendly nations where communists appear close to entering the government.”8 The forgery gained attention in Europe following the abduction and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, which Soviet commentators claimed were acting under the instructions of the CIA.
A more recent example is that of letters sent to athletes from twenty African and Asian countries threatening them if they did not support the Soviet boycott of Olympics. The letters were made to appear as if they had been sent by the Ku Klux Klan. This latest KGB forgery was revealed by Attorney General William French Smith in an address to the American Bar Association dealing with the Communist threat to international law. His statement was supported by FBI Director William H. Webster. Smith revealed that linguistic and forensic techniques identified the source of the letters as the KGB.9
Another favorite tactic is the political influence operation, which is designed “to insinuate Soviet Policy Views into foreign governmental, political, journalistic, business,
labor, artistic, and academic circles in a nonattributable or at least seemingly unofficial manner.” Because they “fall in the gray area between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation,” these operations are extremely difficult to uncover. 10
In one famous case involving an “agent of influence” the Danish Ministry of Justice explained how the Soviet Embassy in the summer of 1981 promised to partially finance “the expenditure incurred in connection with the publication of a number of advertisements in which a number of Danish artists expressed support of an initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The collection of signatures was organized by Arne Herlov Petersen,” an agent of influence.11
The Double Standard
Although the rulers of the Soviet Union make every effort to influence free world public opinion, knowing the effect this can have on the policies of free world governments, they resolutely resist giving their own people that same power. For them, as we have seen, such influence would be ‘inconvenient.”:
While the political decision making process in the free world takes place as though at a circus before the eyes of a colossal number of spectators, we have a different tradition. Our decision making processes run their course without too much publicity. It is important that the people taking part in the decision making process retain maximum objectivity in their evaluation of the actual issues.
Pressure from public opinion could make their approach to the problems more difficult when decisions are make in public. That is why we think that, at the present state of development at least, it is better for these problems to be handled with as little public access as possible.12
Accordingly, Soviet citizens are deprived of the right to influence their government’s actions in an area concerning their most vital interests–the issue of war and peace. Although there is an official peace organization representing the views of the state, attempts by ordinary Soviet citizens to form their own peace organizations have been suppressed ruthlessly.
“The opportunity to criticize the policy of one’s national leaders in matters of war and peace as you do freely is, in our country, entirely absent,” Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Laureate in Peace, wrote to an American colleague. “Not only critical statements but those merely factual in nature, made on even much less important questions, often entail arrest and a long sentence of confinement or psychiatric prison.”13
The hypocrisy of the Soviet position is shown in the following report from the New York Times:
The Soviet police moved in today to seal off the apartment where a fledgling independent disarmament group was planning to meet. The action came after the police had warned the group’s members that their movement was provocative, antisocial, and illegal.
The crackdown on the group, whose objective was to be as free of official
control as disarmament movements in the United States and Western Europe, was accompanied by glowing accounts in the Soviet press of the huge protest Saturday in New York against nuclear War.14
And indeed, the chief editor of Pravda indicated to an Austrian interviewer last year that members of unofficial peace groups in the USSR would be treated as criminals.
I cannot agree, either, with the assertion that there is an independent peace movement in the Soviet Union. What this is all about is actually a handful of people –10, 15, no more –among them also a few criminal types, who actually have only one aim: to assert their private, personal interests, and ho to this end are abusing the emotions for peace, the longing for peace.15
All of this may strike the average free world reader as grossly unfair, but to Soviet officials this double standard is unremarkable. “The ruling classes of the bourgeois states are unable to accept as a norm of international law the socialist conception of ‘fairness,’ ” observes a Soviet legal specialist. “For the same reasons the socialist states are unable to accept the bourgeois conception of fairness.”16
The word “peace” is the leading edge of Communist semantic warfare whereby they use Aesopian language with their own meaning being different from the generally accepted meaning to confuse their enemies.
As we have seen, the Soviets have mounted a massive propaganda campaign to convince people around the world that they are the party of peace. In particular, the Soviets have attempted to portray themselves as the champions of disarmament. Indeed, in 1983 Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a major speech, cited Lenin’s comment that “disarmament is the ideal of socialism” as proof of the USSR’s peaceful intentions throughout its history.17 Mr. Gromyko did not go on to recount Lenin’s full remarks, which are more revealing of Soviet purposes.
Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in socialist society; consequently, disarmament will be achieved. But whoever expects that socialism will be achieved without a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power based directly on violence. And in the twentieth century — as in the age of civilization generally — violence means neither a fist nor a club, but troops. To put “disarmament” in the program is tantamount to making the general declaration: We are opposed to the use of arms. There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence.18
Thus, Gromyko’s reference purposefully distorted Lenin’s true meaning. Yet if Gromyko was trying to hide his intentions, other Soviet spokesmen have revealed them. “In merciless polemics with bourgeois pacifists and social-democratic dogmatists,” a
Soviet publicist wrote last year, “V. I. Lenin demonstrated that the one true path of struggle against war is an upsurge of the revolutionary movement and the victory of the socialist revolution.”19
“In view of the keen political and ideological struggle in the world today,” a Soviet analyst wrote in 1968, “it is important to remember that, when two classes say one and the same thing, it is not one and the same thing.”20
Recognizing the attraction of democracy in the modern world, the Soviets invented the concept of people’s democracy, in which the people are denied democratic rights available in the free world. In a book entitled Socialist Democracy, the head of the Soviet Political Science Association explains the difference between Soviet and free world concepts of democracy.
The question of freedom cannot be approached from an abstract point of view. To reject a class approach is to do violence to reality. Any moral assessment of the right of the state to restrict individual freedom depends entirely on the basic premises adopted. The proletariat and other working classes reject the right of the bourgeois state to limit their freedom of action in the struggle against capitalism and assert the right of the socialist state to limit freedom of action in the struggle against socialism.21
The Soviet concept of democracy, in other words, is the exact opposite of ours: whereas democracy in the free world protects the political rights of all, democracy in the Soviet bloc is designed to suppress the political rights of those opposed to the Communist party. Similarly, Moscow’s use of the word “socialism” is intended to make its philosophy more attractive in the free world, where social democracy has become popular. Yet while using the words “Communism” and “socialism” virtually interchangeably, the Soviets strive to assure that Communists understand the difference. In Brezhnev’s words, “Communists should remain revolutionaries and convinced supporters of the replacement of the capitalist by the socialist system.”22
1. Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, Member, “Lessons of World War II for Our Time,” World Marxist Review May 1972, p. 96.
2. Ye. Rybkin, “A Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of War and Peace,” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 18, 1968, p. 90.
3. Ye. Rybkin, “V. I. Lenin, CPSU on Imperialism as a Constant Source of Military Danger, ” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 4, 1983, p. 10.
4. B. Sarkadi Nagy, “The Unprecedented Scope of the Antiwar Movement,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1983, p. 75.
5. Statement by the FBI in U.S. Congress, House, Soviet Active Measures, p. 224.
6. Nagy, p. 75.
7. U.S. Congress, House, Soviet Active Measures, p. 37.
8. U.S. Congress, House, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), p. 86.
9. “”Klan Olympic Hate Mail Said to be KGB’s,” Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1984, p. 1.
10. U.S. Congress, House, Soviet Active Measures, p. 60.
11. Ibid, p. 62.
12. Aleksandr Bovin in Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), February 27, 1983, in FBIS-SOV, March 4, 1983, p. R 9.
13. Andrei Sakharov, “The Danger of Thermonuclear War, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1983, p. 1015.
14. Serge Schmemann, “Soviet Police Bar Disarmament Meeting,” New York Times, June 14, 1982, p. A 3.
15. Viktor Afanasyev interviewed by Vienna Domestic Service, November 16, 1983, in FBIS: SOV, November 18, 1983, p. CC 2.
16. G. I. Tunkin, Ideologicheskaya borba I mezhdunarodnoye pravo (The Ideological Struggle and International Law) (Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnyye otnoshenia,” 1967), p. 30.
17. TASS, June 16, 1983, in FBIS:SOV, June 17, 1983, p. R 9.
18. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), Vol. 23, p. 95.
19. O. Bykov, “Revolutionary Theory on the Deliverance of Mankind from War,” Mirovaya ekonomika I mezhdunarodnyye otnoshenia (World Economy and International Relations), No. 4, 1983, p. 11.
20. A. Sovetov, “The Present Stage in the Struggle between Socialism and Imperialism,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, 1968, p. 7.
21. G. Shahnazarov, Socialist Democracy, trans. Bryan Bean (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 143.
22. For peace, security, cooperation and social progress in Europe: On the Results of the Conference of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of Europe (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1976), p. 21. Emphasis added.
SOVIET ECONOMIC WAR
The objective of Soviet economic war strategies is to gain control of primary sources of energy and strategic minerals, to buy or steal free world technology, and to sell illegal drugs to target countries.
The Soviet Union is positioning itself to apply a strangulation strategy which could block free world access to primary sources of energy and strategic minerals: the Persian Gulf for petroleum; southern Africa for strategic minerals. It is aiming for control of sea-lane choke points such as: the Strait of Malacca, the Red Sea, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Caribbean. The projection of Soviet naval strength to Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam); anchorages off Ethiopia, South Yemen, Madagascar, Mozambique and Angola; and the naval bases in Cuba are principally for this purpose.
By blocking access to raw materials, the Soviet Union could damage all of its most economically advanced enemies at one time. Japanese, West European, and
American dependence on mineral and energy imports is well known.
One recent study estimated that ending chromium imports from South Africa to the U.S. would result in the loss of one million jobs.1
The loss of the Persian Gulf fuel resources would have a more substantial impact on Japan and Europe than on the U.S., but commitments made by the U.S. to share oil-shortage burdens with its allies ensure that Americans would be significantly affected as well by an interruption of oil flows from the Middle East.
The Soviet resource war has also meant encouraging “national liberation movements” in key resource areas. For example, since the 1960s, the Soviets have funded revolutionary groups in Zaire, a major source of cobalt and copper for free world industries. Increasingly, the Soviets have not only provided money and guns, but they have also supplied advisers and armed combatants through surrogate countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam. In Lusaka, Zambia, the center of Africa’s copper belt, members of the Soviet embassy have been declared persona non grata with remarkable frequency for meddling with union organizations in the nation’s key copper industry.
Given the structure of Soviet society, it is impossible for the Soviet scientific establishment to deliver state-of-the-art research in the wide range of fields that are moving rapidly forward in the world of today.
So, another Soviet economic war strategy is to buy and to steal free world technology. In 1983 testimony before the Senate, Undersecretary of State William Schneider identified five ways the USSR would benefit: (1) significant savings in time and money in their military research and development programs; (2) rapid modernization of their defense industrial infrastructure; (3) closing of gaps between our weapon systems and theirs; (4) rapid development of neutralizing countermeasures to our own technological innovations; and (5) saving of capital to be used in more direct military applications.2
Despite its illegality, the Soviet emphasis on theft of technology has involved very little risk. What has happened to the Soviets for their many episodes of known theft? Representatives of Soviet missions have been expelled. In the 1970s, waves of expulsion of Soviet personnel from Western Europe and Japan occurred, many of them employees of Aeroflot, Soviet trade missions, and even employees of international organizations. But this is a very small cost.
The Soviets know that they do not have to focus on classified goods or data to obtain much of the technical details of U.S. military programs. The very openness of American society that is its hallmark — especially in scientific endeavor — makes it that much easier for the Soviet Union to obtain basic research as soon as it is available to the U.S. military.
The fact that American firms compete in the global marketplace by exporting the latest technology creates a golden opportunity for Soviet espionage. In early 1984, a former executive of ASEA, a large Swedish electronics firm, acknowledged selling a sophisticated computer containing American parts to the Soviet Union, even though the parts were on a not-for-export list. At the same time, another Swedish firm was fined
over $3 million by an American court for shipping U.S. radar technology to the Soviet Union in the late 1970s.3 The Soviets have often used as “neutral” transfer points for American high-technology several non-Communist countries, including Austria, Switzerland, South Africa, and France.
What do the Soviets do with one computer? They engage in “reverse engineering,” taking apart a complex commercial product so that they can make copies. The RYAD series of Soviet computers are imitations of the IBM 360s and 370s. But the habit is old: the Soviet TU-4 bomber is a copy of the American B-29.
The U.S. has thus consistently faced a dilemma, wishing to unfetter trade with the members of the free world community, but finding that the most valuable technologies are often sold right away to the Soviet Union. The efforts to institutionalize controls through the NATO-based COCOM, or even through offshore application of unilateral American controls, have been exercises in frustration. While they have undoubtedly helped to reduce or slow down the flow of militarily-critical technologies to the Soviet Union, they have done so at the cost of constant bickering between the U.S. and its allies.
The Soviet quest for hard currency, combined with its interest in undermining free world societies, has led to Communist bloc export of drugs. There are a number of examples to support this conclusion: North Korean diplomats were expelled from various European countries for dealing in contraband drugs. In April 1984, CBS News reported that Bulgaria and its export agency (Kintex) have been intensively involved in a three way trade of contraband arms to the Middle East for heroin, which was exported to Western Europe for high-technology goods, which were sent to the Soviet Union, and so on.4
Another Soviet bloc member seeking to undermine the social fabric of the U.S. and at the same time to convert drugs to hard currency is Cuba. In early 1984, Cuba was said to be receiving as much as $500,000 per shipment of marijuana and cocaine from Latin America that was given “safe harbor” in Cuban waters for transfer to ships making the final run to the American Coast.5 For the Soviet bloc, such economic transactions are ideal: they make money, and the free world is weakened.
1. James T. Bennett and Walter E. Williams, Strategic Minerals: The Economic Impact of Supply Disruptions (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1981).
2. William Schneider, Jr., “Export Control of High Technology,” U.S. Department of State Bulletin, June 1983, pp. 71-74.
3. Washington Post, May 3, 1984, p. 8.
4. CBS News Transcript, April 27, 1984.
5. “Smugglers of Drugs from Colombia to U.S. are Protected by U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1984, p. 1.
SOVIET MILITARY POWER
. . .the Soviets…now probable possess the necessary
combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy,
and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047
U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own
ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force now deployed
Cannot inflict similar damage, even using the entire force.1
Report of the President’s Commission
On Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission)
The major Soviet expansion–the addition of Eastern Europe to its empire–was achieved by force of arms. To keep this gain, and to be ready for further expansion, the Soviets did not demobilize after World War II.
Since World War II, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Forces have had conventional military superiority over the United States and Western Europe. The United States and Western Europe decided not to match this superiority at the conventional level, but to balance it by United States strategic and theater nuclear force superiority–the “nuclear shield.”
With only half the gross national product of the United States, the Soviets have been spending half again as much as the United States on military forces generally and three times as much on strategic military forces.
They spend 13-15% of their gross national product on military power as compared to U.S. defense expenditures of 7% of GNP.
Such a rapid and intense armament program has not occurred since Hitler’s arming of Germany in preparation for World War II.
In conventional weapons the Soviets have kept their advantage; for example, they have a four to one advantage over the U.S. in tanks and a six to one advantage in artillery.
Since the Soviets are still well ahead in conventional forces, it is critical to look at the strategic military balance. Here’s how the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the current strategic military balance in their Military Posture FY 1985.
Soviet strategic thinking holds that, with superior capabilities, they can fight and win a nuclear war with the United States. The sustained Soviet strategic buildup during the past two decades seem to bear this out. Table 1, at right, shows that the Soviets hold a distinct advantage in terms of total numbers of strategic offensive forces.
The Soviets have improved all aspects of their strategic offensive forces and supporting elements, significantly modernized their command and control capabilities, and upgraded their strategic defenses. The soviets are convinced that potential enemies will not only be deterred from initiating attack on the Soviet Union because of their superior nuclear
forces, but also will be hesitant to counter Soviet political or military actions in general.2
See Table 1 at end of chapter.
This dangerous strategic situation is the result of a decision by the United States in the mid-1960s to achieve security through strategic arms limitation instead of military strength.
To facilitate arms control talks, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara froze our ICBM level at 1054 land-based missiles and our SLBM at 656 submarine-based missiles.
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
40 TITAN SS-11 550
450 MINUTEMAN II SS-13 60
550 MINUTEMAN III SS-17 150
1040 SS-18 308
304 POSEIDON• SS-N-5 45
288 TRIDENT I SS-N-6 368
592 SS-N-8 292
168 B-52G BEAR 100
96 B-52H BISON 45
61 FB-111 BACKFIRE•• 230
· MISSILES 1632 2379
· BOMBERS 325 375
• INCLUDES SLBMs POTENTIALLY CARRIED ON TRIDENT
AND TYPHOON SSBNs ON SEA TRIAL
•• INCLUDES SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR FORCE AND NAVAL
AVIATION BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT______________________________________
AS of JANUARY 1984
Table 1. Military Posture, FY 1985, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 21.
The Soviets, seeing this, went all out to take advantage of the situation. By 1969, when the SALT negotiations began, the Soviet strategic force was already ahead in deliverable megatonnage.
Henry Kissinger spoke of the shift from clear U.S. military superiority in the mid-1960s to growing Soviet military superiority in the 1970s. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 on the proposed SALT II Treaty, he observed:
Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the military balance. If we are to remedy it, we must first recognize the fact that we have placed ourselves at a significant disadvantage voluntarily. This is not the result of SALT: it is the consequence of a unilateral decision extending over a decade and a half; by a strategic doctrine adopted in the Sixties, by the bitter domestic divisions growing out of the war in Vietnam, and by choices of the present Administration. All these actions were unilateral, hence avoidable. They were not extracted from us by clever Soviet negotiators; we imposed them on ourselves by our choice, theories, and domestic turmoil. It is therefore in our power to alter them.3
Neither the SALT I Treaty nor the SALT II Treaty slowed the Soviet buildup in any way.
The result is that the Soviets now have a modern strategic force with 75 percent of their delivery systems less than 5 years old while the United States has an aging force with 75 percent of its delivery systems at lest 15 years old.
Thus, it is understandable that in response to a question General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Defense Appropriations Committee he would be willing to “trade” United States missiles for Soviet missiles.4
While, the Reagan administration is having great difficulty getting Congress to fund three new weapons systems–the MX missile, B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine–the Soviets currently have more than 30 new strategic offensive systems in various stages of development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in discussing these new weapons noted:
Projections for the 1983-1993 period include new, solid-propellant medium and small ICBMs, both silo-based and mobile, and improvements in the currently-deployed SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. Follow-on systems with greater accuracy and targeting flexibility are being developed. SLBM projections include deployment of the new SS-N-20 (typhoon-class) SLBM and development of the SS-NX-23 follow-on missile for the SS-N-18. The airbreathing threat is likely to grow significantly. Continued Backfire production accounts for the great increase in the number of delivery vehicles. Projected development of the new Blackjack A and Bear H intercontinental bombers will also increase the airbreathing threat. Both of these bombers eventually will carry long-range cruise missiles. The airbreathing threat projection also includes development of land- and submarine- launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2,000 nautical miles.5
Similarly, the Soviets are ahead in Intermediate Nuclear Forces. They have deployed 378 SS-20 nuclear missiles with three warheads each. Production on both these systems continue. The Soviets also have under development five new, long-range cruise missiles which will be integrated into both the Warsaw Pact and Soviet strategic forces in the coming years. In comparison the U.S. had deployed to NATO at the end of 1983, 9 Pershing II IRBMs and 16 ground-launched cruise missiles. The total NATO program calls for 108 Pershing IIs and 464 GLCMs, but these will not all be in place until the end of 1988.
In Secretary Weinberger’s Annual Report for FY 84, he included a table which summarized the numbers of key weapons, conventional as well as nuclear, produced by the two sides between 1974-82. This dramatically illustrates the cause of the change in the military balance to which former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, referred. See Table 2 on page 61
Strategic Military Balance–Defense
Nowhere is the disparity between U.S. and Soviet military power greater than in strategic defense forces. The disparity viewed over a twenty-year period is the result of opposite decisions by the two nations. The Soviets decided to invest in the defense of weapons and people. The U.S. decided such an investment was not cost-effective.
The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) codified a minimum defense for both nations in ABM weapons. It did not obligate the U.S. to reduce its air defense or civil defense structures. The U.S. decision to reduce those elements was unilateral.
It is now widely recognized that the Soviets agreed to the ABM Treaty for one reason, and one reason only: to halt U.S. research and development that was leading to an effective ABM system, a system considerably superior to the one then being built by the Soviet Union. That Soviet decision was not made because of a fundamental belief that strategic defense was meaningless in the nuclear age. Soviet officials have repeatedly denounced the idea of defenselessness as unwise. Their internal propaganda has held it up as an example of confused bourgeois thinking–of the complete disregard of United States leaders for the lives of their citizens.
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED WEAPONS 1
Soviet Non- Pact
To Soviet Non- To
Soviet U.S. Warsaw U.S. NATO
Category Union U.S. Ratio Pact NATO Ratio
Tanks 17,350 6,400 2.7:1 3,450 2,600 2.3:1
Other Armored Vehicles 2 36,650 4,800 7.6:1 9,100 10,300 3.0:1
Artillery and Rocket Launchers 13,350 950 14.1:1 1,300 700 8.9:1
Tactical Combat Aircraft 3 6,100 3,050 2.0:1 800 2,650 1.2:1
Intercontinental Ballistic 2,035 346 5.9:1 __ __ __
Major Surface Warships 85 72 1.2:1 10 79 0.6:1
Attack Submarines 61 27 2.3:1 __ 33 1.0:1
Ballistic Missile 33 2 16.5:1 __ 3 6.6:1
Theater Nuclear 5,850 3,550 1.6:1 __ 1,450 1.2:1
1 Totals represent that portion of a nation’s production earmarked for its own
military services plus imports, and excludes production for export.
2 Includes light tanks; armored personnel carriers; infantry fighting vehicles;
reconnaissance, fire support, and air defense vehicles.
3 Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and all
combat-capable tactical training aircraft.
4 Includes ground and sea launched missiles, as well as intermediate and medium
range ballistic missiles.
Table 2. Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1984, p. 24.
The United States made its decision to halt its investment in ABM defenses in the early 1970s in keeping with the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction. This was based on the idea that if the population of both nations was undefended, neither side would attack because the other would destroy its population in response. As discussed in Chapter 15, the Soviets have never accepted this theory–which made nuclear hostages out of the American people while the Soviets have gone all out to protect their people.
The decision to reduce drastically our air and civil defense structures was a direct result of the ABM decision. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared in his Annual Report of January 1976, “Because of the ABM Treaty, the Department will
continue to reduce its emphasis on actively defending CONUS [continental United States] against an all-out strategic attack. A major anti-bomber defense of CONUS without comparable anti-missile defense, in an era of massive missile threats, would not be a sound use of resources.”6
Specifically, the ABM Treaty signed in May 1972 authorized both nations to have two ABM sites containing 100 missile launchers each. One site was to protect the nation’s capital city; the other was to protect an ICBM base. The Protocol to the ABM Treaty, signed in July 1974, reduced the number of sites from two to one.
In the fall of 1975, the Congress ordered the Department of Defense to unilaterally dismantle the one ABM site the U.S. had built near Grand Forks, North Dakota, to protect an ICBM complex. Today, the U.S. has no defense at all against Soviet land-based or sea-based missiles[CFC1] .
During the period of the 1970s the U.S. began what Secretary Laird referred to as the “drastic reduction” of its air defense force.7 First, it dismantled all its 895 surface-to-air missiles between 1973 and 1975. Next it began the more gradual reduction of its fighter-interceptor force along with the associated radar and communications network. The force of slightly over 600 fighter-interceptors has been cut to less than half, although the long over-due replacement of outmoded F-4s has fortunately begun. Concurrent with this action, the U.S. disbanded the Air Defense Command as an operational command, giving the air defense responsibility to the Tactical Air Command. The Department of Defense Civil Defense organization was dismantled in 1977. Its responsibilities were transferred to the independent Federal Emergency Management Agency. As it now stands, its primary responsibility is to aid U.S. citizens in the event of natural disasters.
In contrast, the Soviet Union has since the mid-1960s built an ABM site around Moscow. It now contains 32 modern launchers and is being expanded to the Treaty level of 100 launchers. The Soviets have also experimented with a nationwide ABM system involving surface-to-air missiles in an ABM mode. The Soviets have also built a massive air defense system involving over 10,000 SAM missiles and 1,200 modern interceptor aircraft. In its tactical air forces, the Soviets have an additional 2,000 interceptors and 1,800 SAMs. The Soviet civil defense program is nationwide and ranks as a major component of the Soviet military establishment. It is headed by a four-star general who is member of the Soviet equivalent of our Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In addition, the Soviets have experimented extensively with anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and have such a weapon in the operational force. Yet it is precisely the development of a comparable weapon by the United States which the Soviets want to block at the proposed ASAT negotiations. Indeed, the Soviets also want the United States to commit itself to a moratorium on the development of both ASAT and ABM weapons before the negotiations begin.
The defenselessness of the United States has at long last been recognized. Under the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, priority is being given to anti-ballistic missile defenses. However, no decision has yet been reached to build an air defense force or to give the Federal Emergency Management Agency organization a bona fide civil defense responsibility.
1. Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, April 1983, p. 4.
2. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1985, p. 21.
3. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, The SALT II Treaty, Hearings, 96th Cong., 1st sess, 1979, p. 154.
4. Defense Daily, November 29, 1983, p. 140.
5. Military Posture FY 1985, p. 26.
6. Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs, January 17, 1976, p. 70.
7. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, February 15, 1972, p. 74.
A STRAGEGY FOR PEACE WITH FREEDOM
Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world
community of free and independent states–free to choose
their own future and their own system, so long as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.
John F. Kennedy
State of the Union Message
January 11, 1962
For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world
in which all people are at last free to determine their own
Address to British Parliament
June 8, 1982
Surely all Americans agree with this vision of the future shared by Presidents Kennedy and Reagan.
Standing between wish and reality, however, is the Communist Empire’s drive for world dominion.
The two goals are utterly irreconcilable.
The Soviet Union has a strategy for achieving its objective. The United States does not.
Since World War II, the United States has reacted to Soviet initiatives only when it perceived a threat to its national interests. The only difference between our Presidents
has been how quickly they saw the threat of each Soviet thrust and how strongly they reacted.
When the Soviets have taken over another country and consolidated control, the United States has accepted the change as a fait accompli and redrawn the line it was previously committed to defend. The freeing of Grenada was an exception to this pattern. Support of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters is another exception. But, as this is written, the House of Representatives has cut off aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and, thus, reestablished the pattern.
Unless the United States adopts a strategy to influence the outcome of this conflict, the U.S. will continue to lose in the same way a football team would lose if it has no game plan and does not choose to cross the line of scrimmage.
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary describes strategy as:
The science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.
In devising a strategy, we must be very clear that our ultimate goal is both peace and freedom.
Some believe we do not need a strategy to achieve the goal of peace alone. They think that all we have to do is to follow a policy of appeasement and phased retreat until we reach some kind of accommodation with the Soviets. They forget that in the end a free people will resist when they realize the cost of accommodation is the loss of their freedom. By then, it is too late for non-military resistance. This was exactly the pattern that got us into World War II.
The development and implementation of a strategy are very complex–especially for a democracy where the Executive Branch does not control all elements of national power and must seek a broad consensus before it can implement any true strategy.
Fortunately, there is a broad bipartisan support. That support was revealed in a public opinion poll conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) on July 27, 1984, involving telephone interviews of 1,003 respondents forming a scientifically selected sample of the adult population.
For example, 80.1% of the respondents agreed that “The United States should have a national strategy of peace through strength.”
The Peace Through Strength Strategy also has strong bipartisan support in the Congress. It has the endorsement of President Reagan and the sponsorship of 257 Members of Congress of both parties.
The Peace Through Strength Resolution was introduced in the United States Senate on March 8, 1983, with the co-sponsorship of 54 senators.
At that time, the eight principles of a national strategy of Peace Through Strength were explained to the Congress by four Republican and four Democratic senators.
Democratic Senator Ed Zorinsky’s remarks are included in Chapter 1. We are printing here extracts from the statements by the other senators because it would be difficult to improve on the clarity of their observations and recommendations:
PRINCIPLE 1: to inspire, focus and unite the national will and determination to achieve peace and freedom,
Public support is necessary if the United States is to implement a national strategy of peace through strength. It is a democracy, and no major policy can long be followed in the face of strong popular opposition.
But, adopting a national strategy that will influence the entire range of U.S. defense and foreign policy, including issues of such public concern as trade and military acquisition, will require far more than simple public acceptance. It must be vigorously promoted and explained.
As far as possible, all U.S. initiatives should be justified publicly in terms of their relation to national strategy. This implies that not only will the U.S. Government have to involve the isolated and compartmentalized foreign policy community with the public, but also that the entire basis for the current system of classifying Government secrets will have to be reworked to share with the public more facts about the Soviet threat.
The advantages of informing the public will be enormous. Public support for U.S. defense and foreign policy has often weakened, because the people simply did not understand the realities it was based on. This lack of understanding not only has given rise to opposition to a particular policy, but also has weakened public support of defense and foreign policy as a whole.
The need to justify defense and foreign policy initiatives to the public in terms of how they further the national interest would also improve policymaking.
In short, by forcing the defense and foreign policy community to clearly identify and express U.S. national priorities and goals, a national strategy of peace through strength would not only rally the American people behind the Government, but would also prove a powerful incentive to improve the quality and coherence of national policy initiatives.
Senator Jeremiah Denton
…a focusing of the national will is a crucial precondition to forging effective policies in this area. The United States cannot convince a skeptical world of its good intentions and probability of survival if its own people are not united behind a goal and a strategy to achieve that goal.
Our lack of a strategy and our inability to explain our motive for foreign policy initiatives have in many cases opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. Few nations are willing to believe the lack of coordination in U.S. policy is due to ineptness.
Senator Dennis DeConcini
PRINCIPLE 2: to achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union,
The key to a peace through strength strategy is to achieve our goals without armed
conflict. To do this, we must deter the Soviets from starting a war.
History shows that only superior war fighting capability can deter an aggressor. Forces that cannot win cannot deter.
The United States can have a superior war fighting capability without the cost of across-the-board numerical superiority if it exploits advanced technology such as the cruise missile and space based laser.
Senator John Tower
Now, the Soviets have gained a significant nuclear and conventional military superiority over the United States. This, together with the powerful Soviet worldwide propaganda and disinformation network promoting disarmament in the West, makes rebuilding our defenses an urgent necessity.
Senator Paul Laxalt
The opinion Research Corporation survey found that 61.7% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
PRINCIPLE 3: to create a strategic and civil defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected,
Under the Constitution, one of the first responsibilities of government is to provide for the common defense; yet, since the early 1960’s, the United States has structured its military forces and designed its strategies in keeping with the no-defense concept called mutual assured destruction (MAD).
According to the MAD principle, the United States and the Soviet Union will be equally deterred, and therefore secure, if the population and industrial centers of both nations are defenseless and can be easily destroyed by retaliation to a first strike. According to MAD, the absence of defensive weapons enhances deterrence.
As a matter of policy, therefore, the United States has scrapped nearly all its defenses. We have no defenses against Soviet ballistic missiles and only a few aged fighter interceptors to defend against Soviet bombers.
This MAD concept was never accepted in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets have built a modern, nationwide antiaircraft defense system with a small ballistic missile defense force around Moscow, backed by the missile defense capabilities of some of its antiaircraft missiles (SAMS).
Over and above these active defenses, the Soviets have a very large civil defense or passive defense system. The Soviets have spent billions of dollars to build blast and fallout shelters for political and industrial leaders and key workers in and around major Soviet cities. And, they have detailed plans for the evacuation of cities in the event of a nuclear war.
It is intolerable that the Soviet government should conscientiously provide for the
survival of its people while the U.S. Government makes no effort at all to defend its people.
Using advanced technology, the United States can and must defend its citizens against the horror of nuclear war. For example, the Government Accounting Office has strongly advocated a satellite-based laser defense.
Senator Steve Symms
The Opinion Research Corporation survey found that 84.8% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
PRINCIPLE 4: to accept no arms control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States or its allies, or which locks the United States into a position of Military inferiority,
In few areas has the lack of a national strategy had more disastrous results than in arms control. Beginning with the SALT I treaty of 1972, the United States has entered into numerous agreements with the Soviet Union that are unbalanced, self-ensnaring, unverifiable, or not enforceable. Because there is no overall standard by which treaties can be evaluated in the context of a total strategy, political leaders have found it easier to heed those advisers who counsel accommodation, appeasement, and unilateral disarmament.
But arms control is important–too important to be negotiated without reference to a clear overall strategy.
For example, it makes no strategic sense to bargain away the right and responsibility of the United States to defend its citizens from Soviet nuclear missiles.
Arms control can only be one of many means to reach the goal of establishing peace and freedom. It is not a goal in itself. Arms control on its own cannot create stability, but it can help to maintain stability already established, while reducing the probability of war occurring, the costs of maintaining deterrence, and the levels of damage should deterrence fail.
Senator Jake Garn
The Opinion Research Corporation survey found that 80.6% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
PRINCIPLE 5: to reestablish effective security and intelligence capabilities,
…good, intelligence is central to any nation’s security.
Yet, over the past 10 years ferocious and disabling assaults have been made on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence services to carry out clandestine data collection,
engage in covert operations, or coordinate counterintelligence.
A national strategy of peace through strength requires the most accurate information possible, not merely for foreknowledge to forestall moves by the Soviet Union and other adversaries, but also to defend against terrorism and other internal security threats.
Senator Robert Dole
The Opinion Research Corporation survey found that 86.2% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
PRINCIPLE 6: to pursue positive nonmilitary means to roll back the growth of communism,
We can take on the Communists in a nonviolent competition or contest on the principles of freedom and human dignity. On those issues, we cannot lose. By helping expand democracy, we can roll back their current empire, without a shot being fired.
If we refuse to engage in such a contest and allow the Soviets to use terrorism and subconventional wars, such as they have used in Nicaragua and Angola, to subjugate one country after the other, then we are bound to lose.
To win, we do not have to propagandize. All we have to do is tell the truth–and use a little imagination, and repeat the lesson a few times to make sure it gets through.
There is no way that slavery can be more appealing to people than freedom.
If we do not offer an alternative to Marxist ideas and principles throughout the world, then we may have to fight them someday with guns and bombs.
Again, we need to ask ourselves: Which peace, attained by whose strength? And, if we define the word “strength” to include mental and moral strength, then we can win without bombs. And after we have won, we can cut the Defense budget, prudently.
Senator David Boren
Communism is an ideology that has achieved its greatest, successes by playing on mankind’s best aspirations. It must be fought–and ultimately defeated–by having its abuses and brutal nature exposed, and by being encountered by better and more honest ideas. In the end its own victims will eliminate it, a day which will come more quickly if enough American Strength is available to blunt or prevent Soviet employment of naked force…
Nor is it possible for the United States to lower its voice about the dangers posed by the Soviet system without losing much ground. In the past, U.S. policies, whether containment or détente, were based upon the hope that the Soviet Union would eventually moderate its ideology as it experienced American good will. Instead, the Soviet Union has grown more assertive and more imperialistic as its military strength and aggressive momentum have increased.
A key tool available to the United States in rolling back this Soviet momentum is
communications. Chief among them are the radios–Voice of American and Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe–and satellite television, which can reach into areas barred to other forms of American influence.
Other forms of communications should not be overlooked, including overseas libraries, language and cultural instruction in American schools, exchanges, art, and entertainment.
To date our communications have been among the most effective means of spreading the Western values of freedom and democracy, even with the minimal official encouragement they have received. This should be greatly expanded and focused.
A second means of rolling back the influence of communism is to describe the shambles its “scientifically planned” economy makes of the lives of its citizens. Merely the existence of well-made Western merchandise is a destabilizing influence in Communist systems, which are forced to explain away their own shoddy products. Of more importance is the disruption “centralized planning” causes in the Soviet Union, where meat is rationed; or Poland, where food is rationed; or Cuba where everything is rationed.
The greatest weakness of all in the Communist system should be exploited–its total denial of freedom to its citizens. Walls have to be built to contain people within the Soviet system. This fact should be more than enough to totally alienate all nations of the world except for those that have adopted their own form of repression….
In short, the national strategy of peace through strength is built upon the understanding that military force is simply not appropriate for actions beyond deterring attack or containing aggression. The offensive role in an U.S. national strategy must be carried out by nonmilitary means which will take many years to bear fruit.
Senator Dennis DeConcini
The Opinion Research Corporation survey found that 78.1% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
PRINCIPLE 7: to help our allies and other non-Communist countries defend themselves against Communist aggression,
The emphasis on consensus and coordination that a national strategy of peace through strength places on the formulation of American foreign policy also holds true in relations with our allies. The struggle with the Soviet Union is by no means bilateral–every nation not already in the Soviet orbit is ultimately threatened by its expansionism. Therefore, it is clearly in the U.S. national interest to provide appropriate assistance to other nations whose independence or security is threatened.
By strengthening alliances and supplying aid to other nations sharing the U.S. strategic predicament, the national strategy of peace through strength not only addresses problems of U.S. security, but also demonstrates that the United States is a faithful partner whose political system deserves emulation.
Senator J. Bennett-Johnston
The Opinion Research Corporation survey found that 87.1% of the respondents agreed with this principle.
STRUCTURE FOR STRATEGY
Nowhere in the government of the United States is there a department or agency specifically charged to design a long-range national strategy for the country. Hard to believe, isn’t it?
The State Department aspires to the job, but former Ambassadors confirm that in practice the Department operates on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. As our former Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brezinski, expressed it less than a year ago:
What is the proper arrangement for the shaping of United States policy? The traditional answer–that the policy should be molded by the Secretary of State–seems to have been proving increasingly inadequate. It would appear that the old formula can no longer cope either with the challenges we face abroad or with the distribution of power in Washington among key agencies involved in promoting national security–of which foreign policy is only a part.1
Prior to World War II, there was a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that produced strategic papers, but never addressed such central questions of war and peace as: What are our country’s true interests? How can these interests best be protected and advanced? As the distinguished soldier-statesman, General A.C. Wedemeyer, who was there at the time, writes:
I could find few if any concrete answers to these vital questions. So far as I could discover, no systematic official attention had been given them. No mechanisms for considering them in an orderly and informed way existed within the government.
After the Axis powers were defeated, the National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The Council has four permanent members: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. It also has five statutory advisers: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President (Chief of the White House staff), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and as of 1984, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
While most people assume the NSC has the responsibility of preparing a national strategy, this is not the case. Its mission is advisory only and the President uses it as he sees fit. President Eisenhower who favored the military general staff approach organized the NSC into a Planning Board and an Operations Coordinating Board. President Kennedy, did away with this internal NSC structure entirely. Historians familiar with the period say that he believed such analyses of basic national security policy tended to limit the President’s options and should be discontinued.
Today the NSC, for all practical purposes, is a crisis management agency. It is organized into geographic or functional Interdepartmental Groups that work under Senior
Interdepartmental Groups. There is even a supreme crisis management body called the Special Situation Group, headed by the Vice President. For a global power like the United States there are more than enough crises to go around and the NSC’s time is fully occupied just keeping up with events. To assume the additional task of drafting an overall national strategy, the NSC would require instructions from the President to do so and a very special augmentation of its staff.
If the NSC is to carry out its mission of advising the President on the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies, that integration must be carried out in consonance with some agreed national strategy, set forth in a basic national security document available to all departments and agencies of government. The national strategy, in turn, should reflect a consensus of the responsible leaders in Congress and of the American public at large.
The most important document of this nature that has been prepared to date is NSC 68. The only reason it was written was that in January 1950, President Truman directed:
…the Secretary of State and Defense to undertake a State and Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans.
Submitted to President in April 1950, it described a defensive military political policy of containment and negotiation coupled with an offensive ideological policy of planting and nurturing “the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system.”
NSC 68 identified the enemy. It minced no words. The enemy was not the Soviet Union or its people, but the Soviet leaders whose aim is “the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world, and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.”
Thirty-four years later history shows that we have not contained Soviet expansion nor have we undermined in the slightest the Politburo’s authority within the Soviet Union. Today the Soviet Union is stronger than ever and has assumed the role of a global power. The USSR is still under the tight control of the men in the Kremlin.
In 1950 when NSC 68 was written, President Truman was gravely concerned about the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal (estimated at that time to reach 200 fission weapons by 1954) and by the “possibility they might achieve a thermonuclear bomb capability ahead of us.”
Today, President Reagan is gravely concerned about the size of the Soviet strategic arsenal (now in the range of 9,000 or more nuclear and thermonuclear warheads), about the U.S. decline to strategic inferiority with the USSR, and about the possibility that the Soviets might develop a nationwide ABM system ahead of us.
National security planners generally recognize that Soviet successes have been the result of their adherence to a long-term consistent strategy and their organizational skill in integrating and focusing their global operations to move forward toward a clear national goal. The Soviets regard their relationship with the rest of the world as one of continuous, irreconcilable conflict, requiring an organizational capacity comparable to that which democratic states institute only in time of war.
Today America sorely needs a national strategy for the Space Age which takes into account the tremendous strategic and technological changes that have occurred in the more than three decades since NSC 68 was written. If this is to be done promptly and wisely, the President must (1) direct that it be prepared and (2) augment the NSC structure so that the most qualified authorities in the country can participate in drafting such a basic national security policy for the President’s approval.
Considering the world situation today, the President may wish to initiate this planning process by issuing instructions to the NSC along the following lines:
The NSC is hereby directed to prepare a national strategy for the Space Age. It is to be a strategy based on the continuation of my policies of Peace Through Strength….the deterrence of war by restoring America’s preeminence as a strategic power; the provision of means to defend out people against nuclear attack should deterrence fail; and the mobilization of international support for a non-military political/ideological offensive to accelerate the ultimate disintegration of the Soviet empire.
It should take into account (1) the nature of our potential adversary, considering especially the small group of Soviet leaders who control the destinies of a great nation and of the Soviet people; (2) the loss by the United States of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union; (3) the decision by the Soviet leaders to continue increasing and modernizing their strategic forces even after they have attained nuclear superiority. This indicates they are not simply seeking a defensive capability that will relieve them of their understandable fears of foreign attack or invasion, but may be motivated by a more sinister design than we had previously assumed.
The strategy should be designed to mobilize the necessary national resources (1) to achieve at the earliest practicable date conditions of mutual assured survival for the U.S. and its allies and (2) to implement the Crusade for Freedom, while seeking the maximum possible participation and support of our allies.
To be meaningful over the long term, the strategy must recognize that mankind has now entered the Space Age and that space is now a national security dimension which will have an important, ever-increasing impact on strategy and on the structure of our armed forces in the future. The ABM defenses which are the basis of mutual assured survival will, as new technologies develop, require the use of this new dimension.
The strategy must take into account the implications of the significant technological breakthroughs that have already been achieved in the fields of space, energy, communications, computers, biochemistry, and microbiology. It must be alert to the opportunities that science is providing us to devise ways to solve the perennial problems of hunger, disease, poverty, and war. But it must also recognize that these promising new discoveries, if not used wisely, could adversely affect the destinies of all nations. Because the world has entered an era of interdependence of resources and science, ways should be sought to make this reality the basis for the rational settlement of international disputes.
As part of this broader task, the NSC also should prepare an unclassified summary which will serve as the basis of a continuing information program to explain this national strategy and build the necessary public and legislative consensus for its supporting programs.
In proposing how the NSC might be augmented so that it can prepare, as a matter of priority, such a basic national security document for the President, we find the suggestion of General A. C. Wedemeyer a most constructive one.
He proposes that there be established a senior advisory council, which we would call the “National Strategy Advisory Board,” which would “develop plans for and employing all the political, economic, and psychosocial resources of the nation together with its armed forces in the ongoing struggle to insure the security and well-being of the people.”
As we see it, the mission of the Advisory Board would be to:
–prepare and update as required the basic national strategy called for by the President’s directive, and –monitor and review the day-to-day NSC directives to insure that they are consistent with and support the national strategy as approved by the President.
The Board would consist of not more than eleven prominent Americans, recognized for their integrity, vision and patriotism. Seven would be selected from different backgrounds and careers and four would be chosen from the Congress. They would all have the perspective and experience to view our national security problems in their entirety; the objectivity to review the plans and policies of the NSC constructively against the background of the approved national strategy; and the wisdom to understand and relate to the aspirations and national goals of Americans from all walks of life. Except for the members of Congress, they would serve, not periodically as in the usual pattern of an advisory board, but full time. They would have the services of a small secretariat and would be provided access to classified intelligence and government documents as required in the performance of their mission.
Their term would be for six years at the pleasure of the President. Their Chairman would have direct access to the President when and as required.
We propose that the Advisory Board be established within the NSC structure by Executive Order early in 1985 with the understanding that the order would be subject to review and confirmation by appropriate legislation as soon as possible.
To insure an intimate bipartisan relationship with the Congress, two of the four congressional members of the Board would be chosen from each of the political parties. They would be nominated to the President by the Congress, two from the Senate and two from the House. While they would necessarily have to give priority to their Congressional responsibilities, they would participate actively in the work of the Advisory Board and be jointly responsible with the other members for its recommendations. By their membership on the Advisory Board they would be able to serve as conduits between the Executive and Legislative Branches, helping thereby to anticipate and minimize adversarial attitudes which might impede the effective implementation of national policy.
In this book we have sought to outline some of the elements of such a national
strategy for Peace Through Strength. These, of course, will have to be reviewed within the government by the offices specifically charged with monitoring these various aspects of national security. It is our hope that, based on the information available in the public domain, we have made some contribution to the cause of peace with freedom.
1. Zbigniew Brezinski, “Deciding Who Makes Foreign Policy,” New York Times Magazine, September 18, 1983, p. 56.
A CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM
What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long
term–the march of freedom and democracy which will
leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has
left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the
self-expression of the people.
before the British Parliament, June 8, 1982
On January 14, 1983 President Reagan issued “Presidential Decision #77” to “build up the U.S. Government capability to promote democracy.”1
That historic decision is an important crossroad. The paths to it over the past four decades are largely reactions to the forward threat of Soviet Communism. The paths out of it, which we look at in this chapter as well, are of the ambitious but largely unrealized plans emerging from President Reagan’s speech to the British Parliament on June 8th, 1982.
In this speech he proposed to foster “the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.” He proposed to do this through concrete steps–conferences, work by our political parties, consultations with our allies, and above all continued pressure on the Communist powers.
Our belief is that the President has proposed the only way out of the seemingly endless arms race, subversion of free societies, fear of holocaust, a way out for people everywhere despairing of tomorrow because of the nuclear threat today.
If the conflict between the free world and Communism is to be ended–without war–then the Soviet leadership must be persuaded that it is more profitable for then to give up the goal of world domination than to continue seeking it.
This we can persuade them of firstly by being so strong militarily that they dare not attack us and secondly by going on the ideological offensive by developing democracy worldwide while exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities: in other words, a policy of
military defense, political offense.
This is a policy with deep roots in American strategic history. NSC-68, as we saw in Chapter 10, called precisely for an ideological offensive to plant and nurture “the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system.”
A $5 billion annual expenditure on our “public diplomacy” is called for, to be reached in increments over the next five years. Our public diplomacy is here defined to include all our programs to (1) develop the democratic infrastructure worldwide–from assistance to unions or free presses threatened by Communist governments or movements to conferences on democratic institutions; (2) to enhance our radio broadcasting worldwide but especially behind the Iron Curtain; and (3) to assist anti-Communist movements wherever, including freedom fighters in need of weapons and humanitarian assistance.
The United States has never done well in selling ideas, or even in speaking to our virtues. President Reagan, in his speech, “wondered about the shyness of some of us in the West about standing for these ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world.”
It is about time that we devised simple programs whose acceptance would ultimately render unnecessary much of our defense spending and make the world safe for diversity, to quote President Kennedy. The solution will obviously require help from both private and public sectors–as indeed PD #77 envisages–and it requires first of all a broader understanding of how critical the opportunity is.
Democratic strengths & Soviet Vulnerabilities
Almost forty years ago, Sir Winston Churchill traveled to the little town of Fulton, Missouri, to deliver what has subsequently been regarded as the most important speech of the post-war era. In talking about the “iron curtain” that had descended along the line from “Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic,” Churchill was only describing the new reality in all its bleakness, but it took so cogent a presentation to rally the rest of the free world to resist further movement of that line.
From there free world statesmen were able to devise, at best, damage limiting policies to hold it in place. For a generation policies of containment were attempted, with only mixed results. NSC-68 pointed in the right direction, but as a then-classified document it could hardly light the way for the American people.
By the 1970s, as we have seen, western politicians were groping for new ways of dealing with Communism, denial being the most pertinent during the period of “détente.” But at least these politicians were recognizing that the old policies no longer worked, as Communism began breaking out of its constraints and implanting itself, as always by force, in the far corners of the third world.
President Reagan told Parliament: “From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none–not one regime–has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.”
What the President was attempting to do–and partly succeeded where all others failed completely–was to find a way out of the consequences of the Iron Curtain which
Churchill had first described. He found it in the most obvious thing of all, democracy. Its obviousness today is exceeded only by the extent to which the free world did not perceive yesterday that it was the route to take, the way out. Great ideas are always simple and obvious–in retrospect. Reagan was telling us that democracy is flourishing as never before, yet ironically in greater danger than ever. Indeed its growing success is very much the spur to our adversary to build up its preemptive military might precisely because such a powerful idea poses the greatest danger the Communist empire has ever faced.
Yet Reagan’s speech contained a fundamental strategic reality, namely that as the free world begins to believe in itself anew, and sees the flourishing of its system and spirit despite the threat from a hostile totalitarianism, the free states will rally far more energetically, with greater purpose.
In the president’s speech to Parliament he laid out the ideological basis for a free world strategy. For a successful national strategy must have a clear cut objective, which Reagan gave it in the call for the lighting of democratic fires, including behind the Iron Curtain–indeed especially behind the Iron Curtain.
A successful strategy must also employ a mix of means in line with its capabilities, and here developing the ideological side at a time of relative military weakness is not only what is right, it is making a virtue of necessity. Strategy must be conducted with consistency: It must be crafted so well that a president and Congress of either party will find it compelling. It must transcend, as does President Reagan’s speech, the domestic politics of the day.
The crusade for freedom is the positive step of the Free World, an affirmation of what we believe. There is a negative side, exposing–and taking advantage of–the psychological, philosophical and operational vulnerabilities of Communism, without which no offensive of ours will succeed. The crisis of Communism in Poland is but the latest demonstration of the failure of Marxism-Leninism to create a humane existence for those living under it, as well as proof of the continued inspiration of the idea of liberty flowing from the free world.
As Ambassador Max Kampelman has written, “the credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people. ‘The gas has largely escaped from its ideological balloon.’ “2
Soviet vulnerabilities are legion, but only if we have the wit, the means and the will to exploit them. The Soviet economy, except in the military sphere, is plagued by inefficiency, low productivity, shoddy goods and services, and lack of incentives.
Although pre-revolutionary Russia was a grain exporter, the Soviet Union must import feedstock to fulfill its promise of more meat to the consumer. Private plots, as President Reagan reminded us in his speech, “occupy a bare 3 percent of the arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of Soviet farm output.” The average life span of males is declining because of widespread alcoholism and poor health care.
The Soviet Union has a growing second or black market economy. The second economy, as Professor Richard Pipes has recently written, “consists of myriad individual transactions completed every hour of the day throughout a vast empire, unobserved and unrecorded. It encompasses barter of goods and services; moonlighting by state employees; the use of government equipment and material for personal profit;
construction work; and, above all, the production and marketing of food. The state, unable to satisfy the growing needs of consumers, is compelled to tolerate this unwelcome development, even though the practice challenges its claim to a monopoly on economic resources.”3
Unless major economic reforms are undertaken, the “second economy will continue expanding and threaten the elite’s control of the population.”4 Bribery is endemic. Strikes of a sort are common, despite the absence of national unions. Throughout the Soviet hierarchy, intellectual dissent is far greater than the number of known publicized dissenters. Many voters in Soviet elections do not mark their ballots even though they can be identified.
The increasingly intractable nationality problem plagues Soviet leaders. Religious awareness is growing both in Slavic regions as well as in Islamic Central Asia. The 50 million Moslems living in the Soviet Union reproduce faster than the Russians and are clinging to their faith.
Professor Pipes has recently identified the nomenklatura–the Soviet Union’s elite leaders–as themselves the most vulnerable point in the system, as they forever must wage war against their own people.
To save itself from having to make concessions certain to reduce its power and privilege, the nomenklatura relies heavily on terror. At home it threatens those who dare stand in its way with imprisonment and exile; abroad it brandishes the threat of nuclear holocaust. “The essence of the struggle”–in the words of Vladimir Bukovsky, a Russian dissenter of proven record–“is the struggle against fear.”5
The flaws in the Soviet system have direct relevance. It has often been observed that the Soviet regime becomes less aggressive only as a result of failures abroad and worries at home about its ability to govern effectively. Efforts by the free world to enhance its confidence and sense of security only whet its appetite–for such is the essence of appeasement.
The Framework for Political Action
What should be done in practice? Some believe that nothing should be done to undermine the ideological foundations of the Soviet system for fear of triggering a nuclear war. The Soviet propaganda machine, taking advantage of this free world conviction, is engaged in a relentless barrage against the U.S. and all free societies.
It is time we reverse this one-sided struggle; we should wage the ideological struggle as vigorously as Moscow does. For to accept the notion that we should propose change only in right-wing dictatorships “is to accept the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens, “Reagan said to the British Parliament.
We recognize that only the people living in the Soviet Union can change the Soviet political and economic system–but we can help them. The principles of peaceful coexistence agreed to by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, and the
Helsinki Final Act, commit Moscow to a standard of human rights that it has nowhere upheld. It is leverage which our European allies have been willing to join with us in using, to press the Soviets hard and publicly with respect to their continuing violations.
Soviet citizens will continue to struggle for their rights, if they know that their voices will be heard. If the Soviets can claim that they will bury us, we at least have the right to encourage their citizens to work within to change their system over time. In other words, why not sow some Solidarity Seeds? Why not help the Soviet Union evolve into a Poland, then into a Hungary and eventually into a Yugoslavia?
President Reagan has proposed that we commit ourselves as a nation–“in both public and private sectors–to assisting democratic development.”
Even a substantial buildup of our capability for political action will cost only a tiny fraction of what we must spend in the defense arena to restore a military equilibrium. Indeed, for less than one percent of the U.S. federal budget, or $5 billion, less than two percent of the military budget, a figure to which government officials and private citizens, working together, have come, we could win the political war.
Our proposal is to increase our public diplomatic spending by $1 billion in 1985, $2 billion in 1986, and so on, up to $5 billion in 1989. This would provide for substantial increases in our broadcasting, along with the educational and political programs for strengthening pluralism wherever it is threatened and fostering it where it does not yet exist. It would provide for substantial increases in the support now flowing to freedom fighters standing up to Communism.
The need to help the people living under Soviet control to begin to transform their system is an idea whose time has come. And once the decision is made to move to such a goal, appropriate programs will follow as a matter of course.
Once that decision is made, it will be felt, especially among the captive peoples. Within the Soviet bloc people are well-tuned to detect, through the nuance of Western radio broadcast and the response (or lack of it) by their rulers, whether the free world is resisting Soviet moves.
It will also be felt among our allies and friends. NSC-68 argued in terms pertinent today that “as we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.”
The process of gradual transformation of the Soviet system, which President Reagan has called for, must in substantial measure start outside the Soviet Union, owing to the closed character of Soviet society. Our action program calls firstly for the reinforcement of pluralism, of competition in the realm of ideas, throughout those parts of the world susceptible to the Communist appeal. Even the expenditure of a few hundred thousand dollars for a serious academic conference on the process of democratization in Eastern Europe, or one on Constitution-making, held under the joint auspices of government and private agencies, can have enormous impact, as those of 1982 and 1983 have already had. Educational and training programs in democratic development, in which the United States has experience, would be devised.
Thus the expenditure of $2 billion annually by government, quasi-governmental
agency, and private bodies, for encouraging the democratic process by study, exchange, and direct support to democratic institutions in countries where such needs external encouragement, would put democracy at the top of the world’s agenda–and put Communism on the defensive everywhere.
In the field of broadcasting, we are calling for a billion dollar annual reinforcement to the Voice of American (VOA) and to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in order better to reach the Soviet peoples.
Finally, direct help to those fighting for freedom must be increased, and some of this must be done by the private sector. At least $2 billion more is needed annually if the free world side is going to have a chance against will-supplied Communist terrorist/guerrillas. This sum includes the humanitarian aid going for medical assistance and the like to freedom fighters and refugees; the international effort to publicize their cause, and direct support to the arsenals of these movements.
Developing The Framework
Following President Reagan’s parliamentary address of June 1982, senior working groups within the U.S. Government sought to institutionalize the presidential message. In effect this is an important component already in existence of the structure for strategy envisaged in Chapter 10–but this component is too weak to do its job. It is underfunded. And in the absence of the higher strategic commitment called for in this study the framework for democratic development cannot be fully fleshed out.
What was attempted is a framework of interdepartmental committees addressing themselves to the key components of the president’s strategy. In what was ultimately promulgated as “Presidential Decision #77” in January 1983, a “Special Planning Group” (SPG) at Cabinet level, and under the chairmanship of the National Security Adviser to the President, was created with responsibility for implementing the strategy.
Under the “SPG” were created interagency committees for implementing decisions in the fields of information, political action, and broadcasting.
These were to see to it that the American people got the word of what was happening in the struggle against Communism in the first instance. A comprehensive and truthful program of information was devised, as a first order of new business, for international circulation on free world prospects and Communist challenges for and to democratic development. The “International Information Committee” created thereby is chaired by the United States Information Agency.
Alongside it is an “International Political Committee,” chaired by the Department of State, and tasked to oversee the political action planned as a consequence of the presidential message.
A Broadcasting committee, finally, was established to ensure that as our broadcasting capabilities were modernized and expanded they were clearly in tune with the new emphasis on democratic development.
It was clear from the beginning of the presidential initiative that government alone could not succeed in this mission. Indeed government officials, Congressmen, and private citizens from the world of foundations, labor, and business began discussing plans
for implementing the democracy program soon after the presidential speech.
Thus from the start, “PD #77” envisaged that any political action emerging would “require close collaboration with other foreign policy efforts–diplomatic, economic, military–as well as a close relationship with those sectors of the American society–labor, business, universities, philanthropy, political parties, press–that are or could be more engaged in parallel efforts overseas.”6
It is therefore pertinent that a private initiative, like that of the program “In Defense of America” for building a new American Strategy, should advance plans for spreading democracy. Indeed, the $5 billion program of political action discussed herein is based on carefully considered plans laid out by public diplomacy practitioners–diplomats of the Foreign Service and the United States Information Agency, assistants to the President, and private organizational leaders engaged in the effort to promote democracy world wide.
Likewise, the program as first envisaged within the U.S. government saw funds being raised from several tiers: public funds for programs whose character makes them appropriate recipients of U.S. government grants and, on the other hand, moneys appropriated by foundations, organizations, or private individuals, for those programs where U.S. government funding would be unhelpful and where such private funding could be of a more catalytic character.
Endowing Democracy. On December 16, 1983, President Reagan announced the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to promote “principles of democracy” to the world. In remarks launching the program, the President said that “we’re not trying to create imitations of the American system around the world. There’s no simple cookbook recipe for political development that’s right for all people. Democratic development must take into account historic, cultural, and social conditions. Each nation and each movement will find its own route.”
The Endowment, which is at the top of the first tier of U.S. government political action, has as its purpose the encouragement of free and democratic institutions throughout the world through private sector initiatives; the facilitation of international exchanges; democratic training programs and democratic institution-building abroad; the strengthening of democratic electoral processes abroad; and the participation in achieving these goals of America’s major political parties, labor, business, and other private sector groups.
During the 1950s and 1960s there was an international network of organizations (The Congress for Cultural Freedom, for example) that sustained the free world view and won support for allied cooperation. Much of this network was destroyed during the period of “détente” and in some places has even been replaced by Soviet-oriented networks.
We need to build new networks of internationally-minded groups in the various countries of the free world that share an understanding of the danger posed by the Soviet Union, and we need to do far more to help those worthy groups struggling for their very existence at home and abroad which study and publicize the continuing struggle.
For much must be done to expose and render ineffectual pro-Soviet fronts and sleepers.
Indeed, spending $2 billion, including both public and private funds, for the Endowment and for additional programs of political action as outlined in this section, would lay the intellectual basis for an American grand strategy.
The work of the Endowment, along with that of the Special Planning Group of the National Security Council, “will build up,” in the words of the presidential decision, “the U.S. Government capability to promote democracy,” as we have already noted. Thus, we could begin to “initiate plans, programs and strategies designed to counter totalitarian ideologies and aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates.”
The fact is that even the small programs envisaged by the NED have yet to build an adequate constituency in Congress. Funds too small to make much difference have been quarreled over and ultimately passed by Congress. The problem here is the same in the broader arena of foreign policy and military programming: there is no strategy, no plan for getting from “here to there.” Those sketching out plans for Congress have been insufficiently bold.
Broadcasting. The United States must pierce the Soviet curtains via radio and TV, and provide the facts on a daily and comprehensive basis to the Soviet people. It is saddening that the Soviets outspend America by at least five to one in the realm of information. They spend more to jam our broadcast to Russia than we spend for all of our world broadcasting.
U.S. radio broadcasting plays an indispensable role. Both the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty need to be enhanced. While the professionalism of the news reporting by both networks must be preserved if credibility is to be sustained, features and commentaries appear the best way to transmit free world values to people in Communist nations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should target specific groups, a programming technique that can be very effective.
International broadcasting at the present time is probably the best means of fostering the expansion of freedoms and democracy inside Communist countries. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have demonstrated this, but are pitifully underfunded. Additional and more powerful transmitters are urgently needed. Radio Liberty does not have transmitters at locations and with sufficient power to reach critical non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union adequately or at all–areas such as the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia. Strong religious beliefs and nationalistic feelings of these peoples afford rich opportunities for effective anti-Communist radio programming. Radio Marti also began broadcasting to Cuba in 1984, but its funding level is too low to give it wide coverage of issues and areas. Even so, it represented an important step on our political action agenda.
TV has now become the dominant communication mode of the modern world. Consequently, in addition to radio broadcasting, the United States should employ satellites to beam TV programs directly to Soviet TV sets as soon as this becomes technically feasible.
As an authority on communications has written, “we are on the verge of great changes in the international structures and effects of that most pervasive of mass media,
television. We are passing from the era of the low-powered distribution satellite, which transmits programs through the filter of a broadcaster or a cable system, into the era of the Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), with a higher-powered signal which can go straight into the individual home,” with scant respect for national boundaries.7
Presidential Decision #77 authorizes development in the longer term “of the potential for direct T.V. broadcasting.”8 The present state of the art requires dish antennas in the open, with technically correct lead-in cables at each home reception point–expensive and highly visible installations that the Soviets would never tolerate.
The Soviet Union will attempt to block the manufacture or importation of essential electronics. But the state of the art is changing rapidly, and within a decade much simpler equipment will suffice. Indeed, “the Soviet Union is already confronted by pirate viewing of unauthorized video tapes by the elite,”9 and there is every reason to assume the peoples of the Soviet Union will be as ingenious in devising means to receive DBS broadcasts as they have been in receiving VOA and other free world broadcasts.
The communications revolution may well provide one of the catalytic elements that will sweep Soviet totalitarianism into the dust bin of history.
The expenditure of an additional billion dollars on broadcasting would be one of the most cost-effective items in the U.S. budget. Attempts to interfere with free world broadcasting to the Soviet people amounts to an admission before the entire world of the USSR’s deficiencies. Defensive jamming is also far more costly than broadcasting, and directly violates Soviet commitments undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act. Soviet authorities have said there can be no compromise in the ideological struggle, but Moscow’s defensiveness on this issue reveals its sense of weakness.
Using radio broadcasts, it is also possible to encourage the national–and natural–aspirations of peoples within the USSR, whose legal identity was snuffed out by the Red army, but whose aspirations to nationhood continue in fact to grow.
The Soviet leadership is not only unable to recognize the legitimacy of the national aspirations of non-Russian citizens within the USSR, but also faces a nationalities problem throughout Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union used its military triumph in World War II to impose its will on the prostrate states of Eastern Europe.
One by one, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia fell under Moscow’s sway. The Soviets have certainly suffered setbacks in attempting to keep their empire intact. Yugoslavia and Albania pulled out of the Soviet bloc, and there has been some loosening elsewhere. The events of 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia serve to remind us of the severe problems that national identity–albeit incipient–poses for the Soviet leadership.
U.S. policy–and political action–must avoid overt encouragement of rebellion within the Soviet bloc, which we can support now, with the loss of the strategic superiority which we then enjoyed, even less than we could in 1956, when the Hungarian freedom fighters battled Soviet tanks in the streets for several days. On the other hand, we can increase our support to those resisting Soviet expansionism in the third world, like the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. This would encourage Soviet subjects, as they see free world strategy beginning to place constraints on Soviet imperialism for the first time.
Support for Freedom Fighters. It is thus not enough to try to improve the conditions for democracy in transitional countries of the third world or to encourage Communist subjects to keep the hopes for democracy alive by radio alone; an action component in addition is necessary. In other words, we must not only appeal to those at the center of totalitarian control and those whom the Soviets are trying to bring under their control. We must help those rebelling against that control at the edges of the Soviet system, as a compelling signal to those inside it that hope is not illusory.
This we must do by adding to the president’s program substantial assistance to those freedom fighters in countries where local conditions have made possible and inevitable the challenge to Soviet or Soviet-allied control. This is not something we would or even could initiate ourselves; the rebellion spreading in those countries brought under Soviet influence in the past decade happens as a direct result of the oppression itself.
There are major insurgencies against Communist rule in four countries, Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, and Nicaragua, all of which should be given increased support. There are important resistance movements also in Ethiopia and Mozambique against their Soviet-allied governments, which should be encouraged.
A brief look at one closest to the American homeland helps us understand how and why a major increase in funding is necessary to the cause of freedom. For if Communist insurgency cannot be kept out of our own hemisphere, we will not be sending a very robust message to those we wish to encourage elsewhere in the struggle against Communism.
There are striking parallels between the 1959 Cuban insurrection and the Nicaraguan Sandinista insurgency twenty years later. Ruled by unpopular dictators, both nations were ideal targets for political warfare. The unpopularity of the existing governments legitimized the guerrilla leaders as politically progressive, while the final political goals of the insurgents were left unexamined.
Both the Castro and Sandinista movements operated against well trained forces. Their success was the result of a comprehensive political warfare strategy combining military, economic, and propaganda tactics.
The campaign which overthrew the Somoza regime in July 1979 was the result of careful planning and action dating from 1962. Cuban involvement in the shipment of arms to insurgents was discreet; arms were sent through one or more countries in an effort to hide the source of the weapons from Western analysts.
Almost immediately after the Sandinista regime came to power, it began to show its Leninist colors. This led to the defection of many Sandinists, including the legendary Commander Zero of the 1979 uprising. A Sandinist Deputy Defense Minister, Eden Pastora, left Nicaragua in July 1981 and declared his opposition to the Sandinista regime in April 1983, stating, it was “my duty, as a revolutionary citizen to do everything I can within my power to prevent the revolution from being aborted by Marxist obstinacy or by spurious counter-revolutionary forces.”
Relations between Washington and Managua deteriorated throughout 1981-1984 as the volume of equipment, training and supplies from Managua for the El Salvadoran insurgency continued to expand. The Sandinistas increasingly adopted stridently anti-American rhetoric, including the slogan, “We shall fight against the Yankee, the enemy
of Humanity,” as the Nicaraguan national anthem.
In time, the Roman Catholic Church began to oppose the Sandinistas, particularly after the treatment accorded to the Pope on his March 1983 visit to Managua. While addressing a crowd in Managua, the Pope was repeatedly interrupted by junta-led Sandinista war chants that continued despite the pontiff’s pleas for “silencio.” On May Day 1984, the Sandinistas were able to draw few people to their rallies while the Archbishop of Managua drew over 4,000 people into the cathedral to hear him denounce the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime.10
Despite Congressional opposition to President Reagan’s policy in Central America, the resistance of the Nicaraguan people grows. But that resistance would expand more rapidly if the U.S. stepped up vital military and economic aid to anti-Sandinista forces.
It must be clearly enunciated that the U.S. goal in Central America is the replacement of the Sandinista regime with one which permits free political expression by the people and denounces aggression against neighbors.
If victory is needed in the Western hemisphere for the credibility of our policy, it is needed also in Angola, where victory of the UNITA forces is within reach. UNITA has struggled since before Angolan independence in 1975 as by far the most popular and mass-based freedom movement, and only lost in the first instance to the MPLA forces thanks to the massive Soviet and Cuban assistance the MPLA received.
Yet UNITA now controls absolutely a third of Angola and has operational control of another third. A reasonable increase in its arms supply would lead to the defeat of the Cuban troops and the MPLA government in Angola, in what would be the most impressive defeat of Communist expansionism ever.
It would be the height of irresponsibility to turn our backs now upon the vision of our founding fathers and other free men, a vision that has not only sustained us over the centuries but is now within sight of fulfillment. For once the signal has been sent that the free world means tenaciously to stand by this quest, Communism governments will everywhere be the defense. They will see the inevitability of the spread of freedom and begin to allow their own people political room to breathe in.
At that point the awesome peril that has hovered over all people since the dawn of the nuclear age would begin to recede, as the Soviet empire evolves into a more open and more free society.
1. “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security–Full Text of NSDD-77,” The White House, January 14, 1983.
2. “Madrid, Flight 7, and East-West Relations,” remarks by Max M. Kamlpelman, Defense Strategy Forum, October 25, 1983, Washington D.C., p. 13, mimeo.
3. Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 144.
4. Pipes, p. 147.
5. Ibid., p. 281.
6. Management of Public Diplomacy, op cit.
7. David Webster, “Direct Broadcast Satellites: Proximity, Sovereignty and National Identity,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1984, p. 1161.
8. “Management of Public Diplomacy, op cit.
9. Webster, p. 1168.
10. See “Bishops Become Critical of Sandinistas,” Washington Post, May 22, 1984, p. 1.
…the time has come to lay to rest the expectation that
arms control is the secret key to a more amicable
American-Soviet relationship or even to the enhancement
of mutual security.1
In the standard conduct of international relations, when nations have disputes, they attempt to achieve a resolution of their differences by diplomatic means, primarily through negotiations. This approach implies a recognition that disagreements can and should be resolved by peaceful means.
As we discussed in Chapter 5 on Soviet Deception, the Soviet view of the purposes of diplomacy is vastly different.
The Soviets view diplomacy not as a means for settling disputes, but as just another tool that should be manipulated to their advantage in the East-West struggle.
According to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet policy of “peaceful coexistence is a specific form of socialism’s class struggle against capitalism. This struggle is going on and will continue in the field of economics, politics and, of course ideology, because the world outlook and the class goals of the two social systems are opposite and irreconcilable.”2
This Soviet view of diplomacy presents a fundamental challenge to the Western democracies.
On the one hand, we have an obligation to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union to resolve disputes, since every effort must be made to avert military conflicts. On the other hand, we must remain aware of Soviet purposes in diplomacy, and consequently not have great expectations regarding the outcome of negotiations. So long as the Kremlin believes that fundamental East-West differences are irreconcilable, the burden of the resolution of the problem must be found elsewhere.
Redirecting our Diplomatic Effort
The basic problem confronting American diplomacy is the surprisingly widely held conviction that the Soviet government shares the aspirations of people throughout the world, that it is not an expansionist power but is simply interested in providing a
better life for its own citizens. The reverse is true.
The diplomatic effort to present a true picture should be multifaceted, using whatever forums are available and, when in our best interest, creating new ones. The United Nations is one obvious place, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick has already done much in this regard.
The United States should continue to publicize aggressive Soviet actions–such as the destruction of KAL 007–in this arena, stressing that such behavior reflects the fundamental values of the rulers of the Soviet Union.
The United States must also use diplomacy to join with other countries in resisting expansionism by the Soviet Union and its allies. In some cases, as in Western Europe, this effort would be channeled through formal alliances. In other cases, such as Southeast Asia, the U.S. should support regional associations like ASEAN, which is attempting to contain the Vietnamese/Soviet threat to the region. In other words, whereas the United States has failed to change Soviet policy by building a network of interests with Moscow, it should now attempt to accomplish the same objective by strengthening the web of interests with other countries that see the Soviet Union as a threat.
America’s diplomatic activity should thus concentrate primarily on improving and solidifying its relationship with its allies and with the countries of the Third World. This is an area to which the United States has contributed at least ten times as much foreign aid as has the Soviet Union, a fact insufficiently understood in the Third World itself.
Recapturing the Image of Peace
We are the peace movement–those supporting a strategy of Peace Through Strength. The fundamental misunderstanding by so many, of the supposedly peaceable intent of the Soviets, has long permitted Moscow to wage semantic warfare by capturing the word “peace.” We should have the self-confidence to speak out and recapture not only the word “peace,” but the reality that goes with it. The strategy to regain it includes the use of three themes.
1. A peaceful and free world is the ultimate goal of our strategy. The Soviets claim that capitalism is the sole source of war and that peace will be only be established once capitalism is destroyed. The reverse is true. Moreover, Communist states need to divert their peoples from their miseries with foreign adventures, as well as seek to prove the inevitability of a Marxist triumph world-wide with their conquests. U.S. strategy must aim toward a vision of a human order which is far more than the absence of conflict and war, but is the condition in which freedom is assured and the individual’s rights are fulfilled.
2. A basic devotion to human rights everywhere. We must promote the basic, inalienable rights no government should deny its people. This theme makes possible a systematic attack on the Soviet police state, which represents an outstanding departure from civilized standards in the democratic countries. As President Reagan said in his 1982 speech to Parliament, regarding the prevalent view that we should encourage democratic change only in rightwing dictatorships, such “is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability,
they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens.” Moscow’s open flouting of the Helsinki Accord, to which it is a signatory, gives the West a lever by which to wage a campaign on human rights.
An obvious forum is the periodic review of the Helsinki Final Act, at the most recent of which Ambassador Max Kampelman effectively revealed Soviet violations.
France’s President Mitterand set a high standard for the West during his June 1984 visit to Moscow, with his open challenge to his Soviet hosts to release Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Laureate for Peace, and permit his wife to travel to the free world for medical treatment. Some diplomats argue that what is needed is quiet diplomacy to convince the Soviet Union to become more humane; and to be sure, the U.S. government should be careful in its treatment of individual cases lest it jeopardize the welfare of individual men and women. But the logic by which the Politburo would cease its barbaric practices without the use of real pressure–like the adverse publicity President Mitterand gave it–is not self-evident.
3. The role of U.S.-Soviet Negotiations. Although negotiations cannot resolve the basic difference between the two sides, so long as the Politburo has as its aim the elimination of the free world, they will remain a basic element in the conduct of our diplomacy as we work out reciprocal agreements on everything from landing rights to the exchange of diplomats–all of which must in the future be based on the principal of reciprocity. Negotiations ideally can even help reduce the danger of misunderstandings that could lead inadvertently to war. Thus negotiations in the 1970s involved an effort to define a code of conduct minimizing the risk of accidental confrontation. The record, alas, demonstrates that this had no material effect on Soviet behavior. Today there are negotiations on “confidence building measures,” but in practice those already negotiated have been observed more in the breach. In short, such agreements cannot do much good and in practice have done actual harm when they divert public attention from the real threat.
The principal negotiations of the 1970s had the objective of limiting armaments.
These negotiations served more to lull the West into thinking that the world was becoming a safer place.
In the euphoria following the signing of the two SALT agreements, the United States relaxed its guard. On the other hand, the Soviets marched forward with the greatest arms buildup in history.
As the Strategic Survey for 1984 argued, “as other ties with the USSR became attenuated, arms control once again came to be counted upon not only to bring security benefits, but also to play a central–perhaps the central–role in managing East-West relations as a whole … This, however, was a burden which arms control, by itself, proved unable to bear….arms control cannot stand in for other forms of diplomacy.”3
If arms control negotiations are not to do actual harm, they must satisfy the following criteria:
They must first flow from an overall negotiations strategy, which must be designed before the particulars are considered. In other words, we must ensure that this
strategy is not a mere reaction to a Soviet grand design, as has been the case hitherto. And these negotiations can no longer, as they have in the past, be expected to bear the burden of solving the whole U.S.-Soviet conflict. They must be considered within the larger perspective of American grand strategy. Otherwise arms control only deals with symptoms, which become confused with causes. As was already laid out in Part I, the real cause of U.S.-Soviet differences lies deeply within Soviet ideology and foreign policy aims.
Secondly, our arms control aims should be pursued with patience and ingenuity, and be constructed to give the Soviets an incentive to come along with us. We should recognize that we cannot obtain something for nothing in arms control. The Soviets have been emphatic that an arms control agreement cannot change the existing balance of forces.4 Real arms limitations will not occur until the Soviets believe the United States is serious about restoring nuclear parity, or until they see a technological advantage looming for us, that they can negate through disarmament. The Soviets must never again be permitted to use arms control negotiations and collective peace campaigns to “steal a march” on the free world, as they did with SALT I and SALT II.
The third principle should be linkage across the continuum of arms–from conventional to nuclear. To the extent that the Soviets see fit to negotiate broadly, we can redress our disadvantages in one area with advantages in others. Thus, if they are willing to negotiate realistically on conventional forces in Europe so as to reduce their preponderance there, we could correspondingly redirect our need for intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe which are designed to compensate for our conventional inferiority. But the more narrow the range of weaponry on which they are willing to negotiate seriously, the more precise must be our insistence on the “rules of negotiations,” as enumerated herein.
Fourthly, agreements must be specific and precise in their terms. In negotiating the agreement limiting offensive weapons in SALT I, the United States could not obtain Soviet assent to a formal definition of a heavy missile. The reason became clear after the agreement was concluded, when the Soviet Union deployed a missile that would have been excluded had Moscow agreed to the U.S. definition of a heavy missile. The Soviet delegation’s refusal to agree to a formal definition should have raised concerns in Washington, but instead the American delegation convinced itself that it had received sufficient oral assurances from the Soviet side. In any future arms control agreement, the U.S. should insist on precision and specificity, and obtain Soviet agreement in the documents themselves.
Fifthly, any agreement must be verifiable. Owing to the mobility of modern missiles and the advantage accruing to a side with a substantial reload capability of stored missiles for fixed or mobile launchers, the time has come when we must insist that verification be based on “on-site” inspection. Nothing short of this will suffice. We must be able to detect violations well before they have military significance. Implicit in this is that the U.S. government has the capability and political will to challenge Moscow if it suspects a violation has occurred.
Sixthly, agreements must serve a useful purpose by encouraging stability. There is no sense in reaching an agreement for the sake of reaching an agreement. Similarly, if an agreement no longer contributes to stability, it must be reexamined. A case in point is
the SALT I ABM Treaty. Although ABM systems can contribute to strategic stability by protecting vulnerable ICBMs, they are prohibited by the ABM Treaty. As a consequence, the United States has been trying for several years to find other ways to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs, with limited success. Instead of perpetuating this situation, we should recognize the fundamental absurdity of honoring an arms control agreement that, because of technological advancements, has come to undermine the very purpose for which it was designed. Specifically, a shift from an offense (retaliation) based deterrent to a defense (protection) based deterrent as envisaged in the strategic defense initiative makes the ABM Treaty obsolete.
Finally, in negotiating arms control, we should always be aware that we are negotiating with the Soviets, and not with ourselves. Too often, we moderate our own positions in the mistaken belief that this will make our proposals more acceptable to Moscow. As Soviet negotiators revealed during SALT I, however, such an approach is self-defeating.
The popularity of arms control is a product of the perception of an uncontrollable arms race. According to this view, each side responds to its exaggerated perception of the threat from its opponent, leading to an escalating arms spiral. Consequently, many people believe that if the United States takes unilateral actions to assuage Soviet fears, the momentum of the arms race would be broken. Surely the lesson of our build down in the 1970s demonstrates that this is an idyllic view.
Indeed, if we look at the historical record, we find that arms control has had less effect on the strategic balance than other, internal factors-primarily the mistaken belief that unilateral U.S. disarmament would persuade the Soviets to follow suit. For example, the United States froze the size of its strategic forces in 1967, reduced their megatonnage substantially over the ensuing decade and a half, and also reduced the number of warheads, even though none of this was required by arms control agreements.
The technology becoming available for ballistic missile defense is such that cost leverage will increasingly favor the defense. Department of Defense calculations show that an effective defense can negate incoming warheads at 40 to 50 percent of the cost to add more offensive warheads. If the Soviets are unwilling to reduce the size of their arsenal, and continue to increase it, they are placed at an even worse disadvantage. This is because the costs of research and development, and of sensors, which do no vary with the numbers of warheads intercepted, are a large share of the cost of defense systems. In fact, studies show that in this environment defense would have a four to one advantage over the Soviet offense. This should surely motivate serious bargaining over reductions rather than an increased investment in increasingly-ineffectual offensive forces.
It is worth noting that the only serious negotiations that have ever occurred with the Soviets came as a result of their realization that an American technological advantage gave us the possibility of gaining a strategic advantage. This was the case when the ABM treaty was signed.
The ultimate question to answer before attempting diplomatic solutions to more structurally basic problems is, what motivates the Soviet Union to steadily increase its military power. For a decade in the West a chorus of analysts assured us that the Soviets had no need to build large ballistic missiles; therefore, they too would eventually grasp the “higher strategic logic” and accept the prevailing American approach to “arms
control.” The Soviet generals who had fought World War II and built up Soviet might apparently knew something that American arms controllers had overlooked, namely, that power matters, and that expansion of military power has desirable and directly measurable political results. So long as the men in the Kremlin believe this, arms control can deal only with the symptoms of the East-West conflict, and not its causes. Accordingly, arms control negotiations, indeed all our negotiations with the Soviets, must be put in a context of supporting our overall national strategy to insure the defense and survival of America.
President Carter’s national security assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski, summed it up: “Arms control as we have known it has come to the end of the road. Once the great hope of those who believed that the U.S.-Soviet rivalry could be limited by joint agreements–with some even seeing in arms control the catalyst for a genuinely friendly American-Soviet relationship–comprehensive arms control…is likely to be the victim of the bloody-mindedness of the present Soviet leadership and of the dynamics of the technological revolution.”5
1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Arms Control to Controlled Security,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1984.
2. Andrei Gromyko, “Lenin’s Peace Policy,” Moscow News, 22 April 1984, in FBIS:SOV, 27 April 1984, p. R 7.
3. Strategic Survey 1983-1984 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 28.
4. See, for example, Yu. Zhukov, “The Most Important and Urgent Task,” Pravda, 16 November 1977, p. 4.
5. Brzezinski, “From Arms Control to Controlled Security.”
KNOWING THE SCORE
If the United States is to safeguard the peace successfully, it must understand the strategy and tactics of those who would threaten the peace. Conflict and competition frequently take unconventional forms and can change rapidly. In this complex and dangerous environment, the United States needs to give priority to strengthening its intelligence capabilities worldwide and especially developing a more effective policy for dealing with all aspects of Soviet expansionism, including terrorism.
Enhancing intelligence capabilities is an indispensable component of a strategy of Peace Through Strength.
America’s “intelligence community” is made up of units from several governmental departments. The product of all these offices is coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence, who also heads the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the civilian core of the community. The CIA is responsible for overt and covert clandestine intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert operations outside the U.S., and for analysis and national estimates. Specialized intelligence functions are
carried out by other agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and components from such varied offices as the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce and Energy, the Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. With DIA are the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Air Force conducts a large scale satellite reconnaissance program. All domestic intelligence and counterintelligence functions are the province of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), subordinate to the Department of Justice.
In the 1970s, the intelligence community, and the Central Intelligence Agency and FBI in particular, came under attack from a variety of directions. On the one hand, the CIA was condemned for perceived violations of civil rights and for covert actions abroad. On the other, it was attacked for incorrect intelligence forecasts, such as underestimates of the buildup of Soviet strategic offensive forces and the size of the Soviet military budget. These charges culminated in a massive shakeup of the CIA during the Carter Administration, when many Agency veterans were dismissed and CIA’s covert political operations in support of friends abroad were virtually closed down.
These actions dismayed many Americans who view the intelligence community as one of our first lines of defense, and who felt the actions taken were undermining the free world’s intelligence capabilities. In recent years efforts have begun to improve the capabilities of the intelligence community so that it can provide decision-makers with the best possible information and analysis.
Much more than restoration to the previous state is needed, because even as American intelligence was being torn down, the Soviet activities which it was supposed to monitor were expanding and becoming more sophisticated. The KGB never slowed down in its campaign against Free World interests and institutions. Hence, if we are to have the detailed information we need to operate our armed forces, to avoid diplomatic disasters, and to combat Soviet disinformation and active measures, every aspect of American intelligence will have to continue to improve substantially.
When individuals, or nations, shut their eyes and ears, events do not simply cease to happen around them. They simply find out about these events the hard way. This country must develop a greater capability to see the overall correlation of political, economic and military forces in international affairs. It is no longer enough to find out the throw-weight and launch-weight of Soviet missiles, or merely verify the number of silos. It is now evident that the Soviets have a large number of missiles either to reload silos or to be launched and independently of silos. In addition, Soviet occupation with the SS-20, SS-X-25 and SS-16 mobile ICBMs suggests they will continue to pursue a mobile ICBM, complicating our intelligence efforts.
Even the very best intelligence cannot make up for the lack of a self-assured, success-oriented foreign policy. But effective intelligence in all its main aspects is
indispensable for the successful conduct of foreign policy. The highest officials in our government, our Congressmen, and the public ought to be informed much better than they are about the crucial importance of this input to sound strategy.
What We Must Do
Human intelligence. The clandestine collection operations which the CIA conducts worldwide to safeguard American interests must be restored quickly to their pre-1970 degree of effectiveness. To accomplish this, improvements must be made to assure operational security; e.g., 1) elimination of unjustified access to CIA operational files through Freedom of Information Suits; 2) reducing the number of persons who have prior and current knowledge of clandestine collection operations; and 3) increasing the variety of expertise and experience of staffs engaged in intelligence collection abroad.
Most of our clandestine and covert staff officers are known to hostile services, consequently they face difficulty in secretly approaching sources of information. This problem can be lessened by hiring and training as human collectors people who can pass as non-Americans, or as Americans unconnected with the U.S. government. Opposition to use of such non-official cover has been a staple of the anti-intelligence lobby, which argues that it is immoral to use students, journalists, clergymen, or scholars as intelligence collectors. Yet the national interest demands the most sophisticated kind of comprehensive intelligence collection by human beings of data that cannot be seen or heard by technical means.
Technical collection. Big, one-of-a-kind, space-based systems whose location is known to the Soviet Union are less and less useful in peacetime, and certain to be destroyed at the start of hostilities. Moreover, even if they could survive, they are designed for in-depth looks at pre-chosen targets, rather than for rapid coverage of wide areas to find targets in a rapidly evolving situation. We should take a lesson from the Soviet Union’s technical intelligence systems, which are much less sophisticated (and therefore cheaper) and much more plentiful. We need Toyotas as well as Mercedes in our technical collection inventory.
Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence (CI) affords an independent check on the security and hence the effectiveness of collection systems, both human and technical. Perhaps the greatest need of American intelligence today is for an optimum system for analysis of the data we receive from our collectors from the perspective of counterintelligence–that is to say, by asking how the enemy may have used the knowledge he has of our collection systems to bias what we receive.
The intelligence community needs strong CI representation in each intelligence agency–especially the CIA. Technical collection in general also needs augmented CI to deal with advances in Soviet deception techniques.
Covert Action. Ideally, covert action (CA) is the secret, sometimes paramilitary exercise of influence on foreign situations in a manner that is unattributable to or plausibly deniable by the U.S. government. This activity of intelligence has also been severely criticized by some elements both in and out of government. Improvement in CA will not come through reform of the CIA, but rather through revitalization of the process
by which American foreign policy is formulated and carried out.
The shortcomings have occurred because covert activities have been ordered ad hoc, and not as part of purposeful, success-oriented foreign policies. Hence, though we have won some covert battles, we have lost in the larger, long-range struggles. All too often CA is seen as something to be done instead of diplomatic, economic, or military efforts. In fact, however, CA generally makes sense only as a calculated addition to these efforts.
Analysis & Estimates
Since the end-product of most of our intelligence activity is analytical estimates based on a mosaic of collected data, it is critical that the analysis and assessment of the results be of the highest quality. These reports are supposed to convey at least as much knowledge on a given subject as the collectors gathered, plus a bit more than the raw information implies. In fact, our analytical system has too often delivered far less than the data available. The best-known case, of course, is the Soviet strategic buildup which began in the 1960s, which our National Intelligence Estimates simply under estimated, partly from an inadequate understanding of Soviet deception strategies. The people who compile these refined analyses for the highest political level have a crucial function, for their interpretations provide the basis for national policy. The quality of these staffs must be as high as possible.
Analysis and assessment of data in an operational atmosphere in which Soviet intrigue sets the tone present special challenges. The first consideration is the question of deception: Are the collected data what they appear to be? This is true whether the information is obtained via human sources or through technical means. Obviously this aspect of assessment must lean heavily on an effective counterintelligence capability.
If the free world is to play in the same league with the massive Soviet intelligence apparatus, our intelligence community must have the benefit of the best analytical minds and the most sophisticated techniques of assessment. Nothing is more essential in implementing a strategy of Peace through Strength.
The Perilous State of Our Internal Security
A nation may have the strongest defense establishment in the world, but this establishment may prove utterly futile if the nation fails to put in place adequate defenses against the serious existing dangers to American internal security.
Internal security protects the government against the unremitting efforts of the Communist bloc to infiltrate its agents into positions of influence in policymaking areas, or to recruit people who have achieved such influence, either on ideological grounds or by means of blackmail or monetary enticement.
Internal security also increasingly means protecting government officials and the public in general from terrorists’ attacks. Such attacks are as a rule carried out by organizations that operate in the name of “oppressed peoples”–but more often than not it is demonstrable that Soviet bloc countries were involved in providing training, logistical
facilities and funds to these groups.
Finally, internal security has to do with the protection of the nation from violent revolution. Such a danger may seem remote, even farfetched in the present context, but one must remember that in 1968 France was brought to the very brink of anarchy by massive youth demonstrations.
The first ingredient in an effective internal security program is a sound domestic intelligence program, without which no law enforcement agency and no national government can function. Domestic intelligence traditionally has operated through four primary instrumentalities: (1) citizen cooperation, (2) third party records, including bank records, telephone and utility records, etc., (3) surveillance, including electronic surveillance, and (4) informants. For years now, however, our law enforcement authorities have operated under a crippling loss of access to these primary instrumentalities of intelligence because of lack of Congressional and public support.
Citizen cooperation has been reduced to a fraction of what it used to be in part because of the impact of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Third party records, because of privacy legislation at Federal and state levels, have become increasingly difficult to obtain. Electronic surveillance is permitted under judicial warrant in certain categories of criminal activity but for all practical purposes is banned for internal security investigations. And, thanks to FOIA, informants have become an all but extinct species because of the widespread fear that their identities will be revealed in response to an FOIA request.
The existence of a national security database provides protection against the infiltration of government by disloyal elements, against those who would disrupt the tranquility of our communities, against revolutionary terrorism, and against the ultimate danger of revolutionary subversion. Conversely, the non-existence of an adequate database is an open invitation to disaster in all four areas.
The problem of infiltration in government is an old one. The threat posed by the increasing prevalence of terrorism, however, is a phenomenon that dates back only a few years.
The Levi guidelines for the conduct of the FBI in domestic security investigations, in force from 1976 to 1983, made it impossible to maintain surveillance of revolutionary groups which openly advocated the use of force and violence but did not currently engage in violation of the law to the knowledge of the authorities. This made a mockery of all political intelligence collection efforts collected in advance of terrorist or espionage crimes in order to prevent them.
Particularly damaging was the near-total destruction of the domestic intelligence database laboriously built up by the FBI and the local and State law enforcement agencies over a period of several decades.
As of March 1976, there were 4, 868 cases under investigation on internal security subjects. By the Spring of 1984 the FBI had cases on fewer than two dozen organizations and none on individuals in this area of vital concern.
The Levi guidelines have now been replaced by new ones promulgated in March 1983 by Attorney General William French Smith. They are a move in the right direction, but much ground remains to be regained because of the chilling effect lingers on.
In no area have the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act and the Levi
guidelines inflicted more damage than in the application of the Federal Employees Security Program. Without the contents of investigative files on domestic radicals available on request, no meaningful investigation of revolutionary groups can be conducted on a long-term basis.
The situation has been further complicated by the reduced willingness of local and State law enforcement agencies to share intelligence with each other, out of deference to FOIA and the Federal Tort Claims Act, which permitted suits against individual government employees charging them with violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In 1977 the Civil Service Commission ruled that applicants for employment, even in sensitive positions, could not be asked about membership in organizations committed to violent overthrow of the U.S. Government or to the use of force for political change.
This concept has disappeared from the new guidelines adopted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 1984. Investigators interviewing third parties are now permitted to ask in a general manner about membership in questionable organizations and to report any such statements by witnesses in their own words. The proposition that employees in sensitive government positions are expected to be completely loyal to the United States is explicitly spelled out. On paper, these new guidelines represent a quantum improvement and they should promptly be translated into practice.
Two improvements can be made to improve the quality of government screening of applicants for employment in sensitive positions. The first is the introduction of an in-depth subject interview using the polygraph. Such a procedure has been used to good advantage in the past by sensitive government agencies. It has now been put into practice by the Department of Defense.
The polygraph has been particularly effective in eliciting admissions that were not made in the course of answering form questionnaires or responding to questions posed in personal interviews.
The reinstitution of the domestic intelligence data base, in addition to again making possible a vigorous and meaningful Federal Employees Security Program, would provide our law enforcement authorities with an essential weapon in defending the government against subversive infiltration, in combating domestic terrorism, in defending our communities against violence, and in defending our government against the ultimate threat of revolutionary subversion.
Substantial progress has been made toward the improved collection, counterintelligence, analysis, and covert action that President Reagan promised to pursue in his 1980 platform.
Policy is the thoughtful thread that connects what we want with what we are able to do. Improved intelligence will be useful to the extent that our military programs and foreign initiatives proceed from a coherent strategic design that links goals with the means to achieve them. Knowing the score is knowing the world and coping with it competently.
THE ECONOMIC ARM OF FREEDOM
The economies of the U.S., Western Europe and Japan are vastly superior to those of the Soviet Union and the bloc countries in Eastern Europe. However, despite the tremendous advantage in Western productivity, little effort has been made to exploit this powerful factor for strategic gain. The West must capitalize on this source of influence.
The Communists claim that economic factors dominate politics. Yet, every Communist economy is a failure in supplying basic human needs, let alone in providing a better life for the people living under its rule. One may contrast, the drab economies of Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and Vietnam with those countries where free economies reign, (e.g., South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.).
While the Soviet Union works to acquire advanced technologies from the West by any means, paradoxically, Western countries advance loans and credits to prevent faltering Communist countries from collapsing.
The exercise of economic power as an arm of strategy is not as well established as the employment of military force, psychological techniques and politico-diplomatic maneuvers. The United States now has the opportunity to apply, in a methodical and continuing manner, economic power as an integral part of its national strategy.
The West is beginning to appreciate the concept of “economic strategy” in the context of the complex world situation. A major shortcoming in present U.S. planning, policy-making and strategic planning is the failure of our strategic analysis to come fully to grips with all the relevant economic factors of the modern world.
Among the issues that need to be addressed are the following: improving the U.S. economic base; strengthening economic cooperation among the industrialized democracies; coping with the Third World’s economic problems; solving the energy crisis; and most importantly, conducting adversarial economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
There is no priority higher than that of our survival as a free nation. We must do what is required regardless of the cost. We must be prepared to make sacrifices when needed.
Strengthening Cooperation Among The Industrialized Democracies
The annual summit meeting of the major Western industrial nations and Japan is the principal forum for fostering the economic cooperation on which free-world security depends. At the tenth economic summit held in London in June 1984, the heads of state agreed on a Declaration of Democratic Values, including the following:
We believe that, in the political and economic systems of our democracies, it is for governments to set conditions in which there can be the greatest possible range and freedom of choice and personal initiative; in which the ideals of social justice, obligations and rights can be pursued; in which private enterprise can flourish and employment opportunities can be available for all.
Effective implementation of the policy decisions taken at these annual meetings between the leaders of the U.S., West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy requires the services of a permanent international secretariat. This has been proposed and should have the endorsement and support of the U.S. government.
The Third World’s Economic Problems
The Third World nations, for the most part, are confronted by severe economic difficulties as well as overpopulation, high birthrates, diseases and, in some cases, starvation. They need, and sometimes even demand, economic assistance from the West. Most of them produce primary products. They claim they receive too little for what they produce and must pay excessive prices for manufactured goods. Their plight is well recognized. The economic communiqué issued after the June 1984 summit meeting dealt at length with the problems of debt in the Third World and the need to increase aid and financing to poor nations.
It is clear that the leaders of the world’s richest nations felt inclined to respond to the urgent pleas for help from the heads of some of the hard-pressed countries, especially in South America, where some states have been threatening a debtors’ revolt.
The Soviets make economic warfare capital out of the Third World’s woes, blaming all of the economic difficulties on colonial rule or, in the case of the United States, neo-colonial domination.
Many obstacles to development exist in the Third World, including limitations set by capital availability and “economic absorptive capacity,” not to mention the frustrations encountered in importing technology and science prematurely into preindustrial social structures. There is also illiteracy, administrative fiscal inefficiency and corruption. In helping to eliminate these, the developed countries will be strengthening the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
Countries willing to undertake major economic reforms should receive priority in the allocation of economic aid; otherwise the money will simply be wasted as much of it has been for many years. We should continue to encourage the Third World to emulate the successful free enterprise models of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
The Energy Crisis
Although the world is temporarily enjoying an oil glut resulting from overproduction and reduced consumption, a future imbalance between supply and demand for energy is not impossible, and in fact is likely. The energy dependency of free-world democracies on Middle East oil must be overcome as soon as possible.
The U.S. has formed a synfuels agency–primarily to encourage the production of liquid fuel from coal. This year the administration cut off billions of dollars from funds appropriated in 1980 because, in the words of Energy Secretary Donald Hodel, projects supported by the agency “never seem to achieve commercial viability.” Yet, the central purpose of the synfuels effort was to provide the risk capital, to assemble the know-how, experience and a fair amount of plant, so that the U.S. would not be left helpless in future emergencies. An additional function was to keep foreign suppliers on notice that we had
an alternative if their prices get too high.
The U.S. must be able to use its synfuel capabilities to an international emergency or in answer to blackmail, and to provide the basic know-how for the time when natural energy shortages make the cost of synfuels competitive. Today the U.S. and its allies remain vulnerable to another energy crisis. This is strategically unacceptable, and requires immediate and continuing attention.
Another key vulnerability of the U.S. and its allies is the possibility of a cut-off of strategic raw materials should the Soviet Union gain control of 1) the countries which produce them, or of 2) the strategic “choke points” through which world shipping carrying these materials can be interdicted. This is why the United States and the free world must have a superior navy to defend the sea-lanes and help our allies defend themselves and help freedom fighters in their efforts to free these countries.
Economic Relations With The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
We should explore how best the Western economic advantage can be used as a lever to help transform the Soviet system. The U.S. should work with its allies to develop a mutually advantageous combined economic strategy toward the Soviet Union. Some of them see no logic in forgoing the natural gas pipeline deal while we sell the Soviet Union vast quantities of wheat.
Some East-West trade is desirable and can be used to complicate the Soviet Union’s problems with its restless satellites. Yet, as a general rule, the West should not finance this trade. The guiding principles should be (1) cash transactions, and (2) no export of critical processes or technology that can be applied to military purposes.
As the free world shifts to the non-military offensive, the following measures should be considered: A centralized new agency, an Office of Strategic Trade, should be created, for an international trade policy which will further the strategic interests of the United States, with a mandate to wage economic warfare against the Soviet bloc. It should conduct economic warfare operations similar to those which the British Ministry of Economic Warfare carried on against Germany in World War II, but on a more global scale. Precedents exist also in our history. A similar wartime organization within the Foreign Economic Administration combined the Office of Economic Warfare and elements of the Departments of State and Commerce, as well as the Lend-Lease Administration.
The mission of the Office of Strategic Trade should be to analyze and exploit the economic vulnerabilities of the Soviet bloc. It would devise strategies to complicate and disorganize the Soviet economy so that over the long term it will bring about a fundamental change in the politico-economic structure of the USSR.
The Office of Strategic Trade would act as advisors to the National Security Council on economic warfare. Its day-to-day operations would be conducted through the Department of Commerce, as an adjunct of the International Trade Administration. Its membership would include representatives from the Departments of State, Defense and
Treasury, the CIA, the Office of the President’s council of Economic Advisors, and such other governmental bodies as needed.
It would deal with such matters as:
1) Tightening Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Control of
Exports (COCOM) and other multilateral controls on high technology goods and licenses. The responsibility for approving licenses for export of sensitive technological goods from the U.S. to other countries has been divided for too long among a range of U.S. agencies that includes Commerce, State, Defense, and Treasury. Each agency by mandate has a different vested interest. For instance, Commerce attempts to promote exports overall, and thus tends to be more lenient. State wishes to promote cooperation with our allies diplomatically, and thus wishes to find solutions with general acceptability.
Some improvement may result from pending revision of the Export Administration Act now before the Congress. The major North Atlantic organizations, NATO, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Atomic Energy Agency, and other groups, have been looking closely at issues of technology theft for the last year. Their consensus recommendations should constitute the minimum for an action agenda.
Additionally, COCOM should be encouraged to eliminate the unanimity rule, thus affording individual countries which develop new technologies additional protection against leakage by other COCOM members or neutral states to the Soviet Union. Special provision would have to be made for the increasingly common practice of originating technology in one country and licensing manufacture in other countries. The increasing use of unilateral controls by the U.S. may be necessary to put the other members of COCOM on notice that the United States is serious about export controls.
2) Devising measures to frustrate the Soviet Union’s efforts to steal free world technology. The intelligence community currently estimates that the KGB assigns at least 2,000 agents full-time to such tasks, and as the number grows, so will the challenge to enforcement services in the U.S. and allied countries to control illegal movements of technology. We should increase manpower for surveillance and prevention of Soviet theft of technology.
3) Developing jointly with our allies economic sanctions contingency plans to be at the disposal of the political leadership if needed. A major problem in trying to enact economic sanctions against the Soviet Union after past infringements upon international peace and security–such as the invasion of Afghanistan–has been the attempt by NATO members to develop sanctions after the criminal act. Some member or combination of members then objects to the proposed sanctions as hurting their economies in the short term. A better approach might be to devise potential sanctions, with fully researched analysis of the effects on individual industries and economic sectors, for contingency use, thereby allowing for development of offsetting financial measures ahead of crises.
The West should increase public attention and pressure on the criminal involvement of Soviet-bloc states in the international drug traffic. The international drug market produces the hard currency used to buy the arms to support Soviet sponsored insurgencies around the world. This cycle must be broken. Among the range of possible measures would be to bring greater publicity to the role of Cuba, Bulgaria, North Korea, Nicaragua and other Communist states in the heinous traffic of heroin, cocaine, and other
dangerous drugs. Greater pressure on tracing of actual illegal drug movements would ensure that the traffic does not reinforce the pattern of providing hard currency earnings for the Soviet bloc.
4) Assisting the Congress to prepare legislation for protecting technological research, particularly the problem of the leakage of government-funded, unclassified, open-source basic research into the Soviet Union. Sensible controls will need to be devised for particular areas of research–as has already been done by the National Security Agency on encryption research–with possible prepublication review and classification by the Defense Department in order to limit transmission to foreigners of technical data with military applications. It could also limit access of certain foreign nationals to American technical meetings.
Such legislation is needed soon, before additional damage occurs, but it needs to be carefully defined, otherwise the result may be to reduce the number of private sector institutions willing to accept U.S. government contract work. Controls need to be enhanced on corporate-based research funded by the U.S. government, rather than on general university-based basic research. If done in moderate fashion, it may reduce the flow of state-of-the-art research to the Soviet Union.
5) Making use of national marketing agencies when dealing with the Soviet Union. An important lesson can be learned from the famous “grain robbery” in which the monopoly buyer position of the Soviet state relative to the many sellers in the U.S. economy (whose internal telephoned negotiations the KGB was able to intercept routinely) gave the Soviets an unbeatable advantage. It may be worth trying specific, short-term exemptions from the U.S. antitrust legislation for purposes of large-scale negotiations with the Soviet Union, as for future purchases of grain or other multi-source commodities. With such a trading mechanism, we could demand what we want from them in exchange for things they want from us.
American sellers should also be made aware that the Soviets use illegal means such as electronic surveillance to obtain inside knowledge about the American negotiators. In trading with the Soviet Union, the U.S. economy is not dealing with another “normal” business partner in the world economy. It is attempting to undertake customary transactions with an entity which has no enduring stake in the maintenance of the global economic system.
6) We should stimulate the Soviet citizen’s desire for consumer goods and other conveniences such as refrigerators and washing machines. In time, through the demonstrated effect of economic success and enhanced communications the Soviet citizen would begin to demand more from the Soviet elite and some resources would have to be shifted from military allocations to satisfy consumer desires.
Economic Strategies to Transform the Soviet System
Utilizing U.S. and Western economic advantage to help transform the Soviet system is a more sophisticated question than blocking Soviet efforts to steal high-technology and sabotage Western economies. The reason lies in the very nature of the Soviet system and its unique manner of managing the economy.
The rulers of the Soviet Union have a dilemma: they are fully aware that they
preside over a rather weak and stagnant economy and they are also aware that they cannot go on indefinitely depriving their own people of the most modest amenities of life. Periodically, “incentive” programs are instituted to give workers money for additional production. Such limited “incentives” have been tried many times and do not solve the fundamental problem: lack of freedom.
Soviet leaders know exactly how America generates its technological innovation and wealth. They know that only be decentralizing and individualizing the decision-making process and allowing free, competitive markets to develop in the Soviet Union can they effectively generate technology and wealth. They even tolerate the black market as a perverted reflection of a free market economy. Ironically the black market has become essential to the functioning of the rigid Soviet commercial economy.
They are afraid, however, that if they cure the patient they will kill the doctor. To introduce true incentives and economic freedom into the Soviet Union would destroy the core of the Communist credo and eliminate the ruling Party clique. So, the Communist rulers, to preserve their own power, do what they do best: build military power in the hope that by achieving acknowledged strategic superiority they will be able to overcome the West via fear and intimidation without risking a nuclear war.
The dismal productive achievements of the Soviet Union–brightened only by the accomplishments in its military-industrial complex–provide the fundamental reasons why the Communist economic system is vulnerable.
Soviet agriculture is in even worse shape than its productive system for consumer goods. The Soviet people need to be told why they are so poorly fed, so poorly clothed, and so poorly housed. Soviet leaders have made every effort to keep their own people misinformed and in ignorance.
Many experts believe that the Soviet Union will be facing a deteriorating situation in its hard currency position in coming years.1 Even the likely earnings from the natural gas pipeline to Western Europe–estimated at $8 billion per year–will simply offset the decline in oil earnings. This will give us and our allies the opportunity to exploit this situation by insisting on incremental increases in economic freedom for Soviet citizens.
The economic arm of freedom should be used to enhance the well-being and cooperation of the non-Communist world. Toward the Soviet Union its objectives should be: (1) to weaken the Soviet Union’s power structure; (2) to reduce Soviet capabilities for promoting international conflict, depriving the Soviet leaders of the initiative and putting them on the defensive; and (3) to convince them that their goal of global hegemony is no longer realistic and must be abandoned.
To work toward these goals the U.S. needs an Office of Strategic Trade as an advisory body to the National Security Council, coordinating the responsibilities of the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State in carrying out economic warfare as part of a comprehensive non-military offensive against the Soviet Union.
1. See estimates, for instance, by Ellen E. Frost and Angela E. Stent, “NATO’s Troubles with East-West Trade,” International Security, Summer 1983, pp. 181-182.
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
We face a hostile ideology–global in scope, atheistic in
character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method….
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military
establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for
instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted
to risk his own destruction. . . .
Dwight D. Eisenhower
January 17, 1961
In a U.S. strategy of Peace Through Strength, the United States Armed Forces and those of its allies must provide a shield behind which the Free World can carry on its normal international relations, and can also mount the many-sided effort to transform the Soviet society into a responsible member of the world community. The purpose of the military shield is to deter direct attacks, to limit coercion, and to protect the U.S. and its allies.
However, as we reported in Chapter 8, the United States is now militarily inferior to the Soviet Union in both conventional and strategic forces.
The present strategic military modernization program will not change that. It is only aimed at replacing a small part of our strategic military delivery systems before those systems are due for retirement.
The net effect of the President’s five-part program will not be to expand the U.S. strategic force, but only to replace a few of our aging strategic weapons systems before they have to be retired.
The more modern U.S. strategic force will enhance the U.S. deterrent, but only fractionally.
The standard that U.S. strategic forces must meet in order to be adequate are officially established. No major component can be vulnerable. The forces, overall, must at a minimum be essentially equivalent to the capabilities of Soviet strategic forces. U.S. forces must be able to absorb even a well-executed surprise attack and still have a variety of controlled and selective strike options against the full range of Soviet targets, including hardened counter force targets. They must, in addition, be able to maintain, for even an extended period of time, the capability to destroy enemy industrial and economic targets.
In sum, they must be able not only to deter with confidence a broad range of threats, they must also be able to limit damage and be used in accordance with U.S. political-military objectives should deterrence fail.
U.S. forces do not today meet those standards, nor will current modernization programs satisfactorily change that situation. The administration’s strategic program as regards offensive forces and C-3 (strategic defenses are addressed in the next section) does contain some significant improvement but is inadequate. Most particularly, it lacks the necessary urgency and timeliness in restoring strategic superiority and in closing the window of vulnerability. It promises improved capabilities mainly for the 1990s while leaving us facing severe vulnerabilities and deficiencies for a decade.
As vital as strategic nuclear forces are to U.S. military capability, they command only a small percentage of the U.S. defense budget. This can and must be increased to regain U.S. strategic superiority. It is imperative that the President’s modernization program be expanded to include more certain and more rapid means of reducing the vulnerabilities of our deterrence forces as well as expanding the capabilities of those forces. This should include, inter alia, 1) an accelerated, higher priority small ICBM program with a variety of basing modes, 2) a near term ABM defense for important strategic assets, and 3) an expanded program for the production of MX missiles, cruise missiles, and B-1 Bombers.
Finally, the same imbalance and adverse trends that exist in the strategic nuclear balance also exist in the theater nuclear balance where the Soviets enjoy large advantages over the west in every category. These advantages are of increased significance because of the imbalance at the intercontinental strategic level. Modernization of theater nuclear forces has lagged even more than modernization of strategic forces. The current modernization program, which seems dominated by arms control rather than military considerations, does not appreciably change this. A more determined effort is necessary if deterrence is to be restored in the theater.
The argument against the value of military superiority is especially pernicious because it is always used to justify reducing U.S. military strength. It is never applied against Soviet military power. It is worth remembering that the world was a safer place and Soviet aggression more muted when the U.S. enjoyed overwhelming strategic superiority, because we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems. With a rough U.S.-Soviet parity of numbers and quality of both weapons and means of delivery, the best that can be achieved in some politically useful margin of military superiority.
Current Soviet numerical superiority in strategic weapons, though not sufficient at present to warrant the risk of a first strike, does offer the Soviet Union both military and political advantages. It does not follow that the U.S. should seek superiority merely because it is the Soviet’s goal. The initial objective of superiority for the U.S. at the strategic level, based on a unique technological advantage, is to deny the Soviets these advantages.
Those who argue that the U.S. cannot afford superiority tend to picture the U.S.
building more and larger weapons of all kinds than the Soviet Union. This is not true, nor is it necessary. Strategic superiority does not demand a numerical advantage. It does demand good strategic thinking and superior science and technology.
Overall military and technological superiority for the U.S. would require fundamentally that we possess unique technological advantages which would: (1) discourage a direct Soviet attack against this country and its principal allies; (2) prevent Soviet coercion of allies; (3) inhibit nuclear proliferation; and, (4) allow us to control the escalation of war begun at a low level of conflict intensity. For the U.S. to control the escalation of war does not require superiority in all categories of conventional weapons. Rather, it requires that we be able to exert a downward pressure against an adversary on the basis of superiority at the high end of the conflict spectrum, strategic power.
An issue, therefore, is whether the U.S. should seek to regain a margin of superiority–or, as the President has called it, a “margin of safety”–by developing unique technological advantages. Advantage need not give the U.S. a first-strike potential, but it should be one that would allow us to control the process of escalation.
The political aspect of strategic superiority is often overlooked by those who seek to downgrade its importance. Third World and uncommitted nations, viewing the Soviet dedication to superiority and measuring their sacrifice, draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union will be the dominant world power in the future. These nations do not engage in academic and moralistic debates about superiority. They simply note the facts objectively, and conclude that their future will be best served by accommodating to the USSR.
The people in the United States who most loudly denounce strategic superiority as a national objective do not recognize–or will not admit–that superiority is the Soviet objective. For years Soviet military officials have publicly denounced U.S. Pronouncements about mutual assured destruction as decadent “bourgeois” concepts, not grounded in reality. They have openly declared that they intend to develop superior military power to control the course of history.
First, the Soviets built a large, accurate first-strike offensive force. The Soviet offensive force is designed to give them a disarming capability. It was not designed as a deterrent based on retaliation.
Now, the Soviets are increasing their investment in defense. The Soviets have experimented with anti-air-craft missiles that have an ABM potential, and their experiments have involved netting those weapons in a nationwide array along with acquisition and weapons-control radars. In essence, they have tested the prototype of a nationwide ABM system. Moreover, the Soviets have a large and modern air defense force, supported by a nationwide civil defense structure and program.
Hope for the future lies in what the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to as “the study of means for defending against strategic nuclear attack.” This statement refers to President Reagan’s historic speech of March 23, 1983, in which he announced a basic reorientation of our nuclear strategy from Mutual Assured Destruction toward Mutual Assured Survival. The President called on the scientific community to find ways to make nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete”; and with that challenge, he renounced the theory of deterrence known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
Mutual Assured Destruction bases deterrence on the defenselessness of both
sides. Conceptually, it places both nations in the position of facing each other with nuclear offensive weapons–nuclear swords, if you will–but without nuclear shields. The Soviets have never accepted this no-defense concept and have made massive investments in ballistic missile defense, anti0bomber defense, and civil defense. Robert Jastrow wrote recently of the Soviet response to MAD:
It is now clear–in fact it has been clear for a decade–that while for many years the American government adopted the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction proposed by our scientists and academicians, the Soviet government rejected it. The USSR undertook to do exactly what our strategists say it is supposed not to do: it implemented large programs for defending its citizens from nuclear attack, for shooting down American missiles, and for fighting and winning a nuclear war. The result as Senator Moynihan has said, is a “policy in ruins, and the greatest peril our nation has faced in its 200-year history.1
All military strategies are outgrowths of the political system and values of a nation, as well as being responsive to external threats. There are two fatal flaws in a deterrent strategy of assured destruction: (1) it contravenes America’s values–killing the civilian population of an opponent is genocide; and, (2) by deliberately leaving our own population undefended, it contravenes common sense–no sane, healthy nation is suicidal. In no way can this macabre combination of genocide and suicide be considered a moral strategy. America’s most cherished values, including a respect for life and a sense of proportion in the use of force, are violated. Over the long haul, the MAD strategy weakens our political will, and people begin to turn to forms of unilateral nuclear disarmament, accommodation to Soviet coercive diplomacy, and surrender of allied interest: Munich of 1938 revisited. When these domestic effects are combined with the now-obvious fact that the Soviets still believe in the possibility of some sort of victory after a nuclear exchange, that their national entity would survive and that of the United States would not, a basic change in strategy is indicated.
Defense against nuclear attack, together with an assured survival strategy based on a balance of nuclear offense and defense and conventional war-fighting forces, is now a realistic goal.
There is a problem in making a transition from an all-offensive to a balanced offensive/defensive posture. It is obvious that our strategic offensive forces, now undergoing modernization both in land and sea based missiles and aircraft, must bear the burden of deterrence until strategic defense can be phased in. Steps are already underway to insure the survivability of our missiles (for example, we are building a long range missile for the survivable Trident submarine and “superhardening” of the Minuteman III silos), and we are improving our Command/Control/Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems so that our military commanders will be able to exercise better control over our secure strategic reserve force.
II. DEFENSE; THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
“Would it not be better to save lives than avenge them?”
This is the question President Reagan asked the world on March 23, 1983. He challenged all nations, including the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), to work together to build defenses against ballistic missiles so as to render these nuclear-tipped weapons “impotent and obsolete.”
It will take a while for foreign governments to digest this bold proposal. But as far as the United States is concerned, the most important strategic-political decision since the beginning of the atomic age has been made. Henceforth, U.S. national security policy will no longer be based on the immoral premise for deterring nuclear war by threatening genocide, the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction. Instead, we will begin working toward a new defense posture which will provide, in the years ahead, assured survival for Americans and for all other people who wish to join in this common effort. It will be a posture built around an effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.
Since it will take time to change the basis of deterrence from today’s offensively oriented nuclear strategy to a strategy based heavily on ABMs, there will be a transition period of at least a decade during which our national security will require the continuation of our program of strategic modernization. It will be a period calling for the highest order of wisdom, courage, and statesmanship on the part of the United States.
As we begin this difficult period of transition, there is a feeling of both urgency and optimism at the highest levels of our government. This is the result of three factors which prompted the President’s decision: (1) Our senior scientific advisors have concluded that an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense is feasible; (2) U.S. national security planners believe the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) has lost its credibility as a basis for deterrence; and (3) our intelligence community, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are deeply concerned with the magnitude and sophistication of ongoing Soviet ABM programs and have warned of the adverse consequences of the Soviets developing an operational ABM capability ahead of the United States.2
Unfortunately, the media, both press and TV, continue to treat the whole subject of ABM defenses as if it were a science fiction fantasy which will either quietly fade away or else fall on its face. This attitude persists despite the President’s Scientific Advisor George Keyworth’s official reaffirmation this spring that “The objective unequivocally remains what the President stated in his speech”; despite, two implementing National Security Decision Directives No. 83 (1983) and No. 116 (1984); despite Defense Secretary Weinberger’s statement of March 27, 1984 that “There has not been any change in direction or in the ultimate goal of creating a thoroughly reliable, effective defense” against nuclear missiles; despite a series of nationwide public opinion polls which confirm that three our of four Americans overwhelmingly support the President’s efforts to shift to a strategy of assured survival; and despite the U.S. Army’s achievement of the world’s first interception of an incoming ballistic missile warhead by a non-nuclear ABM more than 100 miles above the western Pacific Ocean on June 10, 1984.
Fortunately, the media’s lack of appreciation of the historic significance of the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI as it is now called in the Administration,
has not deterred its implementation. At first, the scope of the project caught the Washington bureaucracy by surprise, but once they realized the President meant what he said, they fell in line, and things began to move.
Initial skepticism has been replaced by a growing conviction within the Executive Branch and among the scientific community that, given the resources, American technology can accomplish this challenging task. Did we not put a man on the moon within the short span of seven years?
There is also general agreement that a nationwide ballistic missile defense cannot be achieved by any single device. Instead, a layered defense system with both ground- and space-based components is needed. All elements of this system are not expected to become operational at the same time, but they will be phased in as fast as their reliability is demonstrated through test and evaluation.
Two billion dollars have been earmarked in the Administration’s FY’85 budget specifically for research on this project. Over the next five years, it is estimated that $24 billion more will be required for research alone. This is over and above funds allocated to NASA for the ten-year space station project. Within the Department of Defense, Lt. General James Abrahamson was named Coordinator for Research on Ballistic Missile Defenses in April 1984, reporting directly to Secretary Weinberger.
Thus, as of today, the United States is committed to developing a ballistic missile defense system. The concept of a layered defense system, to be built incrementally as elements become operational, has been accepted. A single manager for the entire project has been appointed. Adequate start-up funds are being provided.
The defense and space industries, having reviewed the Project Defender ABM studies undertaken by the Department of Defense in close coordination with industry in the early 1960s, are confident that by making use of the technological breakthroughs generated by the space program, it will be possible to achieve the President’s goal far sooner and with less cost than the “doubting Thomases” expect.
The Administration’s policy of Peace Through Strength which has led to substantial, long overdue increases in defense funding, has strengthened the nation’s industrial and technological infrastructure to the point that these vital resources are available to support the high priority effort being called for by the SDI. In short, all systems are “GO!”
Differences of opinion within the Administration still remain, but with the policy issue settled, they center around four key questions of implementation. First, how soon can our defense planners expect to have the initial elements of the ABM shield in operation? Second, what will be the order of magnitude of the cost of the entire system? Third, how penetration-proof must it be to justify the Cost? And, fourth, what organizational structure should be established within the government to expedite and coordinate the many facets of this giant project?
As to the first, everyone from the President on down is keenly aware of the urgency of the project. Our intelligence community, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are well aware that the Soviets began their ABM research program in 1967 and have given it high priority ever since.
This concern is shared by our NATO allies. During the October 1983 meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, its Scientific and Technical Committee noted that Soviet
efforts in the ABM field appeared to be “markedly greater than those of the Americans.” It warned that “should the U.S. be unable to keep the pace, the situation would become alarming.”
While a sense of urgency pervades the Executive Branch, technical experts differ widely about when the first elements of the missile defense system could be in place. Answers vary, depending on whether “can-do” or “can’t-do” experts are consulted. And much depends on just what the experts are talking about. For example, if the initial increment is defined as the close-in defense of missile silos, that is one thing. But if it is defined as leak proof, space-based, nationwide defenses, that is another.
The first cut at this problem was taken by the Fletcher Committee established by National Security Decision Directive No. 83 a short time after the President’s speech. The research program was divided into five technical areas: surveillance, acquisition and tracking; directed energy defenses; kinetic energy defenses; systems analyses and battle management; and support programs.
While priorities of effort are under continuing review to capitalize on unexpected technological break-throughs, the various proposals for specific ABM defense systems fall generally into three categories: category I, improved versions of the ABM concepts of the ’60s which take advantage of the very significant technological advances made over the past two decades; category II, systems based in space, incorporating present state-of-the-art technology; category III, advanced space-based defenses which probably could not become operational before the 1990s.
The “can-do” experts recommend that in the interest of speed, priority be given to category I. They would start work by updating the ABM systems developed by Project Defender between 1958 and 1964. They believe that if we apply 1984 scientific know-how to these earlier concepts, the prospects are good for point defenses within five years at a cost of around $15 billion. This would be less than it would take to harden or MX silos.
While this initial system is being put in place, research would continue on categories II and III. NASA, supported by the aerospace and computer industries, should be able to make important contributions to category II.
At the same time, the brilliant, research teams at the national nuclear laboratories at Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia would step up their efforts to harness the potentials of short wave-length lasers, fusion energy, and plasma physics, using resources made available for category III.
The second question–cost–remains a big unknown. Much depends on the speed and nature of scientific breakthroughs expected under category III. One thing seems certain, however. When the time comes to deploy the ABM shield, the bill will run to multi-billions of dollars. Since these costs would be spread over a decade or more, they should not pose an insurmountable problem for a nation with an annual GNP of around $3.5 trillion. There could also be a significant offset, in that the U.S. will be able to invest less over the next ten to twenty years in offensive weapons.
Moreover, the President’s program calls for major reductions in the numbers of ballistic warheads of both sides–to 5,000 rather than the 20,000 toward which the Soviets are now building. If the Soviets move toward the lower figure–which, as we saw in Chapter 12, is advantageous for them too if we move in the direction of defense–then the
costs of the SDI are substantially reduced.
Apart from the fact that these funds would be used to help assure the survival of 220 million Americans, economists point out that monies spent on the space program have had a multiplier factor which generated a high return on investment. Cost analyses of the Apollo program led the General Accounting Office to report to Congress that for every dollar of government funds spent on putting a man on the moon, at least six dollars were generated within the U.S. economy.
Debate over the third point–what percentage of incoming missiles must the ABM system be able to intercept to justify its cost–can only be inconclusive at this early stage. Nonetheless, it is ironic to hear people complaining that a defense system would allow thirty missiles through–or even ten or indeed, fifty percent of the incoming enemy warheads through. These people have not objected, oddly, to the present situation in which one hundred percent of enemy warheads would get through. As the Soviets believe “everything counts!”
The balance of terror is maintained today by stockpiles of nuclear warheads already in excess of 9,000 on each side. But as the Scowcroft Commission pointed out, the deterrent effect of these huge arsenals depends not so much on their actual numbers as on the two superpowers’ perceptions of each other’s (1) relative strategic offensive power, and (2) national will to use this power, if necessary to defend their “supreme interests.”
In a world where decisions of war or peace are based on perceptions, uncertainty serves to strengthen deterrence. Wargamers call this “the Heisenberg principle,” after the great German physicist who developed the theory of indeterminacy.
Since the Politburo cannot know the precise kill ratio of our missile defense system, the mere fact we are building one introduces a major uncertainty into their calculations of American power. Fortunately, this uncertainty creates a condition which Physicist Edward Teller calls “deterrence through doubt.” It serves to strengthen deterrence and increases the possibility of additional years of mutual nuclear restraint.
Finally, there is the question of organization. Americans have the illusion you can solve any problem by throwing money at it. Money is necessary, of course, but it takes people and a sound organization to use it wisely. Logisticians have testified that cost is a function of the time required for weapons systems to become operational. Every year of delay added to the time actually required to build a system adds 30% to the cost. Studies completed as recently as 1982 concluded that under normal Pentagon procurement procedures, lead times for weapons systems have averaged 12 years. Given the requirement to deploy the first phase of the ABM shield as soon as possible, delays of this sort are unacceptable.
A number of the President’s closest advisors are urging him to move “assured survival” from the status of a centrally managed Department of Defense program to the higher level of an all-out national security program patterned after the successful World War II Manhattan Project. This is because problems have arisen within the Department of Defense: interservice rivalries, conflict between vested interests of the civilian and military bureaucracies, and the unavoidable red tape of the Pentagon procurement procedures. These are already slowing down and even jeopardizing the successful
implementation of the President’s SDI.
There is also growing recognition within the National Security Council staff that the SDI opens possibilities for important related initiatives in diplomacy and arms control. This has prompted a proposal to create a senior Council on Assured Survival. This body would advise the President on the international and political aspects of his SDI. It would give continuing high level support to the SDI’s program manager so as to accelerate the incremental deployment of the ABM shield.
It has been suggested that this Council be chaired by the Vice President and include the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy; the Directors of CIA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Management and Budget; the Administrator of NASA and the Science Advisor to the President.
The Vice President, who has ready access to the President, would keep him informed of the SDI’s progress, of policy issues that might require resolution within the National Security Council, and of supply or funding bottlenecks which may need the President’s personal intervention to resolve.
Those who advocate organizational changes along these lines do so because they not only recognize the national defense implications of the President’s SDI, but also the wider opportunities it offers for world peace. The fact that the United States intends to shift the basis of its strategy from MAD to Assured Survival makes possible an entirely new approach to deterrence and the avoidance of nuclear war.
The whole point is to create an arms control environment conducive to a protection oriented deterrent. The alternation is to preserve indefinitely and against all evidence of Soviet violations a treaty which has failed to live up to the claims of its proponents. Specifically, a shift from an offense (retaliation) deterrent to a defense (protection) deterrent should be accompanied by a shift from limits on defense designed to ensure that warheads will penetrate to their targets to limits on penetration aids and numbers of warheads which would ensure the viability of the defense. In sum, the SDI, far from signaling the end of arms control, would redirect arms control efforts toward a more moral and humanitarian concept of deterrence.
The implications of the President’s decision of March 23, 1983 are manifold. It permits our Armed Forces to do the job they are charged by the Constitution to perform: defend the American people and protect their vital interests. It has been illegal for them to carry out this duty since August 1972 when the Senate, by the overwhelming vote of 88-2, gave its consent to the SALT I ABM Treaty. That treaty guaranteed the incineration of at least 100 million Americans in the event of all-out nuclear war with the USSR; that treaty prohibited a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles and insured that incoming nuclear warheads, whether fired in anger by the Soviet Union or other hostile states or by accident, will have (to use former Secretary of State Kissinger’s expression) a “free ride” into an undefended United States.
The SDI decision recognizes the fact that the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union has now reached the point where a preemptive counterforce strike with enough weapons held in reserve to deter any retaliation now exists. This situation undermines the credibility of MAD and, if effect, upsets the “balance of terror.” As the London Economist put it, “In the terrifying logic of the nuclear exchange, this certainty of a Soviet third strike would paralyze the American second strike which is supposed to deter
the Russian first strike.”
The SDI offers hope to people everywhere of freedom from their present role of helpless hostages to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It opens the way to a new area of international relations based on closer alliance cooperation, greater sharing of technology for the good of all, and a new appreciation of the mutual benefits of interdependence.
The Hoffman Commission, a group of highly respected authorities on strategy and international affairs appointed to review the SDI for the National Security Council, concluded that the establishment of ABM defenses would “significantly enhance deterrence and world stability.”
World reaction to President Reagan’s call for a global cooperation effort to make ballistic missiles obsolete reflects, in large measure, the nature of international politics today.
As might have been expected, the Soviets summarily rejected any form of cooperation, accusing the U.S. of another Machiavellian attempt to regain world domination.
The Europeans responded favorably. Last October, the North Atlantic Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the NATO governments “to consider carefully ways of ensuring joint participation in the research and development necessary for the creation of ballistic missile defenses.”
The Japanese responded favorably. During hearings in the lower house of the Diet on February 20, 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe stated that as part of its self-defense program under terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan could exchange ABM technology with the United States. He noted that the vehicle for such exchange, the U.S.-Japan Military Technology Transfer Commission, has been in place since November 1983.
SDI Is a Challenge to Fundamentals
President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative boldly calls on the nation to reconceptualize its entire approach to national defense, to rethink its strategy across the board. His challenge goes to fundamentsls.3
American strategic thinkers, forced by the post-war dominance of strategic offense over defense to change the basis of deterrence from defense to retaliation, have come to accept the present defenseless condition for America as an inherent “good,” rather than an imposed necessity. The President is asking for a reexamination of that accepted position. The fundamental question is whether deterrence based on defense is not inherently superior to deterrence based on retaliation–whether assured survival is not preferable to assured destruction.
In our judgement, the military and moral arguments overwhelmingly support Assured Survival.
As agonizing as our national reappraisal over defense fundamentals may be, that reappraisal must be made–and urgently. The Strategic Defense Initiative points the way. Its product could be a true nuclear shield and a true common defense.
To enhance an active defense system, such as the anti-ballistic missile defense system advocated in the Strategic Defense System, we favor an expanded civil defense program. The primary function of an active defense system would be to protect U.S. weapons and forces. The primary function of civil defense, a passive defense measure, would be to save American citizens.
The evidence is overwhelming that civil defense offers the highest return for investment in life saving that the nation can make. Our citizens can greatly improve their chances of surviving nuclear war by taking common sense and inexpensive precautions. Extensive tests have proven this to be so.4 Other tests have demonstrated that industrial plants and facilities can also improve their chances of survival and recovery by other measures.
The effectiveness of civil defense will be improved if it is coupled with an active defense system, such as that proposed in SDI.
From the standpoint of deterrence, a combination of active and civil defense programs will lower the confidence of Soviet strategic planners in the success of a first strike against the U.S. In that sense, active and passive defense measures can contribute to the survival of everyone in the United States.
An enhanced U.S. deterrence would also have the effect of discouraging a major Soviet military aggression anywhere in the world. And in that sense, U.S. active and passive defense measures would contribute to peace worldwide.
Whether we like it or not, space is a potential theater of warfare. As early as two decades ago the Soviet military publication, Military Thought, stated that “the mastering of space [is] a prerequisite for achieving victory in war.” The Defense Department recently revealed that the Soviets aim for that goal.
The Soviets will be able by the mid-to-late 1980’s to increase significantly their space program both in numbers and payload weight. In this regard, the new heavy-lift vehicle is estimated to have the capability to place payloads weighing upwards of 330,000 pounds into low-earth orbit. This is about…five times the maximum U.S. capability. …The Soviets will continue, as in the past, to devote most of their future space program to military purposes.5
It is clear the Soviets are striving to integrate their space systems with the rest of their Armed Forces to ensure superior military capabilities in all arenas.
In recent years the annual growth rate of 15 percent in the Soviet’s space budget has exceeded their overall military budget growth rate. The future mastery of space presents an enormous challenge to the security of the United States.
The ability to exploit space through various kinds of satellites is a major military technological challenge. Already space vehicles provide fast and dependable communications, warning and reconnaissance systems. Future space vehicles will play a
role in anti-missile defenses, and could be carriers for offensive warheads. Many more possibilities for the military use of space will become apparent in time, particularly when man achieves powered flight in space.
Above all, space vehicles may provide the means to open closed societies. No one can build an Iron Curtain in space. It follows that both our security and the possibility of transforming the closed Soviet society may well depend on new space-based systems.
The U.S. has begun to move more vigorously in its space effort. In 1982, the Air Force formed the Space Command to consolidate its operational space activities. The Navy established the Naval Space Command in 1983. When weapons and capabilities are in the operational inventory, these two commands might well be combined to form a new unified command. Resources and priorities given this command should be sufficient to assure that space will serve the U.S.–and not its adversaries.
Conventional and Naval Forces
We are in general agreement with present Department of Defense plans for improving U.S. conventional and naval forces.
1. Robert Jastrow, “Why Strategic Superiority Matters,” Orwell Press, (Reprinted from Commentary, Vol. 75, No. 3, March 1983) p. 8
2. The CIA believes that the Soviet Union is developing a nationwide missile defense systems. A January 1984 report said evidence of Russian preparation for such a system includes laser research, the construction of six large radar complexes, the development of an anti-aircraft missile system that could also help shoot down U.S. ballistic missiles, and the establishment of new military production lines for missile defense components. Additional evidence was provided by satellite photography of a large phased-array ABM radar, now under construction in central Siberia near Krasnoyarsk.
3. Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984, pp. 820-842.
4. Cresson H. Kearny, Nuclear War Survival Skills, American Security Council Foundation, 1979.
5. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1984, pp. 45-46.
THE COMMON DEFENSE
In the aftermath of the Second World War the United States, drawing lessons from its experiences in previous decades, became a member of several regional alliances. The nation’s policy makers recognized that “the common defense” extended beyond our own borders and involved more than our own military forces. For freedom to be enjoyed
by many, it had to be defended by many.
The first of the regional alliances was the Organization of American States
created at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. It was followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established in April 1949. Later, other multilateral and bilateral defense alliances were formed.
The freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of the member states of our alliances are by no means identical. In many the democratic tradition is secure and flourishing. In others, democracy is still in an emerging stage. Nevertheless, key member nations are pledged to democratic principles and to guard fundamental human rights.
A primary task for American leaders remains to foster cooperation with other countries who share or aspire to share our political values and heritage. Ironically, a secondary task, convincing the American people of the need for action in concert with allies, remains difficult. Yet the success of a strategy that leads to stability and prosperity, will depend, in large measure, upon the cooperation between America and other free nations to deal with common problems.
America’s relations with its allies should be accorded highest priority. Insofar as possible, consultation with our allies should result in common policies which equitably share the security burden. In particular, we need close consultation with the nations in NATO about those Third World developments which directly affect the security interests of NATO’s member states.
The Threat of War in Europe
The U.S. struggle with the Soviet Union took on military dimensions with the announcement in 1947 of the Truman Doctrine calling for the defense of Greece and Turkey, and later with the creation of NATO. NATO remains the cornerstone of U.S. security arrangements. The 1949 Treaty of Washington (The NATO Treaty) codified the concept of free world collective security and endowed it with a standing organization for consultation on both political and military affairs.
The Treaty which defined the Alliance’s mission conformed to the realities of the times: the balance between the superiority of Soviet land power and the superiority of U.S. air and sea power.
Any international structure that fulfills its purpose for 35 years must be acclaimed an example of wise statesmanship. Yet a number of developments from the 1960s onward have affected NATO adversely: massive increase in Soviet strategic capabilities; a temporary shift of U.S. attention from NATO to the war in Vietnam; and disagreements on East-West trade and how best to confront Soviet expansionism outside the NATO area.
Most troublesome in recent years has been the military imbalance that has developed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. U.S. Ambassador to NATO, David Abshire, recently challenged NATO over the current imbalance:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries have two and a half times the gross national product of the members of the Warsaw Pact, and over one and a half times the population. Despite these enormous economic and human advantages, over the last nine years the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pack have outproduced the West–sometimes by as much as 7 to 1–in every major weapons category except general purpose naval forces.
NATO’s resolve was severely tested during the four years following its December 1979 dual-track decision to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces, while attempting to negotiate with the Soviets the mutual removal of all land-based missiles. In spite of internal pressures, Soviet diplomatic ploys, and massive disinformation, NATO’s resolve has held firm. Yet NATO’s problems are by no means over.
Although NATO’s Flexible Response strategy needs reinvigorating, it remains as valid today as when first elaborated in 1967. NATO must continue to play the crucial role Flexible Response demands of it. Flexible Response remains a sound concept, but it has yet to be fully implemented.
At their December 1983 meeting, NATO Defense Ministers addressed the need to improve conventional forces. The means to do so are at hand. Newly available technologies, so-called smart weapons and better surveillance techniques, provide ways of reinforcing deterrence, have considerable promise, but they are no panacea. And technology, even the most advanced kind, cannot ignore strategic requirements.
One fact is clear: the interaction in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) is governed by nuclear weapons, which dominate all realistic military scenarios. Exclusively conventional scenarios are detached from reality. This truism is fortunately recognized by NATO governments, which have opposed from the start the “no-first use” school, by which NATO could not leave Soviet planners uncertain as to whether it would respond to their attack with battlefield nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that NATO has the only worthwhile “no-first use” policy–no first use of any weapons, no initiation of war.
New NATO defense technologies will raise substantially the cost of an attack for the Warsaw Pact and could bring about a temporary containment of an attack, if the defensive strategy is managed correctly. Fortunately, NATO commanders have recognized the need to plan for strong offensive actions against the Pact’s follow-on force. If an aggressor is assured that he will not be attacked on his territory, he can devote all resources to aggression and offense.
Political considerations are critical, especially the moral of populations. Many thoughtful people in Europe, deeply worried by what they see as the prospect of war, are drawn to pacifism and to unilateral disarmament, disregarding the lesson of history that one-sided concessions rarely maintain “peace” and frequently lead to war or the loss of personal freedom and nationality.
The Soviets, unconcerned with inconsistencies between words and deeds, are capitalizing on this fear and confusion in European capitals through a massive propaganda and disinformation campaign.
According to Dr. Stephen Haseler, the paralyzing European fear of war “is to be found in an inchoate, often unspoken, but very real belief that the superpower balance of might and will, which has kept the European peace for over thirty years has, if not broken down, then been severely weakened.”1
(See Chapter 15 for further discussion of the impact of Soviet strategic military superiority.)
Whatever NATO decides to do will cost money and, hence, will require authorization from the governments. These governments have asked their peoples to make heavy financial and personal sacrifices. They have allocated around 100 billion
dollars per year to NATO’s defense, and they have called upon millions of their young to serve the alliance. Governmental leaders have not, however, managed to convince their people fully of the value of their sacrifices.
If current attitudes are to be reversed, NATO’s contribution to human freedom must be publicized. Of late, the case for NATO has not been well made by the governments. With slim means, the NATO Secretary General and his aides have sought to tell the story of NATO, but they cannot do this job alone. If freedom is to be preserved, free peoples must pay the price.
Resisting Soviet Power Projection
The Soviet Union, formerly a land power confined to Eurasia, is now projecting its power around the globe through its navy and proxy intervention forces. A look at the changed military balance in Asia, where the U.S. has alliances and friendships of great import, brings home how significant is this Soviet buildup, and thus how important is America’s ability to work with friends and allies in that region. The Soviet Union has dramatically increased its military power in East Asia in the past 15 years. The Pacific fleet has become the USSR’s largest and second strongest. One-fourth of its total military power, 650,00 combat troops, are now deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, supported by 12,000 tanks and 1,600 war planes. In a crass powerplay at the nuclear level, the Soviets recently deployed mobile, triple-MIRVED 22-20s to the Far East.
The Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and South Korea are primarily concerned, however, about Soviet naval forces that maneuver in adjacent waters. The Soviet naval forces include 65 major ships, 70 submarines, and 620 patrol craft.
The increase in Soviet naval strength has forced the U.S. Navy to expand patrols, although force levels are still inadequate. To compensate, Japan has agreed to expand its naval and air patrol radius to 1,000 miles. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces will not have that ability until the late 1980s.
The linking of Japan to either a U.S. security arrangement or a cooperative economic and political arrangement with Beijing is a problem for Soviet planners. Geopolitically, Japan is astride the Soviet exit from Vladivostok to the Pacific. This position gives Japan the potential for blocking Soviet naval passage to the Pacific through the straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima.
Soviet objectives have been to detach Japan from her security arrangement with the U.S., to prevent closer Sino-Japanese ties, and to exploit Japanese technology for Soviet economic development. Japan is a primary source of Soviet access to free world technology. Japanese opinion polls, however, identify the Soviet Union as the least-liked nation in the world.
The growth in North Korea’s military capability remains a critical issue. As far back as 1979, analysts realized that Pyongyang’s main forces along the demilitarized zone were supported by rear echelon strength, mirroring Soviet patterns of forces in depth. The possibility of Kim II Sung starting another war to unify Korea cannot be ruled out. The best way to prevent that is for the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in the Republic of Korea and for Japan to support generously South Korea’s military modernization program.
As might be expected American efforts to reassert its power in the Pacific after its
withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 has met with strong Soviet criticism. In particular, U.S. efforts to encourage stronger Japanese defense capabilities have led Soviet commentators to denounce this move as aggressive and based on “the myth” of Soviet military expansion in the Pacific.
American and Soviet programs for power projection form competing military and political infrastructures. The U.S. network, as we have seen, is peculiarly dependent on maintaining friendly political relations to compensate for the massive Soviet military strength. These relations are less precise and reliable than those of NATO or even Organization of American States (OAS). Perceived uncertainties in these relations are a source of anxiety in the Asian theater. Yet, the political orientation and the economic promise of free Southeast and East Asian states make them natural strategic allies for the United States. While at present, the PRC cannot be classified as an ally it remains a powerful enemy of our main adversary. It is in our interest that the PRC remain independent and capable of opposing Soviet expansionism.
Looking toward the future, the U.S. should continue to (1) encourage Japan to fulfill its pledge to safeguard the sea area within a thousand miles of its shores, (2) encourage greater Japanese-Republic of Korea security cooperation, (3) aid in the modernization of South Korea’s military forces, and (4) provide prudent assistance to the PRC to improve its forces without expecting the PRC to safeguard American interests.
Helping Fight Communist Insurgencies
A third order of U.S. relationships with friends is with those usually small Third World states threatened by Communist subversion. In these cases, political obligations are less binding than in the U.S. alliance system, as for example NATO. Yet in a sense our moral obligation is no less. The reality is that the Soviets have most frequently sought to shift the balance of power–on the cheap, as it were–by aggression against small Third World countries.
Soviet penetration of Latin America, for instance, is not merely the result of Cuban involvement, but is the product of long range planning. The Soviets began cultivating the region in the 1920s when the first Latins arrived at the Lenin school in Moscow. After receiving training in subversion and guerilla warfare, they were sent home to recruit and train others. Guerrilla warfare is now commonplace throughout the region.
The Soviets’ major breakthrough was Castro’s takeover of Cuba in 1959. Upon seizing power, Castro quickly merged the July 26th movement with leftist political elements and formed a new Cuban Communist Party. Soviet interest grew as Castro adopted increasingly anti-American policies and rhetoric. The failure of the U.S. Bay of Pigs intervention of April 16, 1961 provided the Soviets the opportunity to cement Cuban-Soviet relations, which led the next year to the Cuban missile crisis.
The inability of Washington and much of Latin America to recognize Castro’s political objectives created public confusion and policy distortion. The issue is important, for the Soviet success in Cuba and later in Nicaragua resulted partially from a
failure by the U.S. to understand the tactics of Castro and the Sandinistas and the support
rendered by Moscow.
Bolstered by the success in Nicaragua, Castro increased aid to the El Salvadoran guerrillas after the leadership of the various revolutionary groups put aside their ideological differences and formed the United Revolutionary Directorate. The newly created DRU began planning for the campaign of 1981, including the abortive “Final Offensive” in January of that year.
The pressure in El Salvador has continued, but the election of Napoleon Duarte in May 1984 may prove a turning point. Duarte has pledged to bring the Army under control; and if he obtains adequate U.S. assistance, he should be able to force the insurgents to give up. There is no good reason why democratic reform should not now win in El Salvador. The United States is definitely on the side of the vast majority of the people. The present government is more open and responsive to the needs of the people than any in El Salvador for many years.
U.S. actions in El Salvador support its interests throughout the Western Hemisphere and are consistent with the historic Monroe Doctrine. Although the Monroe Doctrine has not been adhered to in recent years, its goals deserve reiteration:
We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
Perhaps most important, it is consistent with and required under U.S. commitments under the 1947 Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the 1948 Treaty of Bogata (Charter for the Organization of American States) which specifically and legally commit all signers to help defend all the Americas against Communist aggression.
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America reported in January 1984 that the Central American “crisis will not wait. There is no time to lose.” It recommended a long-term national strategy formulated “in a nonpartisan spirit and in a bipartisan way.” The commission concluded that “the future of Central America depends in large part on what happens in El Salvador.”
El Salvador’s leaders have begun one of the most revolutionary land reforms in all Latin America. They have even offered an amnesty for guerrillas and their sympathizers. In March 1982, 1.3 million Salvadorans elected a Constituent Assembly which wrote, debated, and approved a modern constitution. That constitution provides for a democratic political system accountable to the people.
The basic U.S. policy toward Central America is sound. The problems lie in inadequate funding, poor implementation, a poorly informed American public, and hence a lack of consensus between the executive and legislative branches of our Government. U.S. policy toward Central America will test America’s credibility. The President on the one hand must convince the American people that he is acting in their best interests. On
the other, he must convince the people of Central America that in acting to improve their well being, he is not trying to impose the U.S. will upon them.
Thus it is imperative that the United States start the reversal of the Soviet Peace Zone-War Zone strategy by joining with other like-minded countries in the Americas in declaring that the Western Hemisphere is the Peace Zone of the Americas. This partnership in establishing the Peace Zone of the Americas would be simply another way of describing the specific and legal commitment of the United States and most other countries in the Western hemisphere to defend the Americas against Communist aggression, as expressed in the 1947 Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the 1948 Treaty of Bogota (Charter for the Organization of American States).
Among other things, this will involve systematic consultation and collaboration between leaders at every level and day-to-day cooperation on the execution of programs. It will involve joint support of freedom fighters. The long-range objective of this effort should be no less than a Western hemisphere free of Communist dictatorships.
Although the price of staying the course may seem steep to some people, the price of failure will surely be greater. If the Soviets–pouring thousands of tons of military equipment into Nicaragua and El Salvador–succeed in taking over Central America through proxy forces, the United States and all other countries of the Americas will lose prestige and influence throughout the world.
Finally, we must not act half-heartedly or in piece-meal fashion. The real danger lies in not taking decisive action with sufficient means. Staying the course, despite fluctuations in popular support, is a major problem with foreign policy in a democracy. The President’s ability to deal with this factor may well determine the outcome of this conflict. To quote from the bipartisan Commission’s report: “We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists, and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.”
1. Stephen Haseler, “The Euromissile Crisis,” Commentary, May 1983, p. 30.
PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH RESOLUTION
The following resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 8, 1983 as Senate Concurrent Resolution 15 with 54 co-sponsors. It was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on March 9, 1983 as House Concurrent Resolution 83 with 195 co-sponsors.
It has been passed by 13 State legislatures: Alabama (1981); Arizona (1982); California (1981); Colorado (1980); Delaware (1981); Indiana (1982); Kansas (1981); Louisiana (1981); Mississippi (1981); Nebraska (1980); Nevada (1983); Tennessee (1982); and Texas (1981).
It has been passed by one House of 5 state legislatures: Illinois House (1982), Kentucky Senate (1982), Massachusetts Senate (1981), New Hampshire Senate (1982) and Virginia Senate (1982).
SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 15
Whereas the Soviet Union has exploited the United States peace initiatives in order to build up Soviet strategic and conventional warfare capabilities;
Whereas these capabilities have given the Soviet Union the means to support worldwide aggression of an increasingly bold nature;
Whereas there is a basis for concern that the Soviets may use these capabilities in armed aggression in Pakistan, Iran, and Yugoslavia;
Whereas the Soviet Union has demonstrated an unwillingness to live by the principles of international law;
Whereas the United States is the one world power that can stop Soviet expansionism: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) That it is the sense of the Congress that the national security policy of the United States should reflect a national strategy of peace through strength, the general principles and goals of which would be–
1) To inspire, focus and unite the national will and determination to achieve peace and freedom;
2) To achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union;
3) To Create a strategic defense and a civil defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected;
4) To accept no arms control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States or its allies, or locks the U.S. into a position of military inferiority;
5) To reestablish effective security and intelligence capabilities;
6) To pursue positive non-military means to roll back the growth of Communism;
7) To help our allies and other non-Communist countries defend themselves against Communist aggression; and
8) To maintain a strong economy and protect our overseas sources of energy and other vital raw materials.